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Sino Japanese war from 1931 to 1945 Information and source

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发表于 8/19/2017 09:39:19 | 显示全部楼层 |阅读模式
Sino Japanese war from 1931 to 1945 Information and source


by Thomas G Guo


"Future historians will, I believe, regard our War of Resistance as the most significant event in this period of world history, since by our enormous sacrifices we are contributing not only to the good of the Chinese nation but also to the welfare of all mankind. From now on, however, we must struggle even harder and must be ready for even greater sacrifices, in order that justice may be accomplished. The aims of our struggle are simple and clear. If we succeed we shall not only be able to build a new China but we shall also contribute immeasurably to the peace of the world."
— Chiang Kai-Shek, Address to the nation on the 27th anniversary of the Republic of China, 10/10/1938
the first Soviet credits, negotiated in 1938, were for $100 million; another credit, arranged in July 1939, was for $150 million. tens of thousands of tons of munitions from the USSR to China. Moscow dispatched five air wings of Soviet planes and pilots to help in the Chinese defense, also assigned military advisers and technicians to the National Government. Soviet planes played a more important role, helping to protect Hankou, Chongqing, Chengdu, and Lanzhou against Japanese air raids. a reinforced brigade of Soviet troops 8th regiment in Chinese uniforms at Hami, blocked any Japanese thrust westward into Central Asia. (O. Edmund Clubb 1964: 220)
From Datong ran into unexpectedly heavy resistance from a Communist force holding the strategic pass of Pingxingguan. that was the communists' first brush with the enemy against whom they had declared war in 1932, and they acquitted themselves creditably(O.Edmund Clubb 222)
In Taierzhuang, Li zongren had laid a trap, counter-attacking heavily, in April 1938, announce a smashing victory over the enemy, claim that two famous Japanese divisions had been wiped out, with seven thousand dead, was exaggerated, but no doubt that the defenders had scored, and the Japanese had suffered a severe reverse(O.Edmund Clubb 224).
After Wuhan, Japanese undertook no further major military operations in China for six years. according to Japanese figures, as of October 1938, the Chinese had suffered some eight hundred thousand dead in battle, as compared with about fifty thousand Japanese killed. the figures open to challenge, however(O.Edmund Clubb 226)
On November 12, 1938 The Chinese
In 1931, at the first All China Congress held in Ruijing, the communist pledged that " the Chinese soviet Republic categorically and unconditionally recognizes the right of national minorities to self-determination. which means Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang and others where the majority of the population belongs to non Chinese nationalities... they ... shall have the right to determine for themselves whether they wish to leave the Chinese soviet Republic and create their own independent state(Harry G. Gelber 2007: 273)
Mao argued for a two front conflict against both the GMD and the Japanese; what he really wanted was that the Japanese and the GMD fight each other, leaving the CCP as ultimate winner. He certainly made various attempts to use the Japanese to weaken the Nationalists( Harry G. Gelber 275)
in July 7, 1937, The Tokyo government did not want war and passed off the incident...there was a local agreement by the two sides at Beijing, but Jiang rejected it, believing that Japan was internationally isolated and China getting stronger. with his best German-trained divisions he attacked Japanese forces near Shanghai, 60 percent were killed or wounded(Harry Gelber 279).
Nanjing Massacre, several weeks of murder, rape, looting and arson by Japanese troops. the exact number of victims remains uncertain, some accounts seems exaggerated. the Chinese delegate to the league of Nations at the time put the civilian toll at 20000. A communist Chinese newspaper put it at 42000. One American witness, Miner Searle Bates estimated that 12000 civilians and 28000 soldiers had died, while another witness put the toll at 50-60000. Modern China alleges that 300000 or more were killed(Harry Gelber 280)
Jiang wanted American lend-lease equipment not to fight the Japanese but to protect his own government against any post-war rebellion(Harry Gelber 287). Stilwell concluded that the nationalist leaders were just " a gang of thugs with the one idea of perpetuating themselves and their machine". Jiang did indeed see all alliances as temporary and tactical, his permanent aim being to stay in power so as to unify and restore China.
Churchill's instinctive response to Pearl Harbor was right: " so we had won after all!" after which he "slept the sleep of the saved and the thankful."
the more US officials saw, the more they were impressed by evidence that the Communists were actually fighting the Japanese( Harry Gelber 305)
Harry Truman, was even less sympathetic to the Nationalists, whom he regarded as thoroughly dishonest. he told an interviewer: "they are all thieves, every damned one of them. They stole 750 million out of the billions that we sent to China. they stole it, and it's invested in real estate down in San Paulo and some right here in New York. "
“From 1937 to 1945, there were 23 battles where both sides employed at least a regiment each. The CCP was not a main force in any of these. The only time it participated, it sent a mere 1,000 to 1,500 men, and then only as a security detachment on one of the flanks. There were 1,117 significant engagements on a scale smaller than a regular battle, but the CCP fought in only one. Of the approximately 40,000 skirmishes, just 200 were fought by the CCP, or 0.5 percent.”
