|
A. RIGHTS AND Duties Are human rights an inherent and inalienable consequence of humanity? Or, are human rights essentially conditioned on acquiescence in, or per- formance of societal duties? To some extent, this is a false dichotomy. For every right, there is a corresponding duty.[1] If I have a right to life, you have a duty not to kill me. Nonetheless, this debate persists. Be- cause to say, simply, that rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, does not tell us exactly what those rights and duties are. It also does not tell us how to resolve doubtful cases where rights and duties are in conflict. However, when questioning whether the third world believes in human rights, it may help to remember that the third world sponsored "New International Economic Order" (NIEO) by a resolution before the U.N. General Assembly NIEO[2] in 1974,[3] proposing a charter of eco- nomic rights and duties.[4] Third world scholars accept the idea of eco- nomic development, one of the keystones of modernity, as the sine qua The question whether rights arise from duties reflects the north-south debate. Representing the global south, Asian[6] schools of thought,[7] whether Islamic[8] Hindu,[9] Confucian,[10] or Buddhist, [11] tend to see not rights, but rather duties as primary, and to recognize rights only as a con- sequence of duty fulfilled.[12] In contrast, western schools of thought, notably ius naturale,[13] tend to see the foundation of human rights on certain inalienable, inherent capacities of humans,[14] generally speaking rationality, though Christian theologians[15] would combine that theory with the idea that that rationality is a reflection of divine perfection.[16] Ius naturale is generally contrasted with positivism,[17] not only in na- tional law but also in international law.[18] That split can also be traced to the treaty of Westphalia.[19] However, the opposition of positivism to naturalism is usually inexact, and often leads to confusion.[20] As Sohn concisely demonstrates, the split between positivism and natural law is a false dichotomy. Positive law and natural law can be comple- mentary.[21] Per Sohn, this is because natural law concerns those inalien- able rights, whereas positive law concerns alienable rights.[22] Sohn fur- ther draws the logical conclusion that those elements of international law which are jus cogens are a reflection of natural law, whereas those hu- man rights that are derogable are a reflection of positive law.[23] This, of course, could be an extension of Aristotle. For Aristotle, nature (physis) concerns that which is unchangeable (i.e. natural law), that which cannot be otherwise; nature is to be contrasted, per Aristotle, from tekhne (gr.) or arte (lat.), that which can be other than it is (i.e. man made, or positive law). For Sohn, natural law concerns the unchangeable and positive law that which is variable. Rubin also accurately described the same splits[24] as Sohn. However, unlike Sohn, Rubin does not appear to synthesize them. Whether Rubin realises it or not, determining where one stands on these splits is a matter of science, not opinion. A scientific position is an objective reflection of material facts, not a subjective expression of feelings. The science of law is sometimes challenged, though generally only im- plicitly, by post-modem denials of the existence of objectivity, truth, and in ultimo, western culture (its existence or values). Post-modernism can, however, pose radical questions: such as, why roughly 80 percent of the world controls roughly 20 percent of global resources, and whether war is inevitable. However, in rejecting objectivity, and thus knowledge, post-modernism throws out the good with the bad. Because of its pre- sumptions, post-modernism cannot benefit from the earlier work of any social theory. For the post-modernist, objectivity does not, and cannot, exist. Taking the post-modernists seriously is difficult: their presump- tions are contrary to common sense. However, one must take post- modernism seriously, because the post-modernists' denial of basic pre- sumptions of modernity such as objectivity, science, and progress, per- mits them to pose serious questions. However, the rejection of the pre- sumptions of modernity prevents post-modernists from formulating co- herent answers to the fundamental questions posed. Returning to the natural law/positivism dichotomy, the usual supposition, of an opposition between positivism and naturalism, is also inapposite for less brilliant reasons than Sohn provides. For example, a naturalist theory, such as Hobbes' theory, proposes that natural law is nothing other than the law of the jungle, that is, the law of the strong, survival of the fittest.[25]An alternate school of ius naturale, put forward most fa- mously by Cicero,[26] and later Aquinas,[27] argues that, only laws which are founded in morality or rationality, are valid. The author regards the former theory (Hobbes) as natural law (per Hobbes, lex naturale), and the latter (Cicero and Aquinas) as natural justice. Both are branches of ius non scripta. Just as there is a descriptive and prescriptive theory of ius non scripta (natural law and natural justice respectively) there are also descriptive and prescriptive versions of positivism. Descriptive positivism limits itself to describing law as it is. Prescriptive positivism does not prescribe what the law should be; rather, it describes what it perceives as correct methods of legal science. Kelsen,[28] following Weber[29] is an example of a prescriptive positivist. Much of the supposed conflict between positiv- ism and naturalism can be resolved by correctly understanding which strand of theory is being considered. Prescriptive theories of natural law are, necessarily, in conflict with prescriptive theories of positivism. Purely descriptive theories however cannot be in conflict methodologi- cally, since they only claim to describe reality as it is. As Nigel Purvis notes, the claim that positivism is purely descriptive explains some of its success in capturing the legal imagination.