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楼主: 郭国汀

人类历史上最恐怖最荒诞的大饥荒真相

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 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 02:57:44 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/12/2014 03:34 编辑

Jacques Guillermaz, translated by Anne Destenay, The Chinese Communist Party in Power 1949-1976, (Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press 1976, pp. 207-241.

China imported grain Australia and Canada 60 million tons were brought in 1961(worth $350 million). in May 1962, 200000 Cantonese peasants, tired of hunger, reached Hong Kong.

at first bad weather conditions alone were responsible for the difficulties,more than 60million hectares out of 106 million were affected, 26 million of these seriously(230). (Editorials of Dec 29, 1960, and January 1, 1961), People's Daily.)



in view of the serious natural calamities that affected agricultural production for two successive years(230).


Mao told Francois Mitterand that calamities that had been "unknown for a century" had stuck the country; he denied the existence of famine, but admitted to a " scarcity"(L' Express,  January 23, 1961). a few month later, speaking to Field Marshal Montgomery, Mao stated that the grain harvest for 1960 had been 150 million tons.Sunday Times (Magazine Section), London (October 15, 1961).


Kang Chao, Agricultural Production in Communist China, 1949-1965(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970) chapter 10. from 1958 up to 1965 for grain (in million tons): 205, 170, 150, 160, 170, 182, 195, 200.


Li Fuchun's report to the national people's congress on march 30, 1961, gives teh last firm figres published before 1970. show that grain harvested in 1959 was 270 million tons, 1962, 250 million tons(236). in Li fuchun's report, agricultural production in 1959 at 78300 million yuan (16.7 percent more than in 1958)!


Li Xiannien read teh state budget for 1959 ( income 54,160 million yuan, expenditures 52,700 million yuan) and including 500 million yuan to aid to foreign countries(239)!
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 04:44:30 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/12/2014 15:53 编辑

Jonathan D.Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2ed, W.W. Norton & Company, New York.London 1999 pp.544-564


the grain production figures had been disastrously over inflated. teh announced total for 1958 of 375 million tons of grain had to be revised downward to 250 million tons (Western economists later guessed that actual production was around 215 million tons) p.550.


Mao declared openly that "If the worst came to the worst and half of mankind died, the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist"(545 quoted at Stuart Schram, The Political Thought of Mao (New York, 1972)pp.408-409)


the huge people's militia that was developed during the GLF. allegedly 220 million militia , and 30 million furnished with modern or primitive firearms, provided a potential rival to the PLA(550).


Mao claimed at Lushan that "I will to to the countryside to lead the peasants to overthrow the government. if those of you in the PLA won't follow me, then I will go and find a  Red Army , and organize another liberation army." "the chaos caused was on a grand scale and I take responsibility. comrades, you must all analysze your own responsibility if you have to shit, shit! if you have to fart, fart! you will feel much better fort it. "(552)


Mao insisted on the heightened extraction of a dwindling peasant surplus. in 1959 grain exports to the soviet union were also increased to pay for more heavy machinery. the average amount of grain available to each person in china's countryside,which had been 205 kilos in 1957 and 201 in 1958, dropped to a disastrous 183 in 1959, and a catastrophic 156 in 1960, 154 in 1961. the result was famine on a gigantic scale, a famine that claimed 20 million live or more between 1959 and 1962. many others died shortly thereafter from the effects of the GLF(553).


In June 1961, Chen Yun made a crucial investigation in Qingpu Shanghai, who came up with five basic recommendations.sent 30 million peasants back to countryside; thousands inefficient GLF industrial enterprises dismantled; 6 % land restored to peasants as plots; private markets reopened; individual households responsible for fixing of output quotas. Liu, Zhou and Deng forward Chen's report to Mao, relactuntally Mao aggred(560).


Great leap famine sparked corruption. given enormous local autonomy in decision making to meet unrealistic national quotas, cadres adjusted to famine conditions by ruthlessly protecting themselves and those in their favor, while confiscating grain from the weaker or those they did not favor(561).
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 18:58:02 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/13/2014 01:52 编辑

John K.Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China A new History, enlarged Ed, Harvard University press Cambridge, London 1998.pp.368-382.


In 1958-1960 some 20-30 million people lost their lives through malnutrition and famine because of the polies imposed upon them by the Chinese Communist Party(368), is one of the greatest of human disasters.

the steel campaign begun in July 1958 to produce steel form backyard furnaces . some 50000 reported set up by the end of July. 190000 in August, 700000 by the end of september, and a milion in Octoer! more than 100 million people were engaged in this "battle for steel"(371).


the state statistical bureau claimed that in 1958 production of food crops and cotton had doubled than 1957, the Central Committee set ambitious targets for 1959 to increase again by 50%! In 1959 grain produce in fact drop down but statistical boasting doubling of output, state requisitions further highter, Mao in March 1959 order to procumate 30% of grain, which led to a first class manmade famine(372).


the higher than usual mortaity did not become known until the statistics were worked out. not until 1960 was it finally realized that many peasants were starving and the whole economy had been thrown into a shambles.(372-3)
 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 22:52:35 | 显示全部楼层
杨继绳:为什么伟大的理想造就了“伟大”的悲剧?