From 1937 to 1941 when China fought alone, China engaged between 500000 to 700000 enemy troops in China proper roughly half of the total Japanese strength, in addition to the 200000 to 700000 Guangdong Army in Manchuria. At the end of the war 1945, 1.2 million out of a total .2.3 million overseas Japanese armed forces were tied down in China. the China campaigns consumed 35 percent of total Japanese war expenditures US$ 12 billion out of a total $34 billion, and resulted in 396040 Japanese killed and a much larger number wounded(Young, Arthur N. China and the Helping Hand, 1937-1945(Cambridge, Mass., 1963) 417-18). China mobilized 14 million men, sustained total casualties of 3211419, including 1319958 killed, 1761355 wounded, and 130126 missing, and incurred an awesome war debt of Ch$1,464 billion( Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Tsung-tung mi-lu ( Secret memoirs of President Chiang) tr. from the Japanese by Central Daily News, Vol.I ( Taipei, 1974) 131).
The Chinese Communist Party’s role in defeating Japan, in saving China from its century of humiliation. Xi Jingping credited the CCP with spearheading the movement to unite all of China’s people in opposition to Japan. To him, the deciding factors in the war were the ‘great national spirit’ of the Chinese people — particularly, their patriotism — and the leadership of the CCP.” Xi’s saying in a Xinhua news report on July 31 that "efforts should be made to have China's contribution to the world anti-fascist war recognized globally".Xi called for cross-strait collaboration in highlighting China's contributions, Nanjing University observer David Arase said it reflects the leadership's belief that "a historical myth of KMT-CCP unity during WWII would help the cause of bringing Taiwan under Beijing's authority". China is hoping a greater awareness of its victory could help boost nationalism and, in turn, the CCP's legitimacy.
Mao brought his Autumn Harvest Uprisings troops 600 into the isolated Jinggan Mountains in October 1927, ordered some landlords killed, buttressed his strength by joining forces with two tough bandit chieftains, Mao written about these people : " they can be divided into soldiers, bandits, robbers, beggars, and prostitutes ...soldier fights the bandit robs, the thief steals, the beggar begs,, and the prostitute seduces". Mao added, "these people are capable of fighting very bravely, and if properly led, can become a revolutionary force"(Spence 386. quoted at Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung ( New York, 1972) pp.245-46.
Germany General Hans von Seeckt, visited China second time in the summer of 1934, pointed out that the arms currently being made in China were "from 75 to 90 percent unusable " in a modern army such as the one he envisaged(Spence 396). China enter a secret treaty with Germany in August 1934, starting with a credit of DM 100 million, to obtain an iron and steel complex, ore procession machinery, and modern arsenals from Germany.
In Wuhan, on Oct 25, 1938, the Japanese took over the ravaged area have sustained 200000 casualties and lost more than 100 planes( Spence 425)
Jiang actually served only as the presiding coordinator of a loose federation of forces. A parliament like body of 200 members, the People's Political Council, help formulate policy, GMD 80 of the 200 sits, independents held 70 seats, and 50 seats to the communists and other small political parties( Spence 434).
In August 1939, Mao greeted the Hitler-Stalin pact as a positive step that would frustrate the plans of the French and British "international reactionary bourgeoisie" and would " deal a blow against the Chinese capitulators. (Spence 435. Robert North, Moscow and Chinese communists ( Stanford University press 1963)pp.185-87.
On 20 August to 10 September 1940 the communists launched a series of attacks against Japanese strong points, roads, and railways in northern China. "hundred Regiments Offensive, 104 regiments of CCP affiliated troops were involved at different times. Japanese did suffer heavy losses, then launched shattering counterattacks, immense cruelty, eighth route army lost 100000 men to death, wounds, or desertion( Spence 439).
In Yangzi delta, jurisdictions of GMD regular units, local militia, gangs of stragglers and deserters form regular units, and member of Green Gang and other criminal organizations. GMD generals in the area had been steadily trying to get them to comply with orders to move north. Nationalist troops trying to enforce the order suffered a serious defeat(Spence 439). New fourth army around 3000 of the communist troops were killed. many more were shot after arrest or taken off to prison camps.
In early 1940, Moscow's pledge to recognize the "territorial integrity" of Manchukuo. The CCP responded to this new blow with brave words: "we must return all the lost land of China. we must fight our way to the Yalu River and drive the Japanese imperialists out of China."(Spence )
The Chinese army was indeed playing a crucial role in the Allied effort, tying down about two-fifths of all the forces available to the Japanese. Hong Kong fell swiftly, Singapore had been regarded as an impregnable bastion that the Japanese would never dare attack, and its fall on feb 15, 1942, after only a day's fighting, and the surrender of its 130000 garrison troops. permanently damaged Britain's weakened reputation with the Chinese(Spence 445)
it was estimated that of 1.67 million Chinese men drafted for active service in 1943, 44 percent deserted or died on the way to join their units. those draftees who died before seeing combat between 1937 to 1945 numbered 1.4 million.(Spence 453)
Winston Churchill never had much faith in China, wrote that to consider it still as one of the Big Four was "an absolute farce". China's grotesque military failures in the Ichigo battles. Meeting at Yalta in Feb 1945, Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill made no attempt to fill Jiang in on the momentous decisions they made(Spence 457).