[30] Most natural law theories, with the notable exception of Hobbes,[31] are, in fact, theories of natural justice, and, as such, are prescriptive. However, Pur- vis, like many others, may be underestimating the methodological diffi- culties which plague naturalism due to an all too common failure among natural law theorists to clearly distinguish prescription from description. Since a descriptive positivism has a more limited task than a prescriptive naturalism, it necessarily generates a simpler theory, which is less open to criticism. However, this theory is descriptively incomplete (no cogni- tion of whole entities, i.e. the sum is always equal and never greater than its parts thus no synergies)[32] and is, essentially, powerless (except in its implicit affirmation of the status quo) because it does not prescribe. Positivism, like "realism," pursues a much less ambitious theoretical objective than naturalism or holism, but for this very reason, it is also less influential. In contrast, when naturalist and holist theories fail, their failures tend to be glaringly obvious, even spectacular, due to "pure" eidetic noesis, i.e. philosophical idealism divorced from material reality. Positivist theories, in contrast, are confined to safer positions.[33] Methodologically,[34] the split between positivism and naturalism tracks and parallels the splits between materialism and idealism, between atom- ism and holism, and between realism and transformationism. However, though materialism, atomism, positivism and realism tend to be reinforc- ing, and though historically holism and idealism are usually associated with each other, the connection of these different theories to each other is not a necessary one. This author, for example, takes a holistic, material- istic view that compels him to a transformationist theory. Hobbes, in contrast, is a materialist atomist who, however, takes a position of natural law, though his "natural law" is in fact, the law of the jungle![35] Only by expressing these theoretical differences, and clearly delineating them, can post-Westphalian theorists hope to transcend the failures and limita- tions of the Westphalian state theory. This relationship between positivism and natural justice contextualizes and guides this paper's theory of human rights. The rights and duties theories appear at first to present a fundamentally irreconcilable duality. However, though there are mutually exclusive dualities, there are also dualities which are, in fact, not absolutely opposite and mutually exclu- sive (discontinuous entities), but rather which are different, not in kind but in degree. Such dualities are continuous entities.[36] Logically, a ma- terialist atomist must believe that the universe is discontinuous, since only discontinuous entities resolve into discrete elements. Similarly, holists usually see the universe as a continuity, where each microcosm reflects the macrocosm (the aporie of light as both a particle and wave may be a useful analogy or model to understand this problem). How- ever, for this reason atomists, perhaps unknowingly, reiterate Pythago- rean theories which mathematics has long rejected. Suppose, however, that mathematical representation is not an arbitrary, pure, formal system (though that is in fact the assumption of contemporary mathematics). Suppose, instead, that mathematical representation, rather than being an arbitrary and purely formal system, is somehow a reflection of material reality. Now, clearly irrational numbers such as radical two exist, the ratio between a hypotenuse and one of the equilateral legs of a right equi- lateral triangle is, in fact, radical two. However, the decimal representa- tion of this ratio is non-terminating and non-repeating. This implies that the holist representation of material reality is correct, and that the atomist representation is incorrect, because, if a line segment could be split into atoms, then ratios, such as radical two, could be represented as whole numbers, or at least as whole fractions. The holist theory appears to be more accurate here because it permits a representation of a ratio of two wholes, which, though paradoxical, clearly exists. In contrast, the atom- ist representation of discrete digital numbers cannot adequately describe this ratio. A similar analysis also holds true for pi, namely the ratio of a circumference of a circle and the radius of a circle. There, however, the ratio is complicated by the fact that a circumference is a curve. There- fore, the example of radical two is easier to illustrate the limitations of atomistic thinking. If ideas are merely a reflection of material reality, and not an abstract model divorced from material reality, then the atomist model, that the universe can be divided into ultimate discrete elements which cannot be further subdivided, and which serve as the fundamental basis of analysis, is incorrect. An ever-smaller point can always be imagined. This is why geometry presumes that any line segment is made of an infinite number of points. Atomists, in contrast, presume that the process of division must end somewhere. But assuming the opposite position, that the uni- verse is a discontinuous whole, presumably, as in integral calculus, the possibility of an infinite series