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楼主: 郭国汀

人类历史上最恐怖最荒诞的大饥荒真相

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 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 02:45:14 | 显示全部楼层
中共人为大饥荒的根本原因?
The root and fundamental causesof the great leap famine



The initial pronouncements of the Chinese governmentlaid most blame for what was then  called the "three hard years" on naturaldisasters, which were said to be unusually widespread and devastatingduring the relevant period. The official grain production  data showthat the worst harvest occurred in 1960, which would normally  leadto the food crisis reaching its most acute phase in the spring of 1961;yet,  the official crude death rates show that in 1961 the countrywas well on its  way to recovery from famine (Garnaut  2013:318). even Liu shaoqi himself openly dismissed the official explanation forthe calamities, saying there was "no serious bad weather" in theareas he had visited, nor the strongly hinted, anywhere(Jung Chang 2005:476).ForLiu was deeply troubled by the famine, which he knew had consumed some 30million lives by early 1961(Jung Chang 470). 中共最初将大饥荒归罪于三年自然灾害及欺骗国人苏修撕毁合同逼债,但天灾说,虽然骗取了不少对中国实际国情并不了解的西方专家学者部份采信,但甚至刘少奇自已公开辩称大饥荒是“三分天灾,七分人祸。”而事实上1958年全国气候为历史上最佳年份之一,1959年至1961年绝大部份地区气候良好

The causes lists : output collapse, irrational methods  ofcultivation, destruction of work incentives, wasteful consumption ofavailable  foodgrain, ignorance of the planning authorities,over-procurement of grain by the government, increasedexports in the midst of the crisis, failure toinitiate imports in time, bad  weather,etc. if the government had acted swiftly  to relax procurement, stopexports, begin large-scale imports and move grain to the most seriouslyaffected regions, massive excess deaths  could have been avoided(Riskin1998: 115). the compulsoryprocurement system; the communal dining system; large-scale irrigation projects, water conservancy works; tens of millions, or 30%–50% of the rural labor force,were involved backyard furnaces; Many commune authorities were so preoccupiedwith iron and steel manufacturing in the autumn of 1958 that they neglected to harvest thecrops, which were simply left to rot in thefields. This diversion of resources is estimated to account for 28.6% of theoverall grain output collapse(Kung and Lin 2003: 54). Mao’s decision to reduce the acreage sown to grain by asubstantial 9.6% in 1959.the work-point system; food distribution andconsumption.Mao encouraged the communes to set up communal dining。归纳学者们提出的各类原因有:产量减少,违反科学的密植深耕,摧毁农民劳动刺激,公共食堂的浦张浪费,忽视计划的权威,过度征粮,在饥荒期间增加粮食出口,未能及时进口,及坏天气等。

Man-made causes, however, far outweighted the imput of natural disasters, the area sown to grain in 1959was cut. others fall under the rubie of the 'five wind'blew during the GLF. wind of communism, destroyed peasant incentives;"free supply" eating in mass halls, closing free markets confiscatingprivate plots. ( Bernstein 2006:422)。人为因素远远超过自然灾害的影响,1959年减少98%种植面积,大跃进期间的“五风”:共产风,瞎指挥风,强制命令风,干部特权化风,浮夸风。


plausible cause ofthe famine including radicalism of local party-leaders, dinning halls, poor whether (Garnaut2013:225-6). 加尔诺特提出地方干部的激进主义,公共食堂及坏天气三大原因。


Both Yang and Dikotter throughexams the local party archives, and internal partyreports, present plausible accounts of how Mao and his colleaguesestablished the policies and institutional structuresthat gave rise to the famine. Yang argued that fundamentalcause of the famine was the top-down radicalization of Chinese party-state. Yangsystematically presents the central party leadership has a high degree ofresponsibility for the famine(Yang 2014). 迪科特和杨继绳均认为中共政治体制和政策导致大饥荒。杨争辩道大饥荒的根本原因在于由上到下的中共党国体制。认为中央领导层应负极大责任。