What is shameless fake hero? ! If Xi really has little knowledge of historical truth, or totally ignorance about the CCP's history, then he is a stupid fool, otherwise, he is malice and shameless liar.
On September 11, 1931, Jiang Jieshi warned the Young Marshal not to engage the Japanese, and on September 15, the bulk of the Northeastern forces at Mukden were transferred. On September 18, the Young Marshal again asked for instructions from Peking, and was told once more not to resist. Deeply embroiled in civil strife, Jiang could not afford a foreign war. He decided to appeal to the League of Nations(Immanuel Hsu 549). Ma Zhangshan general, the governor of Heilongjiang, who heroically resisted the enemy in spite of all the odds against him, inspired the rise of local militia and righteous volunteer(Hsu 550).
on the night of September 18, 1931, The Japanese consul tried to remonstrate, but was silenced when one of the officers drew his sward. while the majority of the cabinet in Tokyo was urging restraint, and the Chinese and Americans requested the League of Nations to call for an end to the fighting, the Tokyo chief of staff sent ambiguous messages to his Manchurian forces. Jiang who faced a crisis among his supporters because of his recent arrest of Hu Hanmin, could no afford another Large scale conflict, Instead he ordered Zhang Xueliang not to risk his troops in pitched battles and to withdrew them south of the Great Wall( Spence Jonathan 1999. 369-70)
In Shanghai on January 28, 1932 army fought back with remarkable courage and tenacity. and the determined defense of Ma Zhanshan in Heilongjiang army renewed foreigners' respect for China’s fighting capabilities(Spence Jonathan 371).
On November 7, 1931 the CCP set up a Soviet in Ruijing.
The communists discovered that the mutineers were more anti-Jiang than anti-Japanese, and come to the conclusion that any large scale Nationalist attack would inevitably involve the communist and hurt their cause ( Immanuel Hus 565) Nonsense again!
in 1937. The Western Allies were wobbly over Hitler and Czechoslovakia, to say nothing of China, the Soviets were in the middle of Stalin's purges, and the US was still isolationist and FDR was in the middle of implementing the Second New Deal. The Germans, oddly enough, had significant trade routes with China until 1938, when the Japanese forced them out of it as a precondition for joining the Axis Powers against the Soviet Union. Major leaders in Chiang's government defected in hopes of forming a collaborationist regime and buying time for peace, but the Japanese had no real use for them, and continued to dream of a broader Japanese-led pan-Asian empire.
The Second Sino-Japanese War was, right behind the Soviet-German War, the biggest and most costly war in human history. It was also the largest war ever fought in Asia, leaving some 15-30 million Chinese military and civilian dead note — and just short of half a million Japanese military dead.
Although China now makes frequent calls for Japanese contrition, however, Mao Zedong declined Tokyo's offer of an apology in 1972, saying that CCP was grateful for the Japanese encroachment that cost 17-22 million Chinese lives. "If your Imperial Army hadn't invaded half of China," Mao told Japanese diplomats, "... the CCP would not have been able to seize political power."
Communist China emphasized its own grass-roots patriotism and independence from the Soviets, also seeking to play up the — actually very marginal — actions of Maoists during the war. They also had to avoid mentioning the details of the actual war's conduct, since that would inevitably mean mentioning the Guomindang and the Warlords. This meshed well thematically with Communist China's other propaganda portraying all historical processes as being the product of grassroots peasant-proletarian struggle. While they were able to write the Warlords out of the war's history, they never felt able to completely deny the Guomindang's involvement and so instead worked to portray them as having been hopelessly corrupt, immoral, fascist, un-patriotic, traitorous puppets of the Americans. Of course, these criticisms had some basis in fact.
Historian Hu Dekun, in an Aug 5, 2015 commentary in the party-run Guangming Daily, argues that China deserves more respect abroad for its role in resisting fascism. "It's not fair that the country hasn't received due respect and has become a forgotten ally," wrote Mr Hu, who is president of the Chinese Research Association of Second World War History.He added that "China's efforts forced Japan and Germany to fight battles independently of each other and to fail to cooperate strategically, giving the Allies an upper hand".Oxford University historian Rana Mitter, author of Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945, believes China's contributions are under-appreciated.
Secretary of War Henry Stimson told Roosevelt that "the brilliant resistance to aggression which the Chinese have made and are making and their contribution to the common cause , deserve the fullest support we can give". Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull were determined to make China one of the Big Four despite British and Soviet opposition(Immanuel Hus 601).