converging upon a limit. The presump- tion of continuity, which, like radical two is paradoxical, is consistent with holism, and leads to empirically verifiable, and useful, conclusions. The presumption of discontinuity leads to contradiction. Consequently, the holist position is again better able to represent reality and is probably more correct than the atomist position. This argument, of course, relies on the materialist presumption that ideas reflect material reality, and do not exist independently of material reality. It also relies on the presump- tion - which, again, is not the presumption of modem mathematics - that mathematics, like any idea, is a reflection of material reality, and thus, not a purely formal system. Pointing out the mathematical deficiencies in atomism does not say there is no place for analysis in scientific thought. It is intended, rather, to temper the role that such analysis is given in a comprehensive theory. Obviously, both continuity and discontinuity have their place in mathe- matics. The fact that holism can consistently integrate atomism as a spe- cial theory, and maintain the presumptions of holism as a general theory, explains why it is the more powerful theory, despite the risks inherent either in complex theorization or normative prescriptions. Those risks are inevitable in law. How is this understanding of continuity at the theoretical level pertinent? The contradiction between rights theories ("western" theories) and duties theories ("eastern" theories) of human rights is only apparent. Both western and eastern schools of thought are elements in a continuity, as both are linked by the common element, humanity. As expressions of degrees of continuity, these apparent opposites are, in fact, reconcilable. Looking at western thinkers, when exploring the thoughts of Plato, he clearly postulates duties as primary in his Republic.[37] To the extent that Aristotle acknowledges the idea of "right" (and thus of "rights"),[38]he posits them as a consequence of human rationality.[39] But Aristotle's conception of rights is balanced by his understanding of the inherently social nature of humans. For Aristotle, like Rousseau,[40] the state finds its origins in the family and it, unlike its individual members, the state (an extended family) is self sufficient. Because the state is self- sustaining, it has priority over any one of its members.[41] Thus, Aris- totle's conception of rights, like Rousseau's, would necessarily contextu- alize rights by the society in which they are found. Indeed, it is only relatively late in western thought that Locke presented the possibility of rights divorced from society. Locke's labor theory of value permits an a- social man, because property, according to Locke, is not a social relation, but the consequence of individual labor[42]- which is empirically defensi- ble (as well as being the position of Karl Marx)[43] unlike the subjective theories of value offered by Rothbard[44] and Mises[45] or the post- modernists. Admittedly, roots of theoretical atomism can also be found in Hobbes,[46] and even Rousseau.[47] But it is only with Locke that the individual can be divorced from society, because property is now a prod- uct, not a relation.[48] However for Aristotle[49] and Rousseau[50] the autonomous, autarchic, and thus independent, human of the social con- tract postulated by Hobbes[51] and Locke, in any of the various shades of that theory, is simply impossible.[52] Yet, though the social contract is not a historical fact, and the state of nature[53]an impossible fiction. Social contract theory appears to have influenced realist state theory. This theory sees the state as self- sufficient, but living in the state of nature as to other states,[54] and, as such, having only one law, the law of the strongest. This "vision" (nightmare seems more exact) is every bit as unrealistic as the social contract theory, which appears to have spawned it and, like social con- tract theory, must be rejected for empirical reasons: it does not corre- spond to material reality. Social contract theory and realist state theory do not even have much heuristic utility, for the presumptions of these theories are so contrary to fact that they cannot provide even an ap- proximate or simplified view of how states are actually formed, or actu- A credible argument can be made that, in pursuing the autarchic indi- vidualist ideal of enlightenment, western society sowed the seeds of its own deracination and alienation, as Marx noted.[56] Still, while there are, certainly, real points of divergence, even within western theories of rights, the fact is both west and east see individual rights as a conse- quence of rationality, and as implying, or even being grounded upon, social duties i.e. as a consequence of a commonality and personhood. Consequently, they can serve a key role in the post-Westphalian world. Turning from legal theory to legal practice, again, western theory does not ignore duties. For example, the first part of the state constitution of the Free Hansa State Bremen is entitled "Fundamental rights and du- ties.[57] The East German Constitution granted both a right and duty to work.[58] Again, in the Swiss Federal Constitution, the duties are also underlined.[59]This is not limited to the German-speaking world. The French constitution also speaks of rights and duties as concomitant. [60]
[1] Mahatma Gandhi, from Yervada Mandir(1930), excerptat: ; H.R. Khanna, Rule of Law, 4 SCC JOUR. 7 (1977) available at: . This principle has also been recognized in the case law. See, e.g., Medical Review Committee v. Lim, 8 MAN. R. 2d 407 (Q.B. 1981). (Canada, province of Manitoba).