As to procurement. A system of “unified purchase and sale” of grain and othermajor farm products was set up in late 1953 to facilitate the transfer ofagricultural surplus between the agricultural and industrial sectors. The grossprocurement in 1959 increased by more than 30% overthe previous year and reached a record level of 64 million tons, or 38%of total output, against an average procurement rate of 25% in the pre-Leapyears.a widely held view attributes this excessiveness to Mao’s erroneousbelief that China had produced a grain output that was twice the size of theprevious year, a belief fueled by the exaggerations and falsification of grainoutput. But procurement ratio remained high, at32.4%, in 1960, after Mao became aware of the multitude of problemsassociated with the commune in general and the public dining institution inparticular(Kung and Lin 2003:55).中共自1953年起在全国实行“统购统销”政策,实质上是强制超级榨取农民血汗供奉工业和其他各行业,起初按农产品的25%征收农业税,1959年3月26日毛下令全国按1/3强制征业税。国民党时代在抗战期间国统区农业税仅10%,延安地区却征30%。在大跃进期间的1959年强制征收率达38%,1960年仍高达32.4%。毛下令若农民抗拒交粮可以动用武力。


Thomas Bernstein’s early macroview that the Maoist state’s excessive grainprocurement was the cause of the Great Leap famine.[1] Kung and Lin conclude thata decline in food availability, thedeepening of an existing systemic bias thatdiscriminated against the rural population in the form of excessive grain procurement, and, finally, therelationships between policy discretions, excessivelabor mobilization, and death rates. Conversely, we fail to support theidea that communal dining was the main causeof the Leap’s famine(2003: 67). Garnaut concluded that localparty leaders encouraged to implement radical policies, were the root causeof the famine. It is suggested that the radicalization of localparty leaders, often considered to be a key cause of spatial variation infamine severity, was strongly conditioned by factors of economicgeography(Garnaut 2014: 341). Bernstein的早期研究结论认为毛的过度强制征粮是大饥荒的主因。K和L的结论为粮食减产,以过度征粮形式表现的城乡差别对待政策,及政策随意性过度大规模调动劳动力与死亡率之间的关系。但未能证明公共食堂是饥荒的主因。英国牛津大学历史学教授G则认为地方干部鼓励实施过激政策是大饥荒的根源。我的研究结果证实党国专制体制虽然是几乎所有共产国家灾难的总根源。中外学者们归纳的各类原因诸如:产量减少,违反科学的密植深耕,摧毁农民劳动刺激,公共食堂的浦张浪费,忽视计划的权威,过度征粮,在饥荒期间增加粮食出口,未能及时进口,及坏天气,地方官员为缴功请赏而采取激进举措,及政治体制专制等均是表面现象或支节原素而非本质原因。我认为具体导致大饥荒的根本原因是计划经济体制,尤其是强行推行农业集体化。凡是曾强制农业集体化的共产党国家无一例外,全部(苏联,中国,越南,简普寨,阿富汉,安哥拉,埃塞俄比亚)曾惨遭甚至不止一次大饥荒。反之三个保留有私营农场体制的前共产党专制国家(波兰,南斯拉夫和古巴)却未出现过大饥荒的事实证实党国专制体制是大饥荒的重要原因但并非充要原因。如果说共产党国专制体制与计划经济体制密不可分,强制农业集体化并非全部共产极权国家均采用。


What are the five winds? the 'five wind'blew during the GLF. wind of communism,destroyed peasant incentives; "free supply" eating in mass halls,closing free markets confiscating private plots. secondwind was of " blind directives" set of wholly unrealisticproduction targets. the third was a " wind ofcommands" , compelled peasants to do exhausting labour. fourth was a wind of " cadre special privileges",cadre appropriated food whenever shortage arose. finallythe " wind of exaggeration of output", led to devastatingincreases in state grain procurements based on false date, played a majorcaused role in the famine. (Bernstein2006: 422-3)





[1]Thomas Bernstein, “Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants,” Theory and Society 13 (1984):339–377.