In Cairo Conference in November 1943, Jiang's request for the prompt return of all lost territories won Roosevelt's endorsement and was later subscribed to by Churchill and Stalin. Roosevelt give China a high place in the future United Nations organization. Complete restoration of Chinese territories lost to Japan(Immanuel Hus 602)
Stalin agreed to enter the war against Japan within three months after Germany's defeat, on the condition that all former Russian rights violated by the Japanese attack in 1904, as well as Russian privileges in Manchuria, be restored to the Soviet Union. Dalian and Port Arthur, the Chinese eastern railway and the southern Manchurian railway, and support of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. Many of the conditions touched upon the sovereignty of China. Roosevelt did not drive a hard bargain at Yalta, but sign away Chinese sovereign rights in Manchuria without authorization. British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden maintained that there was no need to pay Russia such a high price for intervention since it would probably enter the war on its own anyway. but his advice against signing the Yalta agreement was overruled by Churchill, who desired to manifest his faith in the President's judgment and to safeguard British interests in the Far East(Immanuel Hus 608)
The United States was the first to enter into an equal and friendly tariff agreement with China on July 24, 1928, followed swiftly by Germany, Belgium, Italy, Britain, France, and Japan. recognized China's tariff autonomy and agreed in principle to give up their consular jurisdiction(Immanuel Hus 567)
Mao said "our fixed policy should be 70 percent expansion, 20 percent dealing with the GMD, and 10 percent resisting Japan"(Immanuel Hus 589).
this statement has been quoted frequently. see [12] Keiji Furuya, Chiang Kai-shek, Hislife and Times. Translated by Chun-ming Chang (St.John’s University press 1981) p.47. F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern CHina, 1924-1929 (Princeton 1956, 206; Jiang Jieshi, Soviet Russia in China: A summing up at seventy ( New York, 1957, 85; and Arthur N. Young, CHina and the Helping hand, 1937-1945( Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 58.
In 1970, Mao told American journalist Edgar Snow that"Those Japanese were real good. Without Japanese's help, China's [Communist] revolution would not have succeeded. I said the same thing to a Japanese, a capitalist, by the name of nanxiang sanlang(?).He kept on saying: 'Sorry, we did invade China' I said to him: 'Don't say that, on the contrary, Japanese helped us (Communist) in a big way', especially Japanese warlords and the Japanese Emperor." When Japan prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, tried apologizing to Mao in January 1961 for the Japanese invasion of China, “Mao assured him that it was the ‘help’ of the Japanese invasion that made the communist victory and this visit between communist and Japanese leaders possible.”Furthermore, Mao said to Japan Prime Minister Takuei in Nanjing in 1972 that "(Japan) doesn't have to say sorry, you had contributed towards China, why? Because had Imperial Japan did not start the war of invasion, how could we communist became mighty powerful? How could we stage the coup d'état? How could we defeat Chiang Kai Shek? How are we going to pay back you guys? No, we do not want your war reparations!" Mao Zedong declined Tokyo's offer of an apology in 1972, saying that CCP was grateful for the Japanese encroachment that cost 17-22 million Chinese lives. "If your Imperial Army hadn't invaded half of China," Mao told Japanese diplomats, "... the CCP would not have been able to seize political power."
A united front of all Chinese against Japan became the Moscow line in the summer of 1935 in order to combat the rise of fascism in Europe and Japanese aggression in the East.Mao came out for a united front in China against the Japanese but excluding Jiang. In the spring of 1936 a Comintern directive ordered Mao to join a united front with Jiang. Zhou Enlai went to Shanghai to negotiate the terms(John K.Fairbank and Merle Goldman 1998. 310)
Mao mapped out a three stage strategy about the United Front: first to achieve a compromise with the GMT in order to safeguard the existence of the CCP; second, to struggle for parity with the GMT; and third, to infiltrate into central China and build up a new base from which to launch a counterattack and seize the supreme power of state(Immanuel Hus 589)
On August 13 the Japanese opened a second front in Shanghai, to destroy Jiang's economic capacity for war( Immanuel Hus 583).
The CCP issued on September 22, 1937, "Together we confront the national crisis: 1. the CCP will struggle to fulfill completely Sun's three people's principles which best answer China's needs today; 2. will abolish the policy of sabotage and sovietization which airms at the overthrow of the GMD government, and will stop the forcible confiscation of the holdings of landlords. 3. will abolish all existing soviets in favor of democratic government, so as to achieve unified political administration through out the country. 4.will abolish the name and insignia of the red arm, which will be reorganized as the national revolutionary army and is to be subject to control by the government's military commission; it is ready to march forward and fight the Japanese at he front.
In Xuzhou in April 1938, Li Zongren fought a brilliant battle, luring the Japanese army into a trap and killing as many as 30000, of its combat troops proving to the world that with inspired leadership and good weapons the Chinese could hold their own( Spence 424)
It was only after the 2005 historic meeting between then-Chinese President Hu Jintao and then-KMT chairman Lien Chan that China began to acknowledge KMT's role.Peking University's North-east Asian expert Wang Dong said "China's own complicated and oftentimes tumultuous history" is a factor behind the lower regard for its WWII contributions.