[2] GABE VARGES, supra note 82, at 5.
[3] CLAUDE NIGOUL, MAURICE TORRELLI, LES MYSTIFICATIONS DUNOUVEL ORDRE INTERNATIONAL, 105 (Paris: PUF 1982).
[4] See GABE VARGES, supra note 82 at 17.
[5] Tesfatsion Medhanie, Lomg: Can it help reverse Africa's marginalisation? 16 STAAT UND GESELLSCHAFT IN AFRIKA 397, 402 (1996).
[6] This view is not however without critique: See, e.g., Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism And Political Culture: The Debate Over Human Rights And Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 147 (1998).
[7] ANTONIO CASSESE, supra note 2, at 53.
[8] There is no absence of Islamic scholarship in the west on this topic. Further the Islamic scholars do not question the idea of human rights as such but rather the western view of what those rights are. See, e.g., Ebrahim Moosa, The Dilemma Of Islamic Rights Schemes, 15 J.L. & RELIGION 185, 215 (2000); Ann Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash Of Cultures Or A Clash With A Construct?, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 307 (1994); ABDULAZIZ OTHMAN ALTWAIJRI, HUMAN RIGHTS IN ISLAMIC TEACHINGS 4 (2000) available at:
[9] Editorial, Human Rights: Knots and Webs, Hinduism Today (1996) available at:
[10] Joseph Chan, Human Rights and Confucian Virtues, IV HARVARD ASIA QTLY. (2000) available at: .
[11] . Damien Keown, Are There "Human Rights" in Buddhism? 2 J. BUDDHIST ETHICS (1995) available at: .
[12] See, e.g., Mahatma Gandhi, Letter to the Director General of UNESCO, 25 May 1947, IV Human Rights Teaching 4 (1985).
[13] See, e.g., Alfred Verdross and Heribert Franz Koeck Natural Law: The Tradition of Universal Reason and Authority in THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY DOCTRINE AND THEORY 17 (R. Macdonald, D. Johnston eds.,1986).
[14] See, e.g., South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), ICJ Reports 1966 250, 297 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka). But see DR. H. AGARWAL, IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS COVENANTS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO INDIA, 17-18 (1983) (arguing that human rights are universal because they arise out of the common equality of all persons).
[15] THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, SECUNDA SECUNDAE PARTIS §57 (Right) available at: .
[16] Fr. Joseph M. de Torre, Human Rights, Natural Law, And Thomas Aquinas, VI Catholic Social Scientist Review (2001) available at: .
[17] For a brief brilliant summary of the (only illusory) contradiction between natural law and positivism by the late Louis B. Sohn. See Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 17.
[18] Nigel Purvis, Critical Legal Studies In Public International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 94, 81-83, (1991) (describes "naturalist" "positivist" dichotomy in international law).
[19] Id. at 82-83 (describes the supposed decline of ius naturale theory).
[20] Unless the two schools of thought take a great deal of care to define their starting point, they find themselves talking about quite different things. Id. at 115.
[21] Louis B. Sohn, supra note 5, at 17.
[24] Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens And Offenses Erga Omnes? 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 280, (2001).
[25] T]he condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies." HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XIV (1656). Hobbes also distinguishes between natural law and natural right.