 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:27:06 | 显示全部楼层
The seed of great leap forward

In November 1957 Mao return to Moscow triumphant, Khrushchev was friendly andrespectful to Mao, personally escorting him to the Kremlin palace where he wasto stay. "look how differently they are treating us now" whatsnobs!" Mao said. "within fifteen yearsChina will overtake the Great Britain in the production of steel and othermajor industrial products. whole world would be ripe for the communistrevolution." Mao said to the assembled delegates. Mao neither hasbasis for asserting nor knowledge of what the capitalist world was like. A newstrategy was germinating in his mind. the seeds of his great leap forward themost utopian and misguided of all his polices had been sown(Li 1994
220224 225).


 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:28:58 | 显示全部楼层
About government  policies, exports and imports of food, social and administrative disarray due to the Great  Leap Forward, per capita food availability over the period, and mortality statistics. China did not publish any date, until a couple of articles published in China in 1980-81 presented a few isolated statistics on mortality and fertility rates for those years .  The first major article introducing the existence and  full severity of the Chinese famine to a broader public was by Amartya Sen in his article  "How is India Doing?"  (Riskin 1998: 113).
 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:33:49 | 显示全部楼层
Mao intently insult Khrushchev who criticizing thecommunes


On July 31, 1958, He received him by the side of hisswimming pool, clad only in his swimming trunks. Khrushchev did not thenacknowledge the insult. Mao was deliberately playing the role of emperor,treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. Mao told me on theway back to Beidaihe, it was “a way of sticking a needle up his ass”. Theirreal purpose is to control us. They are trying to tie our hands and feet. TheSoviet proposed the creation of a joint fleet and wanted to build a long rangeradio station in China.  He wants a promise from China not to attackTaiwan. He also criticizing China for beginning a program to amalgamate theagricultural collectives into huge peoples communes(Li 1994:261-62).

 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:35:59 | 显示全部楼层
books and essays on great famine
Cao Shuji, Da jihuang (The GreatFamine) (Hong Kong: Shidai Guoji Chuban Youxiangongsi, 2005)
Yang Jisheng, Mubei: Zhongguoliushi niandai dajihuang jishi (Tombstone: A Report on the Great Famine of the1960s in China) (Hong Kong: Tiandi Tushu, 2008)
Dong Fu (pseudonym), Maimiao qing, caihuahuang (Wheat Sprouts Green, Rape Flowers Yellow) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Shuwu,2008)
Qiao Peihua, Xinyang shijian (TheXinyang Disaster) (Hong Kong: Kaifang Chubanshe, 2009).
Song Yongyi and Ding Shu, Dayuejin -dajihuang: lishi he bijiao shiye xia de shishi he sibian (Great LeapForwardGreat Leap Famine: The Truth and Analysis under Historicalnd ComparativePerspectives) (Hong Kong: Tianyuan Shuwu, 2009)