采访、撰文:韩福东

《东方历史评论
去年,73岁的杨继绳从北京飞往纽约,接受了曼哈顿研究所颁发的哈耶克奖。
和哈耶克结缘,是杨继绳晚年收获的意外之喜。他记录大跃进和大饥荒的作品《墓碑》,暗合了哈耶克的某些精神遗产。“我读过他的几本书,他的学说对分析中国大饥荒有用。在没有战争、没有瘟疫、气候正常的年景,三四千万人因饥饿而死。造成这一灾难的领导集团,不是恶魔,不是弱智者,而是怀着美好理想、智力超群的革命者。”2013年7月1日上午,在《炎黄春秋》杂志社,杨继绳开完编辑会议,坐在狭窄的办公室内开始讲述自己对一个时代的理解。
《炎黄春秋》是国内最敢言的历史刊物,没有哪一家媒体向它这样揭发了那么多毛时代的丑闻。杨继绳是这家杂志的副社长。“马克思也曾主张人道主义,也曾主张个人自由。但是,一旦消灭了私有经济,一旦实行计划经济,他承诺的人道和自由只能是画饼。他的经济思想否定了他的伦理思想。”杨继绳最后又回归到他对马克思的评价上来。他回避不了这一点,因为他曾经也是马克思的信徒。
甚至于在他的父亲,因饥饿而死在1959年时,都不能对他的这一信仰构成挑战。他现在承认自己是在“洗脑”的教育体制下长大的一代人。写作《墓碑》因此也成为他晚年的一种自我救赎。大饥荒的历史,触动了毛时代最不堪的决策记忆,在获得荣耀的同时,杨继绳也要面对左翼力量的反弹。
我们的谈话,就从一篇批驳《墓碑》的文章开始。
一、父亲饿死,仍然相信政府
东方历史评论:乌有之乡有一篇文章,“揭穿《墓碑》谎言,杨继绳的父亲不是饿死的”,认为1959年4月还没到饿死人的时候,你父亲应是死于食道癌等疾病。
杨继绳:我父亲怎么死的他比和还清楚?他提这个问题就是不信任我,我当然不回答。把我从学校里叫我回家的那位我儿时的朋友还在,我老家60岁以上的人都可以证明,如果他真想弄清这个问题,给我老家打个电话就行了,如果他更认真一点,花一天时间跑一趟也行。我的书中地址都写得很清楚。
东方历史评论:现在很多年轻人不相信人是怎样饿死的,你能不能作点介绍?
杨继绳:人的生命需要能量维持,生命的活动就是能量的循环。机体静卧在摄氏20度的环境中,完全处于休息状态,既无体力劳动,也无脑力劳动, 肠胃也不蠕动。65公斤体重的男子,24小时需要的能量是1560千卡。农民在野外从事重体力劳动,一天需要能量在3400-4000千卡之间。在大饥荒期间,中国农村平均口量定量为每天0.35斤大米,折合热量618千卡。农民每天差2000多千卡的能量。人体的能量入不敷出时,首先动用体内储存的“糖原”,。体内存储的“糖原”可以维持一天。下一步就消耗体内的脂肪。完全依靠脂肪产生热量可能发生代谢性酸中毒。体内存储的脂肪消耗完毕时,便开始分解体内各器官、肌肉中的蛋白质。蛋白质被分解,使各脏器萎缩:肾脏萎缩出现肾功能不全;胃肠道黏膜萎缩,使营养消化吸收减少······由蛋白质组成的各种抗体、各种酶也迅速减少,这就会出现一系列疾病。生命力顽强的人,在这个过程中没有死,最后因心脏的蛋白质被分解,就因心肌萎缩心力衰竭而死。什么叫饿死?是在人体能量严重短缺的情况下,在消化人体自身的过程中,产生一系列的疾病而死。
东方历史评论:我去重庆长寿去采访所谓的“开仓放粮第一案”,证实那是一个官员的谎言。那边给我讲过一个案子,父亲想要去儿子读书的学校吃饭,但是学校老师不给他吃,他饿死在回去的路上了。我理解,是不是那里的学校不准学生拿米回去?
杨继绳:儿子可以把自己定量的饭匀给父亲吃,父亲舍不得吃儿子的饭。我拿回三斤米回家以后,听说我父亲也没有吃到口,被别人吃了,他继续饿着,还对邻居说:“千万别告诉孩子,等我死了以后再告诉他,不然他又要拿米回来。”这是我2010年回老家听说的。
东方历史评论:那个时候你有没有接触到对大跃进的反对声音?
杨继绳:没有反对声音,谁敢有反对声音?那时我们到鱼塘角大队修水库,路经一个村庄,看到几个小孩站在路边喊:“大跃进,饿肚睏! 大跃进,饿肚睏!”,这是我听到的唯一反对声音。
东方历史评论:你怎么看左派否认大饥荒?
杨继绳:有不同的情况。一种是出于意识形态的动机,有政治偏见,偏见比无知离真理更远嘛!另外一种情况是,普通百姓对当前社会不公正的现状不满意,把毛泽东时代抽象成社会公正的符号,你们要说毛泽东时代的问题,他们就反感。还有一种是对历史的无知。我家附近搞绿化工程的农民工是信阳地区上蔡县的。我和一位60多岁的人聊天,他家饿死了两口人,但他19岁的孙子不相信,反问他:“不给老百姓饭吃,为什么不跟他们干?”他说的“干“,就是斗争,造反。这孩子哪能知道当时农民的状况?农民哪有能力跟政府对抗?
东方历史评论:你当时的认知,和现在的左派有什么差异?
杨继绳:时代不同。我们那个时候官方既垄断了真理,也垄断了信息,我们只能知道政府让我们知道的,我们只能相信政府让我们相信的。我们中的大多数人是当时的政治体制造就的政治愚民。现在的社会比我们那时开放多了,政府既垄断不了真理,也垄断不了信息。现在的左派当然也有无知的一面,但主要是他们自己的选择。
东方历史评论:其实还是知道一些政府不让知道的信息,譬如饿死人。对此你当时真的一点触动都没有,完全被洗脑,没有丝毫功利目的?还是说,潜意识里也有学生干部身份带来的利益期待,以及恐惧,影响了自己的判断?
杨继绳:我怎么会没有触动?!我很自责:如果我回家挖野菜、剥树皮,养活他,怎么也不至于饿死吧。我都十八岁了,别人能剥,我就不能剥吗?我只自责,没有埋怨政府,我以为这是我家的个别现象。
当时谈不上利益期待,恐惧当然是有的。比我高一个班的同学,因为不能吃饱,就在厕所里写“打倒毛”的口号。马上被破案,抓到派出所关起来。当然有恐惧。那种恐惧是在每个人心里的,成了一种自我保护的本能。如果你没有恐惧,就很危险。这并不是因为软弱,而是一种自我保护,人作为人生存的一种能力。
东方历史评论: 你当时认为写这个口号是正确还是错误?
杨继绳:当然觉得是错误的。当时“打倒毛”是一个非常重大的反动口号。也可以说是当时的“共识”。这种“共识”是党多年教育的结果。刚才说过,单一的政治教育使我们成为政治愚民。
东方历史评论:我自己也做过一些采访和查档工作,发现从土改开始,底层痞子化相当严重,殴打地主富农时特别狠。那些逼死人命的村干部,是不是也可以用被洗脑来为自己的行为做辩护?
杨继绳:不能说痞子化,而是痞子。农村有一些不好好种田、好吃懒做的人,一搞政治运动他们的劲头就来了。老实农民是不会主动接近工作队的,痞子对上面派来的工作队很热情,很快成为工作队的依靠对象,在斗争中常采取极端的手段。我们村里一个姓毕的地主,人们都叫他“光瞎”(高度近视),还是个瘫子,家有100多担田,一个月能吃一次肉。就是这么一个人。土改时把他吊起来打,问他银洋在哪里。被整死了。
东方历史评论:那时城里的知识分子是不是也不了解农村的情况?
杨继绳:城里有粮食供应,只是不断减少,一个月26斤,高干虽然每月有一定的营养补贴,但也有浮肿,也是营养不良。一般市民营养不良的情况就更严重了。城里的知识分子也只能从政府那里得到信息,他没有别的信息渠道。听海外广播是“偷听敌台”,一旦被发现就要坐牢。国外的报刊是进不来的,能进来的只能是自然科学类刊物。个别人可能从某渠道得到一些与政府发布的不同信息,他是不敢传播的,传播是非常危险的。
东方历史评论:前一段我查沈钧儒的一些资料,他在国民党统治时很勇敢,但是在大跃进期间,一发言就是拥护总路线、三面红旗。
杨继绳:五十年代初的思想改造运动、肃反运动、批判胡适运动和1957年的反右派运动,使知识分子经历了一次又一次整肃,使知识分子都放弃了独立思考,都不敢说话。民主党派是中国共产党领导下的社会团体,当然只能和党保持一致。
东方历史评论:你第一次接触大饥荒的资料,开始怀疑三面红旗,是什么时候?
杨继绳:知道饿死人是在文化大革命期间。湖北省的省长叫张体学,省委书记是王任重。王任重比较早就倒台了,张体学批判他,说王任重1958年搞浮夸,湖北省饿死30万人。
东方历史评论:你当时怎么听到这个消息?
杨继绳:文革中传单到处是。其实湖北省不止饿死三十万。但这个数字当时对我是一个触动,说明饿死人不是个别问题。不过,我没太深入思考这个问题,是不敢思考。这也是我刚才说的一种自我保护的本能吧。那时腹诽都是有罪的。
东方历史评论:当时有腹诽吗?
杨继绳:没有那个认识,没有现在的认识。我刚开始写这个书的时候,还开玩笑说:我不能反动,但越调查越“反动”。我看的档案触目惊心啊,文字记录几千起人吃人的事件,首先吃自己家里人,父母吃儿女,儿女吃父母,这么严重的事情。
二、大跃进责任人,可能在改革开放后篡改历史
东方历史评论:哪年开始着手写大饥荒。
杨继绳:1995年写完的邓小平时代,1996年开始着手调查大饥荒,利用到各省采访的机会,就去看档案,找人谈。
东方历史评论:为什么选择大饥荒,而没有选文革或其他的政治运动?
杨继绳:当记者就得调查和记录重大事件,大饥荒是重大事件。重大事件包括反右、文革等。反右我没赶上,而且很多右派已经写了很多反右的题材了。写文革条件不成熟。大饥荒我亲身经历,而且我父亲饿死了,就把这个做为重大的课题吧。
东方历史评论:关于大跃进,哪个学者给你的影响最深?
杨继绳:原国家统计局长李成瑞较早提出大量饿死人的问题,我看了他的文章,找他谈了两次,他还给我一些资料。李成瑞虽然是左派的重要人物,但在大饥荒问题上还能比较实际。他主持1982年全国人口普查,对人口问题有研究。在李成瑞的介绍下,我读了蒋正华的研究报告。李成瑞认为饿死两千万左右,蒋正华当时在西安交在,他接受国家课题,研究的结果是饿死1700万。公安部当年搞人口统计的现在健在四个人,其中户籍处长的说是饿死2000万左右,王维志认为3500万,王是在莫斯科统计学院专攻人口统计的,回来后在公安部从事人口统计工作,还到一些省搞过人口数字核对和调查。我基本同意王维志的结论。为饿死人数问题,我和王维志进行过多次讨论。
东方历史评论:你的观点是不是受哈耶克影响比较大?
杨继绳:历史的因缘巧合,中国的革命者引领中国走上了苏联式的道路。他们本以为这条道路会使中国富强幸福,却带来了惨绝人寰的悲剧。这印证了哈耶克的一句话:“在我们竭尽全力自觉地根据一些崇高理想缔造我们的未来时,我们却在实际上不知不觉地创造出与我们一直为之奋斗的东西相反的结果。”
为什么伟大的理想造就了“伟大”的悲剧?也可以从哈耶克的著作里找到答案:因为中国的革命者是按照“伟大的乌托邦”(哈耶克语)构建的制度。这个制度是“根据某些有意识构造的‘蓝图’对我们的一切活动加以集中管理和组织。” “每一件事都由独一无二的中心加以指导。”这个制度企图“组织整个社会及其资源达到单一目标,而拒绝承认个人目的至高无上的自主领域。”这个“单一目标”就是“伟大的乌托邦”——共产主义。
东方历史评论:查档案是从什么时候开始的?
杨继绳:1998年底开始查档案,查了12个省档案馆和中央档案馆。因为我2001年就要退休,所以拼命的查档案。
东方历史评论:地方档案馆比国家档案馆要容易查一些把?有无阻力?
杨继绳:有的县档案馆很不好查,我到信阳档案馆查档,不给查。但凤阳档案馆让查。信阳不让查,我就去河南省省档案馆,要我找省委秘书长签字。新华社河南分社的朋友帮助找秘书长签字的。河南省档案馆查了几天,缩微胶片的档案,查起来很费劲。用手摇一段,抄一段,中午吃饭就把记录本带出来,下午再换一个本,大概用了七八个本吧。看到很恐怖的资料,我怕本子被没收,这样不管怎样,起码可以带出来一部分。
贵州没查成,只看了些目录。
东方历史评论:你在写这个书的过程中,遇到的最大困难在什么地方?
杨继绳:个别材料很多很多。怎么饿死人,粮食怎么浮夸,这些都是在国家档案馆看到的,主要是粮食的产量、征购、库存、调拨,各省的情况都有,八天抄了160多页。