[26] CICERO, THE REPUBLIC at III, XXII (Loeb Classical Library, 1950) available at: (lat.).
[27] THOMAS AQUINAS, supra note 27.
[28] HANS KELSEN, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE (1925).
[29] MAX WEBER, DER SINN DER ,,WERTFREIHEIT" DER SOZIOLOGISCHEN UND OKONOMISCHEN WISSENSCHAFTEN (1917). In: Ders.: GesammelteAufsatze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Tuibingen 1988).
[30] Nigel Purvis, supra note 150, at 81-83 (1991) (describes the naturalist riposte to positivism).
[31] Hobbes clearly describes a natural law theory - but his natural law is the law of the jungle, which like Rousseau, must be escaped by a social contract, i.e. a positive law: The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judgement and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XWV (1660) available at:The work of both Hobbes and Rousseau (and Locke for that matter) is, however, flawed because they presume an impossibility, namely the state of nature. Hobbes's theory of natural law - the law of the jungle, droit de plus fort, does however carefully distinguishes between natural law and natural right, and thus should be distinguished from other theories of natural law which usually do not make this distinction and thus confuse prescription and description.
[32] Perhaps the first and best-known example of a synergy arising, where a whole is greater than the sum of its parts, is Adam Smith's famous needle factory. Smith pointed out that a factory using laborers specialized in different tasks would be far more efficient at needle production than the same number of individuals working in isolation. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, B.L Ch.l, paragraph 1.1.3 (1776). Available at:
[33] See Purvis, supra note 150.
[34] For a good discussion of different methodologies see, Anne-Mare Slaughter, Steven R. Ratner, The Method Is The Message, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1999).
[35] In fairness to Hobbes, we must note that his first natural law, the law of self preservation, by any means necessary, is only his point of departure. He goes on to develop other consequential rights which he considers just as "natural" as the right of self preservation. E.g., pacta sunt servanda (inter alia). HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XV "Of Other Laws of Nature" (1660) available at:
[36] To understand the theoretical distinctions between analog and digital conceptualisation see GOTTRRIED LEIBNIZ, A NEW METHOD FOR MAXIMA AND MINIMA AS WELL AS TANGENTS, WHICH IS IMPEDED NEITHER BY FRACTIONAL NOR BY IRRATIONAL QUANTITIES, AND A REMARKABLE TYPE OF CALCULUS FOR THIS (1684); ISAAC NEWTON, FLUXIONS (1666 - then unpublished working paper, later published), ISAAC NEWTON, ANALYSIS WITH INFINITE SERIES (1711).
[37] PLATO, REPUBLIC, Book IV
[38] Aristotle does speak of "civil rights" i.e. Biirgerrechte; Aristotle, Athenian Constitution - Part 7, Sections 61 - 69 (translated by Sir Frederic G. Kenyon)
[39] This can be seen by the example of the slave: Aristotle regards the slave as only capable of apprehending but not forming ideas. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, Part 5, Para. 3 (c. 350 b.c.) available at: . Consequently the slave has few rights. However the slave, like the drunkard, also has fewer duties, and for a similar reason - at least per Aristotle.
[40] "La plus ancienne de toutes les socidtds et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille ... La famille est donc si l'on veut le premier module des socidtds politiques" JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, CONTRAT SOCIAL, Livre I, Ch. H (1762)
[41] ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, Book I, Part 11 (translated by Benjamin Jowett)
[42] JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. V Sec. 28 (1698)
[43] KARL MARX, MORCEAUX Choisis 263 (Nizan, P. et Duret, J. eds., Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1934) (citing the Karl Marx work, SALAIRES, PRIX ET PROFIT). Marx and Locke also agree on the distinction between use value and exchange value: JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Book H, Ch. V §46-51 eps. §50; KARL MARX, CONTRIBUTION A LA CRITIQUE DE L'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE (Paris, Editions Sociales); KARL MARX CAPITALE 40 (Paris: Presses Universitaires Franqais 1993).
[44] See e.g., MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ED., THE LOGIC OF ACTION ONE 78-99 (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. 1997).