In all, approximately four-million Japanese troops were tied-down in the Kwangtung Army’s China campaign. In the last chapter of this detailed tome, Mitter avers that if China had capitulated in 1938, as was a serious possibility, Japan’s imperial ambitions would have been significantly enhanced. A pacified China would have encouraged Japan to invade British India and made their victory much easier.
In 1970, Mao told American journalist Edgar Snow that"Those Japanese were real good. Without Japanese's help, China's [Communist] revolution would not have succeeded. I said the same thing to a Japanese, a capitalist, by the name of nanxiang sanlang(?).He kept on saying: 'Sorry, we did invade China' I said to him: 'Don't say that, on the contrary, Japanese helped us (Communist) in a big way', especially Japanese warlords and the Japanese Emperor." When Japan prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, tried apologizing to Mao in January 1961 for the Japanese invasion of China, “Mao assured him that it was the ‘help’ of the Japanese invasion that made the communist victory and this visit between communist and Japanese leaders possible.”Furthermore, Mao said to Japan Prime Minister Takuei in Nanjing in 1972 that "(Japan) doesn't have to say sorry, you had contributed towards China, why? Because had Imperial Japan did not start the war of invasion, how could we communist became mighty powerful? How could we stage the coup d'état? How could we defeat Chiang Kai Shek? How are we going to pay back you guys? No, we do not want your war reparations!"
In Japan, where history is distorted by hardline right- wind leaders, in China distorting history is the CCP official policy, where much worse than Japanese. Meanwhile, taking the correct view of history is illegal — which is why books like Who is the New China? Tombstone, Mao's unknown Story, Mao's Private Life, Red Memory-stone, and a large number of historical works are banned.
One disheartening episode is the destruction of the Huayuankou dam of Zhengzhou to prevent the Japanese from taking the major river port of Wuhan. It is a decision nobody should have to make - to sacrifice over 500,000 civilians, or to lose the city immediately and lose millions more? Jiang gave the order to blow up the dam, but lost the city a few weeks later than usual.
After December 1941, the Western Allies began their role in the Pacific Conflict. The American military chief of staff in China, Joseph 'Vinegar Joe' Stillwell, openly hated Chiang, and the two could not cooperate at all. The 'Europe First' policy adopted by the Western Allies was an upset to Chiang, and he felt bitter over being treated as a lesser partner in the Allies. The situation deteriorated further, with increasing abuses of power by his secret police, and the near total collapse of agriculture and massive famines.
In general, the Japanese rulers initially thought that they could win the war against China very quickly. In a memorandum to the emperor, Japanese Arm Minister Hajime Sugiyama predicted that the war could be wound up in a month or so. They regarded China as "a split and weak country which could not possibly be reunified; and which would surrender as soon as Japan showed an uncompromising stand." By the end of 1937, Japan had sent to the Chinese battle front 16 divisions with a total of more than 600,000 soldiers, equivalent to two-thirds of the military strength of the Japanese army, which consisted of 24 divisions with a total of 950,000 soldiers. The Japanese troops were enormously proud of their success in. taking over Nanjing on l3 December 1937.In some areas, instead of fighting Japanese army, CCP used the chance to fight KMT army. And the Japanese army indirectly helped the CCP to get power in China.
During the 3-month Songhai campaign in 1937, Japan, faced with the tenacious resistance of the Chinese people, was forced to send in reinforcements again and again, and the Japanese troops engaged in the campaign exceeded 200,000, with more than 40,000 casualties.
In autumn of 1938, Japan launched the Wuhan campaign and the Guangzhou campaign in an ambitious attempt to wind up the war quickly. The Japanese threw nearly 380,000 troops into the battle in Wuhan. While the campaign was under way, the deputy chief of the Japanese general staff headquarters showed his worries: "The situation would be very unfavorable to Japan if we were simply dragged into the interior of China, without any hope of progress. If we have a look at the situation at home, we can find that the abnormal antiwar feeling has been gaining ground as the people are demoralized and the unemployed are faced with difficulties in their daily life. If such a situation continues, we will gradually fall into a predicament." By the end of the Wuhan campaign and the Guangzhou campaign, Japan had thrown into China a total of 24 divisions with about 1 million soldiers. Thus the Japanese troops had turned out in full force, with only a guard division stationed in Japan proper. After that, the Japanese troops could no longer take the offensive but were forced to shift to a protracted war strategy.
China, which has repeatedly urged Japan to face up to its past, says Japanese troops slaughtered 300,000 people in the 1937 in Nanjing. A postwar Allied tribunal put the death toll at 142,000.