比较难的是确认一共死了多少人。
东方历史评论:你书中引用档案非常之多,档案的真伪你怎么来做鉴别?毕竟毛时代惯于造假,公文也未必可信。
杨继绳:我在12个省和中央档案馆查了档案,每一家档案馆调阅的都上数百卷、上千卷。我采用的大多是中央调组、省委调查组形成的报告,这些调查报告的真伪都经过了调查组的鉴别,官方会给自己抹黑吗?会议记录这样的原始资料也比较可靠。粮食出口、库存,查的是中国经济年鉴上的数字,权威机构的数字,不是某个人的统计。
东方历史评论:在毛时代会不会有这种现象:某人开始当权的时候,对负面的信息少报瞒报;但当他倒台的时候,调查组针对他的报告,可能又有所夸大?
杨继绳:这种情况有,我也注意到这个问题。譬如打倒一个村支书,相关材料就把他说的一无是处。有些太极端的档案,我就没有采用。采用政治运动的材料要小心,读者都可以自己做出判断,我自己引用时也有选择。
东方历史评论:档案有档案的问题,口述可能也有口述的问题。回忆不准,或故意遮蔽和夸大一些事实。
杨继绳:对。都是相对的,不可能百分之百可靠。我写作此书时,都尽可能实事求是,但也不可能做到百分百都是事实,但相对其他关于大饥荒的书,我更多是依靠档案、县志、会议记录写出来的,不是凭传说,相对起来要可靠一点。
东方历史评论:很多档案是不是都销毁了?《墓碑》里提到,粮食部原副部长周伯萍晚年对你说,周恩来看到汇总来的死亡人数后,下令立即销毁,不得外传。
杨继绳:那个档案销毁了。没有进入档案馆的材料容易销毁,但真正进入档案馆的档案比较难销毁了,手续还是严苛的。
东方历史评论:我前两天听一个搞军史的说,他有一次给一个副主席写传,到档案馆调这个副主席的档案,工作人员说,这个档案前不久被另一位国家领导人的秘书借走,还留了一个借条。借档案的领导人和他所要写的这个副主席是派系对立面。过了半年后,他又去档案馆,档案馆说他的秘书前一段把借条都拿走了,就等于说,这个档案不会还了。
杨继绳:要高级领导人才行,一般人没这个能力。去国家档案局查档,要省部级办公厅的介绍信,还要写查档的目的和用途。
东方历史评论:会不会有这种情况,某个国家领导人晚年考虑到自己的历史定位问题,会要求销毁一些档案?
杨继绳:有这种可能。从甘肃省政协主席职位离休的王秉祥,原本在大饥荒年代有很多恶行,但在1990年代出版《通渭县志》时,他干预编辑,删除了有关他错误的问题,又加了一段自己如何“如实向中央、省委报告通渭大量死人,并供应粮食、组织抢救”的文字。可见大跃进时期主政的领导,在改革开放后继续担任重要职务,是有可能篡改历史的。
东方历史评论:《墓碑》出版后,有没有遇到什么麻烦?
杨继绳:麻烦就是不让这本书进入大陆。没有人调查我,原来我在书中没写详细的档案卷号,也是担心安全问题,怕被指控泄密。后来看到《墓碑》出了九版都没事,第十版我就把档案号都公布上去了。
东方历史评论:读者反应如何?
杨继绳:我收到很多来信,肯定这本书,有的还寄来他家庭、家乡在大饥荒年代饿死人的情况,可以作为对这本书的一个补充,但这本书篇幅已经很大,再补充也很难。
东方历史评论:这本书太厚了。之前你和我说过,你打算写一个简体版本的《墓碑》。
杨继绳:没时间了。这本书英文版、法语版、德语版、日文版都翻译了。香港中文版80万字,加上前言后记索引,大约100万字。太长了,不好卖,英文版我删减到54万字,
东方历史评论:你是做记者出身。在写作本书时有没有考虑过文本的构建,把它写的故事性更强,更好读一些?
杨继绳:现在这样的写法,主要是尽量省字,能删的就删,尽量把话说清楚就完了。如果用文学笔法,既丧失信任度(文学是可以虚构的),也费字。还是写实的笔法好。
东方历史评论:你用的档案资料,大概占你所掌握的所有档案的多大比例?
杨继绳:去一个档案馆最顺利的三四天,最长的一个星期,每天查两车(拉案卷的小推车)档案,觉得有用的就复印,复印很贵,一张纸就两块钱,调一个档案就两块钱,一共花钱花了两三万。这些复印档案我已捐给南京大图书馆了,他们已经编目,可以查阅。我的书大概70%是用档案写的吧。
东方历史评论:现在看,《墓碑》有什么遗憾吗?
杨继绳:由于条件限制,我只是查阅一部分档案,我估计我只看到关于大饥荒档案的一部分。如果将来档案全部开放了,对大饥荒可能有更深刻、更全面的认识。但这是以后人的事,我无能为力了。
三、饿死人的根源在制度
东方历史评论:我看到一些文章,原四川省委书记李井泉身边的一些人想给他翻案,大意是说他也想保证地方温饱,是中央催促的太狠。
杨继绳:四川调出粮食很多,是中央他们施加的压力,希望从四川多调些粮食出来。李井泉也不是盲目外调粮食,他也曾跟粮食部长陈国栋讨价还价。在中央档案馆我看到了他给李先念的信,说征购粮太多了,四川承受不了,希望压缩调出指标。最后中央还是没有同意压缩。
东方历史评论:春节前后是饿死人的高峰期。大跃进的时候,夏粮收割前,库存量到底是怎样的?是库存不够,还是库存量很多,但是不能放粮给农民,因为要满足北京、上海等大城市的消费需求?
杨继绳:库存每天都有变化。从粮食部这个表可知,1959年夏收入前库存为286.22亿斤,1960年夏收前库存为190.86亿斤。这还是贸易粮,相当于原粮的1.2倍。这些库存地方没有权力动用。我访问过当年的固始县委书记石绍举。他说,最困难的时候,他对县粮食局长周义原说:能不能从粮库里借300万斤粮食救急,等夏收入后再补上?周义原说:粮食是有,但吴芝圃书记说过,国库里的粮食一粒不能动,每天进多少出多少,都要往上面报。最终还是看着农民饿死,没有借。石1940年参军,7次负伤,因饿死农民撤职查办,坐了一年牢。
东方历史评论:那时中央是一种什么心态,对饿死其实是知道的,为何有粮也不准放?
杨继绳:中央1959年春天就知道饿死人,但不知道严重程度,1959年冬信阳事件以后才知道问题严重。
东方历史评论:之前也有零星的汇报上去吧?
杨继绳:汇报也有,但是中央只当做个别事件处理。地方官员所喜不所忧,向上封锁消息。譬如,信阳公安局和邮局把把12000封信都扣住了,不单老百姓,就是信阳地区专员张树番的老伴李瑞英给华北局的李雪峰的老伴写封信也不行。他们都是山西人。信里全是空话,问问对方怎么样了,想试一试,结果信都退回来了。不让逃荒,怕透露信息。中央来调查时,让农民挺直腰板,不要显示出挨饿的样子。
东方历史评论:四川和河南有本质的差别吗?李井泉可能也曾争取让中央少调走一些粮,但是不是也像河南这样,封锁消息、禁止逃荒……
杨继绳:李井泉的封锁的确很严重。河南山东都是比较早的暴露,所以征购就少一点,后来死人少些了。四川省一直捂着盖子,一直到1962年春都在饿死人,饿死上千万人。
东方历史评论:省级大员都知道饿死人,很严重,但是他们要瞒着,也不向中央汇报,是一种什么心态?
杨继绳:曾希圣知道饿死人很严重,他想自己解决,想短期搞自留地,等问题解决以后再向中央汇报。
东方历史评论:安徽大面积饿死人时,曾希圣根本没想解决问题。在曾希圣搞自留地之前,张恺帆不就因为停办公共食堂被打倒了吗?我去安徽调查过张恺帆案。
杨继绳:食堂是毛泽东关注的,是社会主义阵地,食堂这个阵地不能失,这是很大的原则问题。所以到1960年,贵州搞食堂还吹牛,毛泽东批示,是一个很科学的调查报告。
东方历史评论:那时团中央第一书记胡耀邦1961年去安徽调研,写了《二十五天三千六百里路的农村察看》报告,对坚持合作化起了很大作用,毛泽东批示:写得很好,引发各同志,值得一看。
杨继绳:在专制集权体制下,上级向下级封锁,下级也向上级封锁。他们听的很多是假话,1961是毛泽东所谓的调查研究年,为什么调查研究?因为前两年受骗,要亲自调查。毛自己去不了,都让警卫员回家调查。1961年把食堂取消了,胡乔木带着班子到湖南调查,刘少奇到他们老家调查,周恩来到邯郸调查,朱老总也下去调查。取消食堂胡乔木的调查起了很大作用,其个调查组也提出同样的看法。
东方历史评论:在这之前的一年,1960饿死人比较多,应该是饿死人最多的一年吧。
杨继绳:饿死人最多是1960年。
东方历史评论:1959年召开庐山会议,然后1960年成为饿死人最多的一年。
杨继绳:如果1959年庐山会议不开,可以少饿死2000万人。庐山会议本来是想解决问题,结果彭德怀一封信,7月23日毛泽东一讲话,马上将它反过来了。
东方历史评论:毛泽东是不是最开始确实想纠左,只是后来他感觉对立派系的人想借这个把他搞倒,才翻脸的?
杨继绳:庐山会议前,从1958年秋到庐山会议以前,一系列的纠左措施都是毛提出来的,但毛纠左,是在肯定三面红旗的前题下进行的,效果肯定不好。但饥荒的原因就是三面红旗,你不否定三面红旗怎么行呢?所以庐山会议时,彭德怀对三面红旗有点非议,结果毛泽东马上从纠左转向反右,把1959年春天执行的措施都否定了。
东方历史评论:你认为毛变脸主要是因为彭德怀碰了三面红旗?
杨继绳:是,三面红旗不能碰的。
东方历史评论:按照史景迁的看法,毛泽东、周恩来、陈云、邓小平、林彪等1956年倾向放松对知识分子的管控,而刘少奇、朱德、彭真、彭德怀等人则态度强硬。毛呼吁百家争鸣的讲话,未能见诸报端,因为彭真控制了北京媒体,于是毛要在上海发声。党章中也不再出现关于毛泽东思想重要性的说法。后来国际上有波兰、匈牙利和国内的西藏事件发生,国内强硬派台头,党外批评升级,毛才转向强硬派。
如果这种说法不差,那么反右并非引蛇出洞,而是毛对强硬派的一次妥协,也是为自己“一贯正确”找一个托词。反右时毛泽东就感受到对立派系的存在与威胁。可否从这个视角解读庐山会议?史景迁认为刘少奇和彭德怀在反右时都是强硬派,刘少奇的角色是不是在庐山会议上也很特别?
杨继绳:对反右斗争我没有研究,不好说。毛泽东7月23日讲话以后,风云突变,高官们迅速改变态度,紧跟毛泽东,加入反右倾的大合唱。他们中的有些人在枪林弹雨的战场上没有畏惧,在敌人严刑拷打中也没有屈服,而在极权制度中做了高官以后,有的变成了驯服的绵羊,有的变成了凶恶的鹰犬,更多人则是见风使舵,八面讨好。当然,他们这样做有种种堂而皇之的理由:为了维护大局,为了党的团结。但是,有一点是不能回避的:个人利害关系。在战争年代,他们多是孤身一个,没有家庭包袱,他们认定斗争的对象是邪恶的,成功了就是英雄,牺牲了就是烈士。当了高官以后,有妻子儿女,有荣华富贵。更为重要的是,惩治他们的是被所有的宣传工具天天歌颂的“英明领袖”。这使他们感到,杀了头不仅殃及子女,还要遗臭万年。极权制度就是这样把昔日的英雄变成了奴才。
东方历史评论:毛在庐山会议前有做自我检讨,承认他有失败,秋收起义失败,搞工业也不懂。庐山会议前,刘少奇有承认自己错误的检讨吗?
杨继绳:大跃进开始时刘少奇比毛还左,五风是怎么起来的,刘少奇作用很大。
东方历史评论:解放战争时,华北土改是刘少奇主持的,那个时候他也很左,毛泽东还纠过他的左。
杨继绳:刘少奇土改时就很左,四清时也很左。毛说他“形左实右”。
东方历史评论:我前几天和一些中央特科的部级干部后代在一起,他们有人认为,包括7000人大会,也基本上是一个派系之争。庐山会议之后,刘少奇的发言也都很左,到了7000人大会,他感觉自己派系的人实力上升,就想借这个机会倒毛,才说出“三分天灾七分人祸”。
杨继绳:共产党山头很多,经过多少年不断的磨平山头,很复杂。从外面看,我看不出大跃进过程中有什么派系斗争。
我没有把大饥荒的过错归到毛一人,而是归到制度。极权制度是超稳定的一个制度,一个人是很难改变和制止的。
东方历史评论:所以刘少奇可以为自己开脱,李井泉也可以为自己开脱,底层的官吏更好开脱,他们只是执行高层决策。
杨继绳:每个人都有两面的东西,开脱是开脱不了的。李井泉治下,四川饿死1000万人,他虽然和和李先念在征购数上讨价还价,但四川饿死那么多人,责任还是他是有责任的,是无法开脱的。
东方历史评论