 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:37:51 | 显示全部楼层
Works Cited


•        Becker,Jasper. Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine (New York: Henry Holt, 1996)
•        Bernstein,Thomas P. “Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960: A Study in Willfulness.” The China Quarterly no 186(2006), pp 421-445.
•        Bramall, Chris. “Agency and Famine in China's Sichuan Province, 1958–1962”. The China Quarterly, 208, (2011), pp 990-1008
•        Chang,Jung and Jon Halliday. Mao, The Unknown Story, New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 2005.
•        Chen, Jack. Inside The Cultural Revolution. New York, London: MacMillan Publing Co.,Inc 1975 pp.123-151.
•        Chen,Yixin. “ When Food Became Scarce life and Death in Chinese Villages during the Great Leap Forward Famine.”The Journal of The Historical Society X:2 June 2010.pp.117-165.
•        Chung, Yen Lin. “The CEO of the Utopian Project: Deng Xiaoping's Roles and Activities in the Great Leap Forward.” The China Journal No.69 (2013), pp.154-173.
•        Clubb,O. Edmund. 20th Century China, New York , London: Columbia University Press, 1964.pp.352-367. Mr. Clubb is the last US Consul General in Peping,has llectured on Chinese history at Columbia U, New Your U, Brooklyn College.
•        Crespigny,Rafe De. China This Century.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.pp.222-233. Dr. Rafe currently Reader in Chinese at the Australian National University.
•        Dikotter,Frank. Mao’s Great Famine The Historyof China most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 New York: Walker & Co. 2010.
•        Eckstein, Alexander. Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade, implications for U.S. Policy. New York, Toronto, London: McGraw Hill Book Co. 1966( Eckstein is a professor of economics at the U of Michigan, author of The National Income of Communist China)
•        Fairbank, John K. and Goldman, Merle. China A new History, enlarged Ed, Cambridge, London: Harvard University press 1998.pp.368-382.
•        Garnaut, Anthony. “Hard facts and half-truth: the New archival history of China's Great Famine.” China Information 2003: 27 (2) pp.223-246. ( Garnaut is a professor at the U of Oxford)
•        Garnaut,Anthony. “The Geography of the Great Leap Famine.”Modern China 2014, Vol. 40(3) 315–348.
•        Gelber,Harry G. The Dragon and the Foreign Devils : Chian and the World, 1100 BC to the Present. London: Bloomsbury 2007.pp.355-363.
•        Guillermaz, Jacques. The Chinese Communist Party in Power 1949-1976, Trans. Anne Destenay, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1976, pp. 207-241.
•        Hsu,Immanuel C.Y. The Rise of Modern China. fourth ed, New York, London: Oxford University Press 1990,pp.652-658.
•        Joseph,William A. “A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-Mao Views of the Great Leap Forward.” Modern China, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 419-457.
•        Karnow,Stanley. Mao and China: Inside China's Cultural Revolution. Penguin Books 1972.pp.92-109
•        Kung, James K.S. and Chen Shuo. “ The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China’s Great Leap Famine.” American Political Science Review Vol. 105(1), February 2011,pp.27-45. (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)
•        Kung, James K. S. and Lin,Justin Yifu. “ The Causes of China’s Great Leap Famine, 1959–1961.” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2003), pp. 51-73.
•        Li, Zhisui. The Private Life of Chairman Mao, trans. Tai, Hungchao. New York: Random House, 1994,pp.198-398.
•        Riskin,Carl .“Seven Questions about the Chinese famine of 1959 to 1961”. China Economic Review Vol 9(2) 1998,pp.112-124.
•        Sen,Amartya. “Democracy as a universal value.” Journal of Democracy 10(3), (1999), pp. 3–17.
•        Spence, Jonathan D. The Search for Modern China. 2ed, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999 pp.544-564.
•        Thornton,Richard C. China A Political History 1917-1980. Westview Press 1982,pp.249-271.
•        Wemheuer, Felix. “Dealing with Responsibility for the Great Leap Famine in the People's Republic of China.” The China Quarterly(2010), 201, pp 176-194.
•        Yang Jisheng. Tombstone: a record of China’s great famine in the 1960s(Hong Kong: Tiandi tushu, 2008).
•        Yany Jisheng. “The Fatal Politics of the PRC’s Great Leap Famine: the preface to Tombstone.”  Journal of Contemporary China  19(66), September  2010, 755–776.





 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:39:46 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/27/2014 15:41 编辑

Does Mao know the famines truth?


local official did not dare to report the truth. But agreat deal of information did reach Mao during the autumn of 1958 and firsthalf of 1959. On 5 Sept 1958, an anonymous letter reported that in threetownship in Lingbi county, Anhui, 500 people has starved to death and many toosick to get out of bed. In a comment date on 2 Oct 1958, Mao asked Zeng Xishengto investigate (Bernstein 2006:424). in mid Nov 1958, Mao learned about anepidemic, had spread to 21 county 71 village in Handan Hebei.  Maoordered the report at the Wuchang conference; " neglectof livelihood is a nationwide problems, which must immediately be brought tothe attention of responsible comrades all levels of entire party, equal weightmust be given to work and to livelihood (Bernstein  426).