Jiang was not uniquely incompetent, as Stilwell and the American Experience in China by Barbara Tuchman describes him, but forced to make impossible decisions with no real expectation of help. Mitter makes it clear that he was no saint, but forced into a worse situation than almost any other Allied leader in the war. Jiang was recognized by the outside world and the Japanese as being the “ruler” of unoccupied China. Chiang is indeed a controversial figure, often criticized, berated, misunderstood, and whose country was oftentimes not worthy of strategic consideration by her major Allies: Britain, United States and USSR. The Nationalists under Chiang's command continued their lonely and weary struggle to contain the Japanese incursion into China (US air force was based in China but was more symbolic and did not join in the fighting). Chiang was not perfect by any means, but he was persistent, hard-working and determined to fight to the end at all costs.
Chiang-Kai Shek, whose Nationalist Party, the Kuomintang—-a coalition of war lords and diverse Republican political interests—-waved the banner of Sun Yat-Sen’s republican principles. Seen in the West as corrupt and manipulative, Chiang was a visionary and a competent military leader whose single-minded focus on creating a nation and defeating the Japanese was the glue that held China together against the onslaught. Chiang was ruthless and made some extremely controversial decisions to prevent Japanese victory, among them blowing up the Yellow River dams and flooding central China, thus drowning hundreds of thousands but retarding the Japanese advance. Peter
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now portrays itself as victorious against Japan, but in reality it was fairly inconsequential throughout the war. During the war Mao allied himself with the Nationalists against Japan, but it was the Nationalists who did the heavy lifting. As the CCP gained strength, they broke with the Nationalists. While Chiang was holding the country together, Mao was biding time and building strength.
the Nationalist troops valiantly fought against the Japanese invaders, while on the other to appropriately honoring the critical importance that Mao’s vision and force of personality played in ultimately unifying China and creating the groundwork for the resurgent China of the 21st Century.
While as an historian I was aware of the shameful way China had been repeatedly treated throughout the 19th century by Western powers, I did not realize before reading this book how poorly China was often treated even as an ally of the Western powers during World War II. The following passage from Forgotten Ally [pp. 243-44] provides but one example. grag
General Joseph Stilwell – repeatedly clashed with Chiang Kai-shek, placing his own judgment as to the appropriate use of Chinese troops before those of the Chinese leader. He even came to despise Kai-shek, referring to him privately as “the Peanut.” (In reading about Stilwell I often winced, for he seemed to embody one of the types of “ugly Americans” who have so often annoyed other cultures –an arrogant, self-righteous individual who was unaware that he was, in fact, not nearly as bright as he thought he was.) grag
Mao’s attempts to erase Chongqing’s part in the war, even though it was the capital of a victorious nation, resulted in a major city and region not given a chance to reflect and mourn publicly, nor hold its head in honor. Martin
Chiang was always the illegitimate stepchild of the Allies, not invited to major gatherings like Yalta, made a joke by Churchill calling him “Cash My-Check”, or stood up by Stalin who declined to attend Cairo. However, he was a bona fide world leader, regardless of what view you take of him.Martin.
The book gives credit to Jiang's efforts, albeit flawed, troubled, and controversial, in trying to save China, and perhaps rest of Asia, from Japanese imperialism.
Mao did not contribute heavily to the War of Resistance, instead leaving the Nationalists to lead the protracted battle on their own. Mao used his time wisely at his base in Yan'an, conserving his energy, writing up his political doctrine and thoughts, mobilizing his troops and rallying up peasant support by stirring up nationalism in the face of Japanese imperialism, and antagonism, in the face of corrupt and inept Nationalist policies contributing to society's ills, all of which helped contribute to his rise to power and victory over the Nationalists (Kuomingtang) in 1949. by Lynda
Germany, which has always had a special affinity for China, and which would have made a terrific ally for the dragon if it weren’t for its alliance with Japan. The Soviet Union, by contrast, was not a great ally for China, and could offer some arms but nothing by way of moral support.
In the main, the Chinese people had resisted the Japanese aggressors on their own during the period from 7 July 1937 to 3 September 1939. Those big powers including Britain, France, and the United States, which joined the antifascist alliance later, had not taken part in the resistance but adopted an appeasement policy toward Japan in that period. The Soviet Union had observed neutrality since its policy of collective security had been boycotted by Britain and France.
During the period from 1939 to the south Anhui incident in January 1941, the Japanese and anticommunist KMT troops launched converging attacks against the Communist Party and army. As the expansion of the Communist army in the enemy's rear area was a fatal threat to the Japanese aggressors, they launched mopping-up operations one after another. Chalmers A. Johnson, in his book Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: the Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945, concludes that "The importance of [Japanese mopping up] campaigns to the growth and entrenchment of the Communist movement cannot be overstated."