2014年7月25日

 楼主| 发表于 11/12/2014 23:06:06 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/13/2014 03:14 编辑

Harry G.Gelber, The Dragon and the Foreign Devils : Chian and the World, 1100 BC to the Present, Bloomsbury London 2007.pp.355-363.

a new social revolution ws needed to galvanise the people, hasten China's development and overtake Moscow as socialism's champion. that drive culminated in teh great leap forward, a gigantic experiment in social enginaeering and mass mobilisation; a franzied drive for both industrialization and rural reform(355-6).

many western enthusiasts cheered it all. the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre thought Mao's great leap forward was " profoundly moral"(356).


in 1959/1960 matters were made much worse by bad weather(357). there were huge famines between 1959 and 1961 in which some 30 million people or more died. in short, the great leap was a disaster a man made catastrophe.






《墓碑》里提到,粮食部原副部长周伯萍晚年对你说,周恩来看到汇总来的死亡人数后,下令立即销毁,不得外传。
杨继绳:那个档案销毁了。没有进入档案馆的材料容易销毁,但真正进入档案馆的档案比较难销毁了,手续还是严苛的。

 楼主| 发表于 11/13/2014 04:04:13 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/14/2014 00:49 编辑

O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, New York and London, Columbia University Press, 1964.pp.352-367. Mr. Clubb is the last US Consul General in Peping,has llectured on Chinese history at Columbia U, New Your U, Brooklyn College.


in Nov 1957 at tortieth anniversary of Soviet revolution communist world celebrated, Mao made speech " the East wind is prevailing over the west wind" , and he magnanimously said:" thesocialist camp should have a leader, and that leader is the societ union. "(352)


at the feb 1958 meeting of the National People Congress a call for performance of " a great leap forward" in economic developments during the next three years.


forced keeping the sparrows in flight by noise and movement from the ground until they fell exhausted and killed. It claimed a billion sparrows had been liquidated(358). Mass mobilizzation of 100 million peasants between Oct 1957 and June 1958 for work on irrigation projects. on Oct 1, 1958, People's daily made a pround claim: "with the great leap forward in production, communism has already begun to push forth sprouts in our actual life". china was entering the stage of communism in the Marxian process before the Soviet Union! at the end of the year, The CCP announced tremendous production increases. agricultureal production was up approximately 100 % over 1957!with the output of grain and cotton both doubled.


China in 1953 t0 1957 emphasis on heavy industry. which means that capital funds for industrialization should be squeezed from the peasantry, but the margin of surplus was exceedingly samll. in past Chinese peasants enjoyed men had averaged 200 days, women 100 days of work under the old system. under the GLF, they were not even given enough time for sleep(361).


Right after the 1958 harvest Beijing had taken note of peasant unrest and various shortcomings in onnection with the GLF(361).The various malfunctionings in agriculture naturally did not entirely escape the Party's attention(362). From Wuhan Resolution of Dec 10, 1958 commune members were again going to be made responsible for their own basic support. " we should not declare that communes will enter communism immediately...emphasis on money wages  in relation to free supply. return to the incentive doctrine. proposed that peasants homes, personal property, personal savings and vegetable patches be returned to them. permitted engage in side activities.as for the mess hall, peasants might eat at home if theychose(363). the resolution provided for the dispatch into the countryside of tidying up commissions which were charged with investigating the operation of the communes...some ten thousand such investigators went to work in each province. Mao and Liu went on tours of investigation. corretions of the excesses began(364). From Dec 1958 to Aug 1959, there was extensive reappraisal of the communes with various adjustments of detail. the truth could no longer be hidden , and it was now announced that the grain production in 1958 had not in fact been 375 million tons as claimed, but only 250 million tons ( in fact only 205 million tons ! and expert opinion has computed the 1958 grain production to have been actually about 190 milliom tons. but the cost had been tremendous (365). steel production had not been 11 million tons but only 8. and it was admitted that 3 million tons of steel turned out by the backyanr furnaces had proved useless(364).
next undertook measures of fundamental adjustment. system of three levels of ownership. commune, production brigde, and production teams.after the harvesting of the 1959 crop there was a further adjustment of wages: a maximum of 40% of the peasant's income would be in the form of supplies, and 60% in cash wages(365). which is not equal compensation, but accordance with work outut and political attitudes.

the significance of the whole development was that there had been an increased transfer of responsibility for the care of movable farm property and for the raising of crops back to the peasantry, and incentives had been built into the structure of the counnes no longer would the peasant be compensated according to his need(365).

the target figure for grain output in 1959 first exuberantly fixed at 525 mt; then cut down to 275 mt; at the end Peking asserted that the country had produced 270 mt, thus exceedign the alleged production of 1958 by 20 mt(365). actual figure is believed to have been some 180 mt(366). weather condition during the crop season had been bad, and the claim was undoubtedly spurious, as indicated by domestic food supply conditions and the contry's export position.


No figures were issued for 1960 production in agriculture, but it is known that grain output dropped approximatedly 155 mt. Peking was forced to ask the Soviet Union to grant China postponement of payment of $300 million due on its trade account for 1960. then in early 1961, it entered the world market to buy grain and contractrd for the purshase of some 10 million tons of food grains from Canada, Australia, Argentina, Franceand Burma(366).


Peking blame teh existing situation in the main on natural calamities but never memtion any Soviet forced China to pay debts neither memtion the famine in his work which published in 1964(366-7).




 楼主| 发表于 11/13/2014 16:24:10 | 显示全部楼层
刘少奇冲毛泽东嚷:饿死这么多人历史写上你我


郭德宏 林小波



   
   
   
   
      刘少奇激动地对毛泽东讲:“饿死这么多人,历史要写上你我的,人相食,要上书的!”
   
      由于“大跃进”和人民公社化运动中的严重“左”倾错误,加上从1959年起,我国农田连续几年遭受大面积自然灾害,从而使党和人民面临建国以来最严重的经济困难。如何认识这一危局以及怎样化解?党中央高层出现了意见分歧。
   
      对于1958年以来三年“大跃进”造成的困难和经济形势的估计,在党内是有一些不同看法的。以刘少奇、周恩来、陈云、邓小平等人为代表,由于直接面对国民经济第一线,他们对形势有了更加接近真实的看法。刘少奇最为典型。可以说,刘少奇是党内看到困难形势的严重性并敢于触及造成困难真正原因的领导人之一。他突破了对形势看法固有的一个指头和九个指头的关系,认为是三个指头和七个指头的关系,有些地区,缺点和错误不止是三个指头,并得出了“三分天灾,七分人祸”的结论。当发现1962年财政预算中存在三十多亿元的赤字时,刘少奇更加尖锐地指出:“中央工作会议(即“七千人大会”)对困难情况透底不够,有问题不愿揭,怕说漆黑一团!还它个本来面目,怕什么?说漆黑一团,可以让人悲观,也可以激发人们向困难作斗争的勇气!”同时,刘少奇说过“怕什么丑呢?今天不揭,明天还要揭;你自己不揭,别人要揭;活人不揭,死后下一代要揭”,“三面红旗可以让人家怀疑几年”之类的话。刘少奇还对自己的子女说:“我们革命的目的是要解决人民群众的吃饭、穿衣、住房问题,人民受了这么多苦,要为他们分忧啊!”
   