On Nov 1958, Yunnan provincial party committee sentMao an investigation report on outbreaks of edema, serious deaths had results.The main reason was tense and bitter labour battles, cadre relies on force andviolence laws and discipline. On 2 Feb 1959, Maospoke of five million cases of edema resulting from neglect of livelihood. In early April 1959, Mao received a report from ZhouEnlai on Spring famine in Shangdong, Jiang Su, Henan, Hebei, and Anhui. The centralDisaster Relief Committee also provided statistics on spring famine in 15provinces. On 17 April, Mao asked Zhouimmediately to sent reports to the first party secretaries, so as to “save 25.2 million people from two months of urgent danger."in the spring of 1959, Maonot only justified peasant resistance but told basic level cadres to " payno attention to the directives from a higher level". In a letter on April 29, 1959, Mao sent via aninternal publication to officials from the contre down to the brigades, " do not pay attention to those kinds of higher levelcadres. only pay attention to reality, speak the truth and report how muchoutput you can actually guarantee, do not lie". However, Mao failedto address the underlying, system problem, which was the GLF itself. "petty-bourgeois fanaticism" one person make all decision, many people wereafraid to speak out. leftism was prevailing over everywhere. the higher thanusual mortality did not become known until the statistics were worked out. not until 1960 was it finally realized that manypeasants were starving and the whole economy had been thrown into a shambles.(Faibank1998:372-3)

In contrast, Aug 1959 and the last weeks of Feb1960, the available records indicate Mao did not receive adverse information.partly because of the extraordinary harshness of anti-rightist campaign, somecourageous individuals may have submitted truthful reports, Mao choose not tocut on them, sincere he was fanatically determined to push the leap to furtherheights(Bernstein 423) the trouble information didreach Mao beginning in late Feb 1960.

On 29 March 1960,Zhou Enlai received an anonymous letter from Anhui, on serious grain shortagesin counties. deaths from starvation had occurred; Zhou forward the letter to ZengXisheng, with a request to investigate, clearly, neitherZhou nor Mao felt a sense of urgency about those deaths. On 30 April 1960 in Tianjin, Tan Zhenglin, told Maothat inspective terms had been sent to Fuyang, Anhui, found that onlyindividual deaths, most sick people had been cured. A large number of deathsoccurred in Henan, especially in Xinyang. but Mao did not know this neither didTan Zhelin. On 6 May 1960, in Henan Wu Zhipu,informed Mao of a severe drought butinsisted that the wheat crop was doing pretty well. He reportedmany cases of edema, around 100000, mainly in Xinyang, several tens ofthousands died ( autumn 1960 investigation reveals a death toll of 1.36million, 14 % population). While Mao begun to doubt the reliability of reportsfrom below, calling for investigations, little wasdone at this times. He was unwilling to jettison the GLF(Bernstein 440).

Mao's political secretary Tian Jiaying alwaysexceptionally well informed, not just from the reports that came in throughInternal Reference but because he was continually receiving confidentialbackground material from the provinces and from his friends and lower levelpolitical secretaries all over China. He point out that when advanced cooperatives were introduced in 1956, the peasantscomplained that we were going too fast. commune economically unsound, away for the provincial leaders to escape Mao's whip, a new method of courtingfavor with the Chairman(Li 1994:266).

Li said even in October 1958,He doubted that Mao really know the truth. OnNovember 2 to 10 Henan conference, Mao now was trying to slow them down he wasputting a brake on the most fantastical claims. But about the production figuresand the backyard furnaces, he had no complaints. (Li 280)

Agricultural production in the fall of 1958 wasthe highest in China's history. But by mid December,the nation was seriously short of food(Li 282). Dec1958, Tian Jiaying was the best informed and the most honest, he was inHenan, investigating the situation there(Li 284) .

In Late January 1959Mao went to northeast to see both steel factories and coal mines andconclusive. High quality steel can be produced any in huge modern factoriesusing reliable fuel, like coal. But he gave noorder to halt the backyard steel furnaces (Li 291). In May of 1959, a horriblefamine was sweeping the country, Mao still did not want to do anythingto dampen the enthusiasm of the masses(Li 304).

At Lushan conference, Mao know therewere problems with the GLF and he believed measures were being taken to correctthose problems .Mao praised the achievements of the GLF. Hisconfidence in the GLF remained unshaken; I do not know how much of the realsituation Mao knows when he spoke then. Hecertainly knew that something had gone awry and that there were major shortagesof food. He knew that in many places therewas no rice to eat, and he was willing to isuss those problems and workto solve them. But I do not think that when hespoke on July 2 1959, he knew how bad the disaster had become, and hebelieved the party was doing everything it could to manage the situation." IN short, the situation in general is excellent. there are manyproblems, but our future is bright". Mao said(Li 310).