The 8th Route Army launched the Hundred Regiment Campaign on 20 August 1940. During this 3-1/2-month large-scale campaign, the 8th Route Army fought a total of 1,824 big and small battles, inflicted 20,645 casualties upon the Japanese troops, destroyed such major railways as the Zhengding-Taiyuan railway, the Beiping-Hankou railway, the Datong-Puzhou railway, and the Beiping-Guisui railways, as well as many highways in Hebei and Shanxi Provinces, rooted up 2,993 strongholds of the enemy and puppet troops, and recovered 40-50 counties.
The CCP did everything in its power to avoid antagonising Japan or her puppet regimes and did its best to undermine Guomindang and other independent guerilla groups behind Japanese lines, using their network of spies and sympathisers to tell the occupation forces who they were and where to find them (while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding looking like they were directly fighting non-CCP Chinese resistance groups). Only recently has the People's Republic of China begun to admit that The Guomindang actually did anything at all to fight the Japanese, though it still maintains that the CCP did the brunt of the fighting when in fact they did none at all. except when Stalin bullied them into committing forces (in the short-lived 'hundred regiments offensive') to save the Guomindang's hide in 1940, when the latter was on the verge of collapse.
In December 1941, Japan could send to the southern front (namely, Southeast Asia and Pacific) no more than l0 divisions and 3 composite brigades, which accounted for about 20 percent of the ground forces of the Japanese army. The main Japanese mainforce was trapped in China -- the Japanese army's China headquarters were in command of 21 divisions, l cavalry unit, and 20 composite brigades; in addition, the 4th Division directly under the general headquarters was stationed in Shanghai, and the Kwantung army headquarters, which were in command of 13 divisions and 24 composite brigades, were in charge of guarding against the Soviet Union and the Chinese anti-Japanese Northeastern United Army.
The 8th Route Army and the New 4th Army underwent the most difficult period of their struggle in 1941-1942. The liberation zones began to recover gradually and managed to make progress in expanding their force in 1943 despite frequent "mopping-up operations" by the Japanese. In that single year, the 8th Route Army fought a total of more than 24,800 battles with the enemy and inflicted more than l36,000 casualties on the enemy and puppet troops; while the New 4th Army fought a total of more than 5,300 battles with the enemy and inflicted more than 66,000 casualties upon the enemy and puppet troops.
“From 1937 to 1945, there were 23 battles where both sides employed at least a regiment each. The CCP was not a main force in any of these. The only time it participated, it sent a mere 1,000 to 1,500 men, and then only as a security detachment on one of the flanks.There were 1,117 significant engagements on a scale smaller than a regular battle, but the CCP fought in only one. Of the approximately 40,000 skirmishes, just 200 were fought by the CCP, or 0.5 percent.”
in January 1940 Zhou Enlai sent a secret report to Joseph Stalin which said that over a million Chinese had died fighting the Japanese through the summer of 1939. He further admitted that only 3 percent of those were CCP forces. Zhou pledged to continue to support Chiang and recognize “the key position of the Kuomintang in leading the organs of power and the army throughout the country.” Zhou acknowledged that Chiang and the KMT “united all the forces of the nation” in resisting Japan’s aggression.
Before its surrender, Japan had been worn out by hundreds of thousands of large- and small-scale battles waged by the Chinese people in 8 successive years. During that period, 447,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in China, an equivalent of 39 percent of the total 1.13 million Japanese soldiers killed in World War II. Japan's war expenses in China amounted to some $12 billion, equivalent to 35 percent of the total $34 billion that it spent in the war. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "China is one of the world's' five greatest powers taking part in the antifascist war. It is also the major country opposing the Japanese aggressors on the Asian continent."
Mao, very early ensured that the Red Army did not fight the Japanese. When Lin Biao, on his own initiative fought a positional battle with the Japanese he was successful. But when he rushed back to report his success Mao simply asked how many troops he had lost, Lin admitted 1000 troops had been lost, 10% of the then Red Army. Mao angrily retorted, "Ten such 'victories' and the Red army will be wiped out!". He forbade all his generals from ever taking on the Japanese again. Hence he developed his guerrilla strategy, "The enemy attacks, we retreat, the enemy retreats we pursue them, we only attack small isolated groups of Japanese".
The New Fourth Army consisted of only 10,000 soldiers in four detachments located in the mid-Yangzi River valley when it was established on 25 December 1937. During 1938-1941, its main area of operations shifted northeast-ward to those parts of Jiangsu and Anhui that lay north of the Yangzi River, and several base areas were established. By the time Japan surrendered in 1945, the New Fourth Army had grown to 118,000 regulars, 100,000 guerrillas, and 525,000 self-defense forces.According to the CCP’s own estimates, it began the war with 30,000 troops. By Victory Day, it had 1.2 million regular troops and around 2.6 million to 3 million militia under its command. It was also quick to seize the areas that the Japanese army was vacating, and seized the Japanese equipment. In fact, in some instances it even forced the Japanese soldiers to join the Red Army.