[45] See, e.g., LUDWIG MISES, MONEY, METHOD AND THE MARKET PROCESS, Ch. 3, "Epistemological Relativism in the Sciences of Human Action" (Richard M. Ebeling. ed., Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Pubs. 1990) (Article first published in 1962)
[46] Hobbes' natural law (the law of the jungle) is clearly atomist. The right of nature, which writers commonly call jus naturale, is the liberty each man hath to use his own power as he will himself for the preservation of his own nature; that is to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own judge- ment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto. According to Hobbes, in the state of nature, "right" is equivalent to "power," irrespective of society or family. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XIV, Of The First And Second Natural Laws, And Of Contracts (1660)
[47] Only in so far as the pacte social constitutes society out of individuals, adhesion to the supposed contract. This, however, contradicts Rousseau's recognition that all states arise out of extended families. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DU PACTE SOCIAL, chs. 1l,VI (1762).
[48] JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. V, § 28 (1764) This is incidentally the alienation of which Marx speaks - our alienation from the product our labor; our commodification.
[49] "He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; namely, of male and female... The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants... But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is the village.. .When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, supra note 173.
[50] « La plus ancienne de toutes les socidtds et la seule naturelle est celle de la famille. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL OU PRINCIPES DU DROIT POLITIQUE, Livre 1, Ch. II (1762)
[51] "[T]he condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent chapter) is a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies." HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, Ch. XIV, para. 4 (1660)
[52] The philosophers, who have examined the foundations of society, have, every one of them, perceived the necessity of tracing it back to a state of nature, but not one of them has ever arrived there." JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712-1778), On the Inequality among Mankind Harvard Classics, 1909-14) .See also, Jiri Priban, Stealing the Natural Language: The Function of the Social Contract and Legality in the Light of Nietzche's Philosophy, 24 CARDOZO L.Rev. 663, 664 (2003)
[53] See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, Ch. RI (1764)
[54] KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR (Columbia Univ. Press 1954).
[55] In contrast, the simplified model of the economy provided by the "homo economicus" does, roughly, approximate how economic actors in fact behave. Like the states in IR realism, economic actors are posited as rational maximisers of their utility. However, the economic game is positive sum, whereas IR theory generally proposes that IR is a zero sum game. In economic theory, altruists can be safely ignored as they are a distinct minority. In contrast, realist IR assumptions do not in fact reduce the variables which influence state behavior in a meaningful way because the variables eliminated (economic factors) are more relevant than the ones retained (military factors!).
[56] KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, "The Alienation of Labour" (1844)
[57] Landesverfassung der Freien Hansestadt Bremen, Artikel 1 - 20, Erster Hauptteil: Grun- drechte und Grundpflichten
[58] Verfassung der DDR, Artikel 24(1) Jeder Biurger der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik hat das Recht auf Arbeit. Er hat das Recht auf einen Arbeitsplatz und dessen freie Wahl entsprechend den gesell- schaftlichen Erfordernissen und der personlichen Qualifikation. Er hat das Recht auf Lohn nach Qualitlit und Quantitift der Arbeit. Mann und Frau, Erwachsene und Jugendliche haben das Recht auf gleichen Lohn bei gleicher Arbeitsleistung. (2) Gesellschaftlich nfitzliche Tdtigkeit ist eine ehrenvolle Pflicht ftirjeden arbeitsfiihigen BUrger. Das Recht auf Arbeit und die Pflicht zur Arbeit bilden eine Einheit.
[59] Schweizerische Bundesverfassung, art. 6, Individuelle und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung: Jede Person nimmt Verantwortung ftir sich selber wahr und trtigt nach ihren Krtiften zur Bewdltigung der Aufgaben in Staat und Gesellschaft bei.
[60] Ddclaration Des Droits De L'homme Et Du Citoyen De 1789 Les Reprfsentants du Peuple Franqais, constituds en Assembl&e Nationale, considdrant que l'ignorance, l'oubli ou le mepris des Droits de I'Homme sont les seules causes des malheurs publics et de la corruption des Gouvemements, ont rdsolu d'exposer, dans une Ddclaration solennelle, les droits naturels, inalidnables et sacrds de iHomme, afin que cette Dfclaration, constamment prdsente A tous les Membres du corps social, leur rappelle sans cesse leurs droits et leurs devoirs.
|
雷达卡
发表于 2/6/2018 22:38:45
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
喧嚣卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
楼主