      刘少奇态度的变化对其他领导人产生了重要影响。应该说,对“大跃进”和人民公社化运动造成的困难形势,处于经济工作调整第一线并担任“瓜菜代”领导小组组长的周恩来最为清楚。1960年年底,周恩来针对农业方面由于高估产而带来的严重问题说:“这半年来,我们几乎没有哪一天不考虑这个问题。”面对全国性的粮荒,周恩来和陈云冒着政治风险,决定进口粮食,以纾民难。1961年5月中央工作会议上,周恩来总结说:“那时,就是有点革命,不能深思熟虑,不能冷静下来”,“欲速则不达,跌了大跤”。刘少奇插话说:“想要快一点,结果是跌了大跤,反而慢了。看来,搞社会主义光有好的道德、好的感情、好的干劲不行,还要适应客观规律。这一跤是要跌的,跌得越痛越好,跌得不痛就感受不深”,“问题是跌痛了没有”。周恩来说:“我是感到痛了。”他认为,工作中出现的这些缺点错误,中央应负很大责任。因此,当英国陆军元帅蒙哥马利谈到中国的严重困难时,周恩来客观地回答说:“我们钦佩你公正的判断。当然你看到的是好的一面,我们的工作也还有缺点,也许你没有说,也许你还没有发现。”苏共二十二大期间,周恩来向赫鲁晓夫告别时说:“目前,我们国内还很困难,去年遇到了那么大的灾荒,这一年我的头发白了很多,这次一定要赶回去。”七千人大会期间,周恩来参加了福建组的讨论。发言中,地方干部反映了许多强迫命令、浮夸、讲假话以及党群关系紧张等情况,周恩来充分肯定这些发言“都是很健康的”,对他们的发言“都要尊重”。他说:“你们已经说了很多,主要是对省委说的,但也说了许多是中央的事情,这一点我是心中有数的。”并且他还作了“讲真话,鼓真劲,做实事,收实效”的切中时弊、感人肺腑的发言。西楼会议期间,周恩来非常赞同刘少奇对形势的看法,他说:“目前财政经济的困难是相当严重的,而且有些困难,我们可能还没有看到,没有预料到。”他还十分赞成陈云的意见:“在今后十年中要有个恢复时期。”作为党内为数不多懂经济的、被毛泽东誉为“国乱思良将,家贫思贤妻”的陈云,也对当时形势的严重性心知肚明。他指出:“你们讲话不要怕'左’和右,如果有人说你们右了,我来承担;要开除你们的党籍,找我好了。”七千人大会上,陈云没有讲话,但于2月8日在参加七千人大会的陕西省全体干部会议上指出:“这次大会取得了非常大的胜利,不要估计低了”,“这几年工作中的缺点、错误的责任由谁来负?中央、省委各有各的账,但有许多事情,责任首先在中央”。他在讲话中谈了发扬民主问题,指出:“这几年我们党内生活不正常。'逢人只说三句话,未可全抛一片心’,这种现象是非常危险的。”作为中央政治局委员、中央书记处书记、国务院副总理兼国家计委主任的李富春到河南、湖北等地检查工作,看到中原大地赤地千里、灾情严重,群众衣不暖食不足,处境异常艰难时,沉重地说:“浮夸风给人民带来这样大的灾难,我们真是对不起人民啊!”
   
      针对一线领导人对形势的估计,毛泽东有不同的看法。一方面他承认违背了客观规律,认为“最近三年受了大惩罚”、“碰得头破血流”,认识到“在社会主义建设上,我们还有很大的盲目性。社会主义经济,对于我们来说,还有许多未被认识的必然王国”。同时,毛泽东也检讨了自己的错误。1959年庐山会议上,毛泽东讲:“我是成事不足,败事有余;孙悟空偷桃子,只有这个办法,开庐山会议之类。过去不懂得管理经济之复杂。革命是捣乱,而且敌人有隙可乘”,“如果讲到责任,责任在李富春,责任在王鹤寿,其他部长多多少少有点责任;农业部有责任,谭老板有责任。主要责任应当说在我身上。过去说别人,现在别人说我,实在是有一大堆事情没有办”。1960年11月25日甘肃省委向中央写出报告,深入检查了一再发生“共产风”的根源,认为应当而且必须从省委领导工作中的缺点错误方面去寻找。毛泽东对这个报告看了两遍,说还想看一遍,以便从中吸取教训和经验,并检讨说:“他是同一切愿意改正错误的同志同呼吸、共命运的”,“自己也曾犯了错误,一定要改正”。在七千人大会上,毛泽东又说:“凡是中央犯的错误,直接的归我负责,间接的我也有份,因为我是中央主席。我不是要别人推卸责任,其他一些同志也有责任,但是第一个负责的应当是我。”另一方面,毛泽东认为困难并不大,形势仍然是好的,“三面红旗”必须坚持。在庐山会议上,毛泽东说:“总路线有问题,大跃进有问题,人民公社有问题。他们提出的批评,据我看,提出的尽是些鸡毛蒜皮的问题。我说他们看错了”,“没有什么了不起。要找事情,可以找几千几百件不对头的,但从总的形势来说,还是九个指头和一个指头”。面对粮食紧张和“非正常死亡”等现象,毛泽东的态度是“现在形势大好,缺点错误是部分的”。1961年庐山工作会议上,在周总理发言时,毛泽东插话说:“错误就那么一点,没有什么了不得。”他又形象地说:“现在是退到了谷底了,形势到了今天是一天天向上升了。”会议结束的那天,他还书写了唐代诗人李白《庐山谣寄卢侍御虚舟》一诗中的四句,即:登高壮观天地间,大江茫茫去不还。黄云万里动风色,白波九道流雪山。并赠送中央常委各同志。可见毛泽东的乐观心情了。1961年12月13日至16日,毛泽东在无锡听取江苏、安徽负责人的汇报时说:“对形势要从积极方面去看,有困难要想办法去战胜它。缺点可以有几千条,但这是可以克服的。不可理不直、气不壮,不要灰溜溜。……久卧思起,现在是起床的时候了。”七千人大会召开前夕,毛泽东又说:“国内形势总的是不错的。前几年有点灰溜溜的,心情不那么愉快。到1961年,心情高兴些了,因为在农村搞了《六十条》,工业搞了《七十条》,还提出了'三级所有,队为基础’,这些具体政策都见效了。”他在无锡找华东几个省的同志谈话时,表示1962年要抓工、农、兵、学、商、政、党七个方面的工作,大抓一年,工作要一天一天上轨道。七千人大会后,毛泽东到上海、山东、杭州、武汉等地视察,听到一些地方负责人讲的都是形势去年比前年好,今年又比去年好,比较乐观。
      因此,对刘少奇等人对形势的估计,毛泽东非常不满。1962年夏,在中南海游泳池毛泽东当面批评刘少奇:“你急什么?压不住阵脚了?为什么不顶住?”“西楼说得一片黑暗,你急什么”,“三面红旗也否了,地也分了,你顶不住?我死了以后怎么办!”刘少奇激动地说:“饿死这么多人,历史要写上你我的,人相食,要上书的!”在随后召开的中央工作会议和八届十中全会上,毛泽东把一线领导人对形势的估计当作“黑暗风”来批判了。他指出:“我周游了全国,从中南到西南,找各大区的同志谈话,每个省都说去年比前年好,今年比去年好,看来并非一片黑暗。有的同志把情况估计得过分黑暗了”,“这两年讲困难讲黑暗合法,讲光明不合法了”,“农业恢复要五年、八年,讲的那样长,就没有希望了”。他还批评李富春和国家计委“上不联系中央,下不联系群众,事先不请示,事后不报告,四时八节,强迫签字。我说再看一年,不行就换班。有人劝我不要等了,现在就可以换”。
   
      二是关于包产到户问题。这个问题由来已久,几起几落。高级社建立后,由于在分配上存在严重的平均主义,产生许多矛盾。1957年春一些地方农民要求包产到户,但在两条道路大辩论中被看作走资本主义道路而受到批判。1959年第二次郑州会议后的几个月中,河南、湖北、江苏、湖南、陕西、甘肃等不少省份出现了包产到户的做法,庐山会议后,再次遭到批判,认为“包产到户,实际是恢复单干”,“是猖狂的反对社会主义道路的逆流”。中央还转发了江苏省委《关于立即纠正把全部农活包到户和包产到户的通知》和河南省委《关于右倾机会主义分子的几个典型材料的报告》,认为包产到户归根到底“是要走资本主义道路,是企图使资本主义在农村复辟,实质上是反党反人民的资产阶级思想在党内的反映”。
   
      面对三年严重的经济困难,安徽省委对群众要求包产到户的意见,加以变通,试行“定产到田、责任到人”的包工包产责任制,即“责任田”,得到毛泽东“可以实验”的谨慎同意。同时,中央和地方许多领导都对包产到户予以支持。当时负责农村工作的邓子恢经过广泛的调查研究,支持安徽省委的意见。他指出:“有些地区,特别是受灾地区和山区分散地区,如果适合搞包产到户,农民也有搞包产到户的积极性,那就让他们搞。”朱德于1961年在浙江视察时,对身边工作人员说:“三包到组,在一部分地区可行。”陈云看了安徽搞责任田的材料后,对身边工作人员说:“这是非常时期的非常办法,叫'分田到户’也好,叫'包产到户’也好。总之,国家遇到了如此大的天灾人祸,必须发动全体农民按照《国际歌》词中'全靠我们自己’的话办,尽快恢复生产。”6月下旬至7月初,陈云就用重新分田的办法刺激农民生产积极性、恢复农业产量问题,在北京分别与刘少奇、周恩来、林彪、邓小平交换看法,并取得基本一致意见。时任中南局书记的陶铸也多次讲到包产到户,他认为:“边远地区、山区包产到户,不管黑猫白猫,会抓老鼠就是好猫。”1962年4月,他到河南检查工作,提出借土地给农民自耕,有的同志认为这样做可能导致资本主义,陶铸回答说:“如果这也叫资本主义,我宁可要资本主义,也不要饿饭、死人!”毛泽东的秘书田家英本来不赞成包产到户,但经过湖南农村调查后,认为包产到户在当前具有优越性。调查期间,田家英到上海向毛泽东汇报,毛泽东很冷漠,并说:“我们是要走群众路线的,但有的时候,也不能完全听群众的,比如要搞包产到户就不能听。”而陈云却称赞“观点鲜明”,刘少奇也认为很好。杨尚昆也从北京打电话给田家英:“总理要我问你一下,可不可以把农村的私有部分放宽一些?”回北京后,田家英立即向刘少奇作了汇报,汇报刚开了个头,就被刘少奇打断了。刘少奇说:“现在情况已经明了了”,接着就提出关于实行包产到户的主张。
   