Tian Jiaying Chen Boda, and Hu Qiaomu had been sentto the provinces to investigate the results of the GLF; Tian in Sichuan,Chen in Fujian, and Hu in Anhui. All had witnessed economic disaster andwidespread death by starvation. All reported honestly (Li 319).on August 16 1959, Mao wrote that a great struggle hadoccurred at the Lushan conference " it is aclass struggle, a continuation of the lifeand death struggle between the two great classes."

In early January 1960, productiontargets went up steel production was to increase to 18 MT. irrigationprojects would be expanded. Large pig farmsestablished. Famine finally hit Zhongnanhai. Ourrations had been reduced to sixteen pounds of grain a month, meat, eggs, andcooking oil were nowhere to be had. Mao knew the severity of the crisis. The documentshe received every day now allowed him no escape from the truth. Reports werecoming in from all over the country, and by the summerof 1960, he become so depressed the he took again to his bed. I told himthat edema and hepatitis were everywhere (Li 339). Mao did make one concessionto the famine. He stopped eating meat. "everyoneis starving. I cannot eat meat" he said(Li 340).

In 1960 Mao meeting with British Marshal BernardMontgomery, " if you cannot push everythingelse aside and fight ruthlessly for your goal, then you will not reach it. Youhave to know exactly what you want and then ruthlessly remove every obstaclestanding in your way. " " all thegood party members are dead the only ones left are a bunch of zombies".(Li380) Mao never admitted that he was in disgrace never openly acknowledged thatthe GLF had failed.

Mao never admitted that he was in disgrace neveropenly acknowledged that the GLF had failed. In January 1962 Mao support within the party wasat its lowest. Liu refused to accept Mao's officialexplanation that the country's economic disasters had been caused by theweather “natural disasters hit only one regionof the country, manmade disasters strike the whole country, we must rememberthis lesson”.  with Mao's retreat the basic level cadres wereable at last to end the pretensions of the GLF(Li 386). Mao was forced to admit that at least some of the responsibility forthe disaster was his. Mao was loath to admithis mistakes.  
In Nov and Dec 1959
sixth plenum of the eighth central committee adopted urgent measures to offsetthe growing crisis. Private trade permitted in country markets; individualhouseholds rebuilt their stoves and kitchens and their pigsties and chickencoops allocated small private plots 5-7% of commune land(Chen1975: 132). Veryclear Jack Chen lie here!

1959年1月时任广东省委书记的赵紫阳向中南局书记陶柱汇报称:“许多公社藏匿粮食,仅在一个县即发现藏粮35000吨。(Dikotter 85)据此,赵发起一场反藏粮运动,挖出100万吨粮食。陶表扬之并向毛泽东汇报。随后安徽曾希圣报告称:“所谓农村缺粮问题,与缺粮无关,也与国家过度征粮无关;它是意识形态问题,特别是地方干部的问题。”毛立即转发上述报告并批示:“生产队干部藏粮私分非常严重。遍及全国,必须立即解决!”毛指示清洗5%的地方干部,几个月后悄然将比例增加到10%。1959年厦天以后,全国各地民兵强制挨家挨户强制翻箱倒柜挖地拆墙,查藏粮。结果许多地区农民很快便被迫吃树叶,茅草,石膏,观音土!(Dikotter169)