Roosevelt was clearly aware of China's role in preventing Japan from carrying out the above plan. In the spring of 1942, he told his son: "Suppose China. did not resist Japan or China was defeated by Japan, how many Japanese divisions do you think could be transferred to fight on other frontlines? The Japanese could capture Australia and India immediately. They could take all these places without making an effort, and they could even march straight toward the Middle East.... Japan and Germany could cooperate to launch a large-scale pincer attack, then join forces in the Near East, completely isolate Russia, annex Egypt, and cut off all communication lines passing through the Mediterranean Sea."
“It is believed by many objective folk that if Washington was not in such a hurry to pull our troops out of North China we would have contained the Communists and prevented the Russians from penetrating into Manchuria and Korea and consequently there would not have been a war in Korea nor in Vietnam,” Corporal Hook writes.
Chinese civilization of millennia suffered disastrous destruction, and the Chinese nation, huge losses. According to incomplete statistics, China suffered over 35 million casualties, both military and civilian; China’s direct economic losses exceeded US$ 100 billion and its indirect economic losses totaled more than US$ 500 billion, calculated at the price in 1937.
World War II had worked to Mao Tse-tung's advantage. Prior to the Japanese invasion the Chinese Communist Party had been on the run, as the government had forced Mao's army to flee to north China in the famous "Long March." The KMT's conventional forces bore the brunt of the Japanese invasion, enabling Mao not only to regroup, but to expand his guerrilla forces by capitalizing on hostility toward the Japanese invaders. As a result, the Communist movement grew from 40,000 party members and 92,000 guerrillas in 1937 to 1.2 million members and 860,000 soldiers by August 1945, by which point the party controlled nearly 20 percent of China's population. Japan's surrender provided further opportunities for Mao, as the withdrawal of Japanese troops from northern and eastern China created a vacuum that the CCP's northern-based guerrillas were better situated to exploit than Chiang's armies in south-central China.
Mao Zedong, founder of the CCP, himself explained what took place in a February 3, 1949, Soviet intelligence document which was recently declassified. The CCP had been fighting a losing battle against the Chinese Nationalist party, the Kuomintang. Mao stated that from the start of the war, the communists “had suffered great losses in the military forces.”
“We remained with only about 30,000 fighters and in this connection Wang Ming claimed that these forces are not sufficient for the struggle against Japan,” and the 30,000 soldiers of the Communist Party was the “skeleton, upon which grew” the People’s Liberation Army, which had expanded a hundredfold to 3 million by 1949 overthrew the Kuomintang and seized control of China.
The communist army of 30,000 was able to grow in numbers through the war with Japan, and later defeat the Kuomintang mainly because its forces hung back while the Kuomintang fought the Japanese.
Japan Prime Minister Shinzo Abe expressed “deep repentance” over Japan’s role in World War II and upheld statements by his predecessors, but stopped short of issuing his own apology.
Japanese leaders have repeatedly apologized for the suffering caused by the country’s wartime actions, including a landmark 1995 apology by then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. But remarks by conservative politicians periodically prompt critics to cast doubt on Tokyo’s sincerity.
By the time the German Wehrmacht launched its blitzkrieg against Poland in September 1939, China had already been at war with Japan for more than two years. The battles of Shanghai and Wuhan, both comparable in scale to the operations at Stalingrad or Normandy, had already transpired, and the brutal Rape of Nanjing had set the war’s total and unrestricted nature. All told, the Eight Years’ War would claim at least 10 million Chinese lives and create almost 100 million refugees.
Dr Sarah Paine of the United States Naval War College said KMT troops did the bulk of Chinese fighting in WWII and that it was the US submarine and air campaigns, in combination with the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, that defeated Japan.
Frank Dikötter, a Chinese History professor at Hong Kong university, notes in a terrific recent book, With regards to the “land reform” campaign alone, for instance, “It is unlikely to have been fewer than 1.5 to 2 million people from 1947 to 1952.” At least another two million were killed in so-called counter-revolutionaries campaign that Mao launched between 1950-1952.
Reference
Barbara W.Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911-45, Macmillan Ed,1971.
Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress, Madame CHiang Kai-Shek and the Birth of Modern China, Simon & Schuster, New York, London. 2009.
Charles F.Romanns and Riley Sunderland Stiwell’s Mission to China (Washington, 1953)
Colin Mackerras, China in Transformation 1900-1949, (Longman, London 1998)
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Dick Wilson, China’s Revolutionary War, Weidenfeld and Nicolson (Academic) London, 1991
Dorn, Frank, The Sino-Japenese War, 1937-1941, From Marco Polo Bridge to Paul Harbor( New York, 1974)
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Edward L.Dreyer, China at War, 1901-1949, Longman, London and New York, 1995
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Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai Shek, China’s Senoralissino and the Nation He Lost (Carroll & Craf Publishers New York, 2004) ;
Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, second Ed, W.W.Norton & Co. New York. London. 1999.
John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China A New History, Enlarged Ed, Harvard Universtiy Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, 1998.
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Wolfgang Franke, A Century of Chinese Revolution 1851-1949( University of South Carolina Press.1970)

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