      出乎刘少奇的意料,毛泽东不仅没有同意包产到户的主张,而且严厉批评了田家英等人,说:“回到北京后不修改《农业六十条》,却搞什么包产到户、分田单干。”并问田家英:“是你个人意见,还是有其他人的意见?”田家英为了不在中央领导层中造成裂隙,回答是个人意见。据陈云后来回忆说:“谈话以后,毛泽东同志很生气。”同时,毛泽东对刘少奇的工作也表示不满,指责他在包产到户问题上为什么没有顶住。在随后召开的北戴河会议上,毛泽东批评说:“1960年以来,不讲一片光明了,只讲一片黑暗,或者大部分黑暗。思想混乱,于是提出任务:单干,全部或者大部分单干。据说只有这样才能增产,否则农业就没有办法,包产40%到户,单干、集体两下竞赛,这实质上叫大部分单干。单干势必引起两极分化,两年也不要,一年就要分化”,“赫鲁晓夫还不敢公开解散集体农庄呢!”“有些同志一有风吹草动,就发生动摇,那是对社会主义革命没有精神准备,或者没有马克思主义”,并多次批评田家英的60%包产到户、40%搞集体的主张;批评中央农村工作部搞资本主义,邓子恢是“资本主义农业专家”


(博讯北京时间2010年9月15日 转载)

 楼主| 发表于 11/14/2014 01:02:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/14/2014 02:29 编辑

Jack Chen, Inside The Cultural Revolution, New York, London, MacMillan Publing Co.,Inc 1975 pp.123-151 in the title " Two Lines in conflict 1958 -1962. Jack Chen, son of Eugene Chen , twice foreign minister of China


communes mobilized labor capital began thousands of basic capital construction projects: building water conserfancy and irrigation and drainage systems, terracing hillsides, sinking wells raising dams, builiding dykes, digging reservoirs, leveling fields(125)." with an almost unbrokenrecord of past successes to its credit, the Party had enormous popular prestige."(125)


"when the natural calamities of 1959 -1961 cut down harvest yields, worried leaders took to raiding peasant homes to ferret out needed food and fodder(129). "farming in 1959 was hit by an unexampled run of bad weather and natural calamities: drought, floods, typhoons, hailstorms, and pests that played havoc with what harvests there were(132)." " but again that year(1959) all kinds of natural disaters beset China's farms(133)". "bad weather continued into 1960, and it was only in 1961 that the country began to get back onto an even keel(133).


when the real figures were extracted , China's 1958 harvest was under 200 million tons of grain(129).


In Nov and Dec 1959 sixth plenum of the eightth central committee adopted urgent measures to offset the growing xrisis. Private trade permited in country markets; individual households rebuilt their stoves and kitchens and their pigsties and chichen coops allocated small private plots 5-7% of coummune land(132). 240000 communes were split into 70000.


the initial mistakes made in organizing the communes and the horreous bad weather, in fact threow China's economy into a crisis that took three years to overcome. the nation was brought to the verge of famine(133)... though various self help, along with the centralied organizatin of the communes and a strict rtioning system, pulled the country through the crisis without grave loss of life. yet there was serious malnutrition in some places, and the birthrate dropped sharply as ill nourished women ceased to conceive(133).


by 1962... all debts to the Soviet U were paid off. these included payments for all the Soviet weapons and munitions used during the Korean war. domestic bonds were all redeemed, and the country without either internal or external debts(134). " we learned the full truth we all realized better that the basis of any great leap must be self reliance(135). " when "three years of difficulties" plagued the nation in the wake of the GL(135)


liu Shaoqi joined his voice to the chorus of opponents of the communes. the peasants " had gained nothing from the collective economy in the last few years". Liu in a speech to cadres going to the grass roots level, July 18, 1962. Deng Xiaoping's famous remark that so long as it raises output, ' going it alone is permissible. whether cats are wite or black, so long as they can catch mice, they are good cats."


in July 1959, speaking off thecuff to a group friends during the festival of literature and art of the PLA, Zhou Yang charged that the GLF has "exploited the enthusiansm of the masses"(146)
 楼主| 发表于 11/14/2014 02:55:17 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/17/2014 14:06 编辑

Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, implications for U.S. Policy, New York, Toronto, London McGraw Hill Book Co. 1966( professor of economics at the U of Michigan, author of The National Income of Communist China)


" Mistaken policies combined with unfavorable weather led to the agricultural crisis in China(57). all the blame was officially placed on nature. before 1949, China was largely self sufficient in performing the supplied food to the population and provide raw materials for the food producing and textile industries function. not served as the principal bulwark of the exports(57)


state statistical bureau in 1958 claimed that the jproduction of food crops and cotton nearly doubled in one year, i.e., increased from 185 mt and 1.64 mt respectively in 1957 to 375 (claimeed on April 15, 1959 People's daily but on August 27 revised to 250 mt; see Eckestene 63)and 3.35 mt in 1958. thus the targets of the 12 year program for agricultural development enunciated in 1956 were allegedly atttained by 1958 !(p. 61 and see Zhou Enlai's "Report on Government Work" at the first session of the second National people's congress on April 18, 1959 ( New China semimonthly) no. 9, May 6, 1995, p.2.) on this base, the central committee went ahead and set extremely ambitious targets for 1959 as well, 525 mt for food crops and 5 mt for cotton.( People's daily Dec 18, 1958; )


In 1958 the Chinese press constantly reported food shortages...there is no indication taht mainland China's storage and warehousing facilities could have accommodated about 40 million tons of grain. neither is there any evidence of an ambitious program of warehouse construction. If so much food had been stroed in 1958, and more added in 1959, there should have been ample stocks to cope with the officially admitted farm production shortages in 1960 and 1961 and the resultant food crisis(64).


China claimed grain production in 1958 was 375 first then revised to 250 mts, and 275 then revised to 270 mts in state statistical bureau, see Ten Great Years, Statistics of the Economic and Cultural PRC (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1960),p.119. which indicate that food crop production incresed by 35 % in 1958 and by another 8 % in 1959. but after releasing the annual communique for 1959 plan fulfillment in January 1960, The SSB stopped publishing annual production results(64). however, it has been admitted officially that production declined after 1958(65). By 1963 it mayhave recovered to only about 75% of its 1957 level(66).

all indictions point to 1960/61 as the most critical year. the foood situation in China reached its low point in the spring of 1961 (67). Grain imports were stepped up 5.8 mts in 1961/1962 as compared to 2.6 mts in 1960/1961(68). the average per capita caloric intake in China has traditionally been low 2000 to 2200 calories a day(67). a 10-20 per cent reduction can have deleterious effects. Such a decline was already in process well before 1957(67). during the period of the first five year plan the average per capita consumption of pork, other meats, and eggs in Shanghai and Tientsin reportedly droped. (p. 67 see Dagong Bao Tianjin sept 1, 1956. People daily November 27, 1958).


" acute economic crisis of the early 1960s"(1) and China's agricultural crisis of the early 1960s"(6)."agricultural difficulties and a subsequent crisis in the food supply"(9)."acute food crisis of the early 1960s"(67). rising "incidence of nutritional diseases"(68) which have been most widespread in 1961. while the food crisis has been serious there have been no indicaton of mass famines(68) ! the winter of 1960/1961 was so serious thtat even military rations had to be cut.  in some areas there were apparently peasant uprisings and almost complete disintegration of local administration and authority(68).see the top secret Bulletin of Activities of the General Political Department of the Chinese PLA for January 1-August 26, 1961.


the govenment's capital investment in agriculture, forestry, and soil and water conservation averaged around 9 % of total investment during the 1950s(68) which sank below 5 % in the mid fifties. India devoted 32 % then 20 % at roughly the same stage of China.

in the construction of irrigation canals, dams, and other water conservation projects. land reform,mutual adi teams, collectives, communes. thus Chinese agriculture was in a state of constant instaility between 1949 and 1956. shift of resources, incentive rewards, egalitarian wage system, each according to his need. shifting of labour disruption of agricultureal production. production brigades, production team, private garden plots, raise livestock, communal mess halls abandoned. creat a system which would permit the regime to extract the maximunm supluses from agriculture without interfering with farm production(78).the central purpose of collectiviation was to create institutions which would bring about a hight rate of saving inthe economy(79).


the GLF was launched on a series of miscalculations, errors in plan design, and serious mistakes in plan implementatin. the depression reached its depth in 1961. In spite of the recent setbacks and just by virtue of its sheer size, China must be ranked among the 10 leading industrial powers in teh world. in terms of total industrial production capacity, althought not in terms of per capita product. China has the economic capability to support a military establishment of such tange and scope that she will be able to pursue her great power ambitions on the Asian continent. the GLF and its aftermath have tarnished the image of success, but not as much as one might expect. increasing foreign adi commitments to underdeveloped countries, coupled with technical assistance and deliveries of industrial equipment, have to some extent at least obscured Chinas economic setback. (84-86)






 楼主| 发表于 11/15/2014 03:57:03 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/17/2014 06:32 编辑

The Memoirs of Mao's personal physician Dr.Li Zhisui, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, translated by Professor Tai Hungchao, New York Random House, 1994,pp.198-398.