事实上,1958年已出现饥荒迹象,1958年3月-4月即已开始缺粮饥荒并漫延全国。广西六分之一的人口缺粮,部分县已饿死人;山东67万人挨饿;安徽130万人陷入饥荒;湖南十分之一的人口已短粮一个月;广东近100万人挨饿,其中惠阳,湛江特别严重出现农民卖儿女现象;河北因缺粮致成千上万农民外出讨饭,苍县、保定、丹阳亦出现卖儿女;天津涌入14000乞丐;甘肃许多农民吃树根,数百人已经饿死。这还仅是春饥荒,入厦后部分地区更加严重,云南吕梁六分之一的人口饿死于1958年1月至8月期间,共16100人,有些是被打死,大多死于饥饿和疾病(Dikotter 67)由于剥夺虚弱无法干活的农民的口粮,云南曲静地区82000人饿死,谢富治1958年11月书面汇报毛,毛从此特别欣赏谢,一年后将谢提升为公安部长。(68)1958年11月日时任外长的陈毅公开称“现在我们有一些人病饿而死,这算得了什么?!Now we have a few cases of illness and death: it’s nothing!”(70)农业部长谭震林估计58年1月全国五百万人患饥饿导致之水肿,七万人业已饿死。周恩来则确认十二万人已饿死。(89)到1959年上半年大饥荒已漫延全国。一九五八年全国已有十二个省出现严重饥荒非正常死亡率达千分之十二点三至二十一点六,云南(21.62),甘肃(21.11),四川(17.37),贵洲 (15.26),宁夏(14.1),河南(12.69),山东(12.77),青海(12.64),安徽(12.36),广西,湖南,河北。质言之,该十二个省在1958年因 饥荒已饿死至少数百万人[1]。谢富治承认:1960年,有180万人犯分布在1077个工厂,矿山;及440个农场,1958年和1962年死亡率各约为5%,1959年到1961年死亡率是10%,超过70万人犯死于饥荒和疾病(Dikotter289)。


1958年8月19日毛指示各省负责人“如果农民抗拒交粮,可动用武力执行命令。”[2]毛反复指控地方干部藏匿粮食。1959年2月27日,毛对最高层说“所有的生产队均藏粮以便私分,他们藏在秘密处所,派人把守。”毛咬定“农民白天啃胡罗卜,晚上吃大米。”毛对圈内人说“农民藏粮非常坏,没有一点共产主义精神。农民毕境是农民,那是他们唯一能做的事。”[3]而毛明知农民根本无粮可藏,毛有高效的情报体制,准确报告每日发生的重大事件。1958年11月18日,一份云南省情报送交毛,描述了因缺营养导致的大肚子病引起大量死亡。毛再次将其推给地方“这主要是县级干部的错误”。毛知道许多地方农民被迫吃观音土,有些村庄全村人饿死。1959年毛榨取出口粮食474万吨,价值九亿三千五百万美元。其他食品,尤其是猪肉出口亦大增。1959年4月毛已知全国一半地区已严重饥荒:“一个大问题,15个省2517万人没有粮食吃”要各省处理。



[1] Source.—StateStatistical Bureau, A Compendium of Materials on Population andCensusStatistics, 1949–1985 (Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian, 1949–1985)(Beijing:Zhongguo Caizheng Jingji Chubanshe [China’s Economic and FinancialPress], 1988).
[2]Jung Chang, Mao, The Unknown Story, Alfred A.Knopf, New York. 2005. P.428
[3]Jung Chang, Mao, The Unknown Story, Alfred A.Knopf, New York. 2005. P.428



 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:49:43 | 显示全部楼层
Chinese traditional way to dealing with natural disaster, especially famine caused by bad weather, the earliest record historical document is The Shijin which is edited by Coufucian himself from more than 3000 poem during more than 2000 BC to his times, that is about 550 BC.  the Dang was wroten by a King about 900-800 BC, who taught his son what principle should be take to handle natural disasters.


What crimes we have committed today? Why heaven send down death and disorder,and famine endlessly? Since drought and flood are so excessive, you should not evadeyour duty. You must be feel terror and scare, as if facing the thunder and roll,Fed your people without left a single one. Then the heaven will not abandon you.   –The Shi Jing[1]-


[1] see James Legge,The Chinese Classics, Vol IV, The Shijin (Part3,Book 3,Ode4 Decade of Dang), HongKong University Press 1960.pp.528-534.



 楼主| 发表于 11/27/2014 15:59:55 | 显示全部楼层
Recently a number of shameless party's "scholars" openly tried to deny the great leap famine, which took away at least 43-46 million Chinese peasants life during 1958 and 1962, the greatest man-made disaster in