Mao told Li" I never realized they(democratic parties) were so unreliable ". "They are nothing but a bunch of bandits and whores" he said(201). Mao, I know now, was being disingenuous, his strategy of using the intellectuals to criticize his foes within the party had backfired(202). Deng Xiaoping was put in charge of the anti-rightist campaign. what vengeance Deng conducted the anti-rightist campaign and how viciously he attacked those who would unermine the party's rule(207). in July 17 1957, Mao published "the political conditions in teh summer of 1957" said the tusk was to supass the US economically within forty or fifty years(209)."if we were to add up all teh landlords, rich peasants, conterrevolutionary, bad elements and rightists, reach thrity millions, they are enemies of the people.mao said to Li(217).

how little the lives of his countrymen meant to Mao. "we have so many people we can afford to lost a few. what difference does it make? Mao ask Li(217).

In November 1957 Mao return to Moscow triumphant, Khrushchew was firendly and respectful to Mao, personally escorting him to the Kremlin palace where he was to stay(220). "look how differently they are treating us now" what snobs!" Mao said. "wihin fiteen years China will overtake teh Great Britain in the production of steel and other major industrial products. whole world would be ripe for the communist revolution." Mao said to the assembled delegates(224). Mao neither has basis for asserting nor knowledge of waht the capitalist world was like. A new strategy was germinating in his mind. the seeds of his great leap forward the most utopian and misguided of all his polies had been sown(225).


in Juanary 11 1958 at Nanning conference, the majority of party planners did not share Mao's goal of catching up with England in fifteen years,and Mao spent much of the eleven days attacking the cautious leaders in charge of planning, development, and finance. few escaped his whip even Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun were criticized( 229). Bo Yibo, the chairman of the state economic commission., known for his caution, under Mao's gun he too was under great psychological strain. Huang Jing, the chairman of the state technology commission, cracked under the strain, he lying in bed, staring at the ceiling, muttering incomprehensibl, "save me, save me" he kept beggin Dr. Li(230). He knelt down before Li Fuchun and kowtowed , begging Li to free him and spare his lilfe. He was put in a hospital in Guang Zhou, where he tried to escape by jumping form a window and broke a leg in teh process, he died in Novermer 1958.

Mao has faith in teh young and the unschooled or uneducated. He said that Sun Yat sen was not a man of learning. he hasd only a hight school education when he began his revolution. " the great scholars hav always been overthrown by the young and uneducated"(235).  "Intellectuals are unstable, swinging with the wind" they read a lots of books, but they are ignorant of real life". Mao at Chendu conferance said to Li (236). To express skepticism about the unrealistically high output targets was to risk being labeled a rights. the force of Mao's will gradually silenced those who disagreed, and those who pandered to him began to lie, agreeing to higher targets even when they knew those targets were impossible to obtain, claiming to have reached those targets even when they had fallen short. the party was beginning to lie, an dMao seemed to like best the most outageous liars(236)

I was astounded Deng Yingchao was not honest, and she had cousulted with Zhou Enlai, I realized that Zhou was Mao's slave, absolutely, obsequiously obedient. everythng he did was designed to court favor with Mao. and be loyal to Mao. Neither he nor his wife had a shred of independentthought(258).


Jiang Qing said to Li "Doctor, you donot understand the Chairman, he is very loose with his love life. his physical pleasre and his mental activity are separate, and there are alwys women willing to be his prey. you have to teach these young nurses something about morality. they should be courteous to their leader, but they should also be careful in their contact with him"(260).Jiang saw reality clearly Mao's appetite for sex was enormous, and sex and love were separate.


Mao returned the extravagant hospitality given him in the Soviet U with a slap in Khrushchev's face(261).On July 31, 1958, He received him by the side of his swimming pool, clad only in his swimming trunks. Khrushchev did not then acknowledge the insult. Mao was deliberately playing the role of emperor , treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. Mao told me on teh way back to Beidaihe it was a way of sticking a needle up his ass"(261). their real purpose is to control us. they are trying to tie our hands and feet. the Soviet proposed the creation of a joint fleet and wanted to build a long range radio station in CHina.  He want a promise from China not to attack Taiwan. he also criticizing China for beginning a program to amalgamate the agricultural collectives into huge peoples communes(262). Mao told him the joint fleet with his ships and our captains. Taiwan is our own domestic affair. we will definitely give the communes a try(262). "Khrushchev wants to improve relations with the US? good, we'll congratulate him with our guns. our cannon shells have been in storage for so long they are becoming uselss. so wy donot we just use them for a celebration? let us get the US involved. Maybe we can get the US to drop an atom bomb on Fujian. Maybe ten or twenty million people will be killed(262). " let us leave Taiwan alone. Taiwan keeps the pressure on us. it helps maintain our internal unity. "262


by early 1958, with Mao's efforts to whip up party support for his approach, Internal Reference had turned 180 degrees, glorifying the great advances that were taking place throughout the country. "this is an extraordinary event the term people's commune is great. " Mao said.


Mao's political secretary Tian Jiaying always exceptionally well informed, not just from the reports that came in through Internal Reference but because he was continually receiving confidential background material from the provinces and from his friends and lower level political secretaries all over China. He point out that when advanced cooperatives were introduced in 1956, the peasants complained that we were going too fast. commune economically unsound, a way for the provincial leaders to escape Mao's whip, a new method of courting favor with the Chairman(266). Tian said the provincial leaders wanted to show the they were doing their best to carry out the decisions on Chengdu and Nanning, they used all sorts of tricks to get the central authority's attention and went into a frenzy competing with each other to increase production targets. they all wanted to be in the vanguard(266).


on August  23, 1958 Mao's answer Khrushchev by shells Quemoy island. seeing Khrushchev's efforts at world peace as an attempt to control him an China, Mao deliberately tried to trip up the game. Mao was convinced that Jiang Jie shi wanted the US todrop an atom bomb on Fujian and Mao would not have minded if it had. His shelling of Quemoy was a dare to see how far the US would go. Khrushchev thought he wanted to retake Taiwan. but that was never Mao's intention(270). the game Mao play was a terrible gamble, threatening the world with atomic war and risking the lives of tens of millions of ordinary Chinese(271).


Mikoyan came to meet Mao in Hangzhou in 1957 to talks on CHina's proposed development of nuclear weapons. the discuss with Mao shaken him, and greatly distressed by Mao's nonchalance about the massive loss of human life(206). Mao argued that China could afford to lose tens of millions of people in a nuclear war.Mikoyan described the horrible destructiveness of the atom bomb. hoped China would learn from the experience of the Soviet U and cease trying to build the bomb. the costs millions and millions of rubles, and the debilitating illness aplastic anemia.

on september 19, 1958 at Hefei Mao was beginning to talk about establishing a free food supply system in teh rural communes, so people could eat all they wanted without have to pay. he talked about taking cadres off salaries and returning them to a free suppy system similar to the one that had existed until 1954(274). Mao thought the problem could be solved by establishing communes in the cities too(275).Mao had doubts the backyard steel furnaces and whether such small scale millis were to catch up with Great British in fifteen years."why do foreigners build such gigantic steel mills? are forigners really s stupid?"(276)


Tian Jiaying argued that it is absurd to think we can march into a communist society by dragging a naked and starving population along with us. peopld are telling lies, boasting. they have lost their sense of shame. some of the reports coming in from the provinces, were claiming average grain yields per mu of ten thousand pounds. " this ridiculous it is shameful" Tian said.(276) He blamed the deceit on teh atmosphere created by Mao. " when the king of Chu was looking for a consort with a pretty figure, all his councubines starved to death trying to lose weight". Mao was accustomed to sycophancy and flattery. top level officials put pressure on the lower ones, and lower level cadres coplied both by working the peasants relentlessly and by reporting what their superiour wanted to hear. In the later summer of 1958 China was stuk with a mass hysteria fed by Mao. Mao began believing the slogans, casting caution to the winds.  Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, and Chen Yi, speaking with a single voice and that is Mao's . everyone was caught in the grip of this utopian hysteria(277).

every communes Mao visited provided tesimony to the abundance of the upcoming harvest.  Mao's earlier skepticism had vanished. The Party secretaries had ordered furnaces constructed everywhere along the rail route, stretching out for ten li on either side, and the women were dressed so colorfully, in reds and greens. because they had been ordered to dress that way. In Hubei, party secretary Wang Renzhong had ordered the peasants to remove rice plants from faraway fields and transplant them along Mao's route, to give the impression of a wildly abundant crop. All China all the people performaers in an extravaganza for Mao(278)

Li had seen in Anhui the finished steel that Zeng Xisheng claimed had been produced by the backyard steel furnace was fke, delivered there from a huge modern factory(278).Lin De said that the newspapers were filled with falsehoods, they would not dare tell the public what was really happpening". but Li did not really believe Lin Ke. He was swept away by the dream of the GLF, caught up in its delusions. He still trusted the party , Mao, the People's Daily. (279). No one, even the cloest to him dared to speak out. Li said even in October 1958, He doubted theat Mao really know the truth. on November 2 to 10 Henan conferance, Mao now was trying to slow them down he was putting a brake on the most fantastical claims. but about the production figures and the backyard furnaces. he had no complaints. (280)


From November 28 to December 10 1958 Wuhan the Sixth Plenum continued the effort to bring more reality to the Great Leap Forward. Zhou flattery Mao said that "Today we have that kind(one day equals twenty years ) of productive power"(282).Ke Qingshi followed suit" Haven's we already outdone Marx in both theory and practice?"


Agricultural production in the fall of 1958 was the highest in China's history. but by mid December, the nation was seriously short of food(282).in fact, a large portion of the huge harvest lay uncollected in teh fields. for massive peasants had been transferred from the fields to work in the backyard steel furnaces.  in fact, Li did not know it then, China was tottering on the brink of disaster. the leading cadres of the party and first party secretaries in the provinces were ingratiating themselves with Mao. disregarding the welfare of hundreds of millions of peasants.  taxed according to their faked reports some places were delivering all they had produced to the state.  Ironically, much of the grain that was sent to the statte as taxes was exported. repaying its debts to the Soviet U Mao could not admit that the communes Khrushchev had so vigorously opposed were anything less than a success(283).


to minimize their losses and keep enough food to eat, communes were saying that they had been struck by natural disaster. their harvest had been abundant, but the weather had destroyed it(283). Dec 1958, Tian Jiaying was the best informaed and the most honest, he was in Henan, investigating the situation there(284) . In Dec 1958 at Changsha, Zhou Ziaozhou was the first to cirticize Mao. then In Dec 26 at Guangzhou, Mao wondered occasionally whether land really could produce ten thousand pounds per mu and was also susicious about the quality of steel being produced in teh backyard steel furnaces. "is that steel really useful"?

in the new year 1959, beijing was in panic, rumors that ruban communes were soon to be established had swept the city(288).Mao heard the hue and cry of the urban residents and soon abandoned his plan for urban communes. Tian Jiaying warned that this was only the beginning. the wholes nation faced a serious shortage of food. and no end was in sight(290).

In Late January 1959 Mao went to northeast to see both steel factories and coal mines and conclusive. high quality steel can be produced ony in huge modern factories using reliable fuel, like coal. but he gave no order to halt the backyard steel furnaces(291). when the seventh Plenum of the eighth party central committee met in shanhai form April 2 to 5 1959 Mao was still optimistic. Mao blain the party leadership for the dislocations of the GLF. false reports and inflated statistics were rampant. "there are so many lies" he said to Li" when there is pressure from the top  there will be lies from the bottom"(295). but the real pressure had come from Mao. he himself had created the atmosphere that made it so difficult for party leaders to tell the truth, Mao saw the fault not in himself but in other leaders, In mid April 1959, congress accepted Mao's resignation as chairman of the republic. Elected Liu in stead(297).


at the end of May 1959, Mao went to Wuhan again, Wang Renzhong claimed the the famine was the result of natural disasters. but there had been no natural disaster in Hubei. the weather in 1958 and 1959 had been splendid. much of the abundant crop had simply not been colleted(299).then Mao back Shaoshan, "if you can not fill your bellies at the publich dining hall then its better just to disband it" Mao said " if you cannot produce good steel , you might as well quit"(304).Mao stll did not want to do anything to dampen the enthusiasm of the masses(304). a horrible famine was sweeping the country.


Tian Jiaying described the famine in Sichuan. the government's efforts to alleviate the crisis had been inadequate. the overly optimistic target for steel production in 1959 had been cut form 20 mt to 13 mt. in July ,,but 60 million able bodied peasants, strong and healthy men who ought to have been at work in the fields, were still working on the backyand steel furnaces(306). Tian was distressed not only because so many people were starving but because so many in authority were lying. people speaking falsehoods are being praised ; the ones who tell the truth are being critiized. Mao was a terrible economist. Wang Jinxian began telling us about Mao's many girlfriends, his private life was shockingly indecent. Wang said(307).


Ke Qingshi, Wang Renzhong and LiJingquan joined our conversation wondering waht we are discussing with such intensity. "we are talking about the famine people are dying of starvation" Tian replied. Li responded " which dynasty has not witnessed death by starvation "? but in 1959, China was supposed to be in teh GLF. even as people starved official propaganda was msking fantasti claims(307). Wang, Ke and Li, under pressure from Mao to increase production or lose their jobs, sacrificed truth on the altar of Mao. they extolled the GLF and mininized their economic problems, feeding the central authority unrealistic ecnommic statistics because they knew what the center wanted to hear. they were supported by central ofiicials like Luo Ruiqing, and Yang Shankun, whose official responsibilies were unrelatedto economic questions but who were attuned to Mao's policy preferences , has been criticized. early teh GLF Bo Yibo resisted setting such unrealistic production targets, but later under pressure from Mao, he had caved in and done everything he could to push his subordinates to meet them. When he realized how serious the econmic crisis was, he instructed is staff to prepare an honest and comprehensive report detailing the problems. but he balked at submitting the report. He dared not challenge Mao. He refused to speak out. Bo never publicly criticized the GLF, nor did Li Fuchun(308). even Tian Jiaying, who has been on inspection tours and know the truth, or provincial leaders like Zhou Xiao zhou, who know the extent of the crisis and was privately critical of both the GLF  and of Mao. were reluctant to challenge Mao directly. at Lushan conferance, Mao know there were proplems with the GLF and he believed measures were being taken to correct those problems .Mao praised the achievements of the GLF. his confidence in the GLF remained unshaken, I do not know how much of the real situation Mao know when he spoke then. He certainly know that something had gone awry and that there were major shortages of food. he hkew that in many places there was no rice to eat, and he was willing to isuss those problems and work to slve them. but I do not think that when he spoke on July 2 1959, he know how bad the disaster had become, and he believed the party was doing everthing it could to manage the situation. " IN short, the situation in general is excellent. there are man problems, but our future is bright". Mao said(310).


on July 10, 1959, the general line, he argued referring to the policy of the GLF and catching up with GB, was completely corredt. the achievement of the past year were great, it is nine achievements and one failure(313). Mao said we have to pay a certain tuition for the experience. the nation had lost some 2 billion Yuan in the endeavor to build steel furnaces. Peng Dehuai handwritten a letter to Mao on July 14, waste huge both natural resoursces and manpower the losses were greater than the gains. Leap has fostered leftist tendencies. a petit bourgeois fanaticism.


Deng Xiaoping was in Beijing hospital receiving round the clock treatment from a young nurse originally sent from Shanhai to Beijing to serve Mao. Shi shuhan told Li that the young woman became pregnant during this time and was trasferred back to Shanghai and forced to have a ahortion(315). Zhang Wentian responded by saying that he would rather die telling the truth than live in misery.


Tian Jiaying Chen Boda, and Hu Qiaomu had been setn to the provices to investigate the results of the GLF. all had witnessed economic disaster and widespread death by staration. Tian in Sichuan, Chen in Fujian, and Huin Anhui. all reported honestly(319).on August 16 1959, Mao wrote that a great struggle had occurred at the Lushan conference " it is a class struggle, a continuatin of the life and death struggle between the two great classes."


corruption within the party grew worse even as the food crisis deepened and more people died. in early January 1960, production targets went up steel production was to increase to 18 mt. irrigation projets would be expanded. large pig farms established. famine finally hit Zhongnanhai. our rations had been reduced to sixteen pounds of grain a month. meat, eggs, and cooking oil were nowhere to be had. Mao know the severity of the crisis. the cocuments he received every day now allowed him no escape from the truth. reports were coming in from all over the country, and by the summer of 1960, he become so depressed tht he took again to his bed. I told him that edema and hepatitis were everywhere(339). Mao did make one concession to the famine. He stpped eating meat. "everyone is starving. I cannot eat meat" he said(340).his gesture won him the admiration of everone who know. Mao believed that counterrevolutionaries were undermining production .


to this day, ruthless though he was, I believe Mao launches the GLF to bring good to China. but he had no modern education and no idea of what the modern world was or how China might join it(351)." I hate the hypocrisy around me, the communist leaders' public carping against the corrupt bourgeois life style, the touting of their hight and lofty communist moral principles ,while they themselves were living lives of luxury asthe masses suffered and toiled and died(354).

in march 1961 the most important issue facing China was the nationwide famine then claiming the lies of millions of peasants by early 1961, some 10 million Anhui peasants were on the verge of starvation and million s died in the ensuing months. hundreds of thousands, those with sufficient energy, were fleeing in search of food. Zeng Xisheng's enthusiasm for the GLF now desperately trying to restore agricultural productinon . he had beguin distributing small plots of communal land to indiviual peasants, who agreed to farm the land in returen for paying the commune a specified portion of their crop(375). Deng support of Zeng s proposal " I donot care if its a white cat or a black cat, it is a good cat so long as it catches mice?Chen Yun said the peasants are doing nothing now but complain, all we have to do is give the peasants their own land disband the communes . Tao Zhu said " if this is capitalism then I prefer capitalism . Liu Shaoqi said we have to go into maximum retreat in both industry and agriculture. we need to dopt the system of household contracts and individualized frming." In 1960 Mao meeting with British Marshal Bernard Montgomery, " if you cannot push everything else aside and fight ruthlessly for your goal, then you will not reach it. you have to know exactly what you want and then rehtlessly remove every obstacle standing in your way. " " all the good party members are dead the only ones left are a bunch of zombies".(380) Mao never admitted thant he was in disgrace never openly acknowledged that the GLF had failed.


In Jaunary 1962 mao support within the party was at its lowest. Liu refused to accept Mao's official explanation that the country's economic disasters had been caused by the weather" natural dissters hit only one region of the country, manmade disasters strike the whole country, we must remember this lesson".  with Mao's retreat the basic level cadres were able at last to end the pretensions of the GLF(386). Mao was forced to admit that at least some of the responsibility for the disaster was his. Mao was loath to admit his mistakes.  Chen Boda had written well and extravagantly in priaisse of the GLF. asserted that with the GLF the dawn of communism had arrived. China was accomplishing in one day what took twenty years to accomplish under capitalism. communism was around the corner(390).with massive starvation during the GLF, Chen dismissed the millions of daths. " this is an unavoidable phenomenon in our forward march" he declared. he absolved Mao of responsibility for one of the greatest catastrophes the country had ever faced. a catastrophe for which Mao's policies were directly responsible. Chen Yun was convinecd that the only solution was a dissolution of the communes nad a returen of land to hte peasants.


Many formal fighters of freedom had contribute all of their energy even life, but China still under teh herous dictatorship tyrant ruling, it is shame of every Chinese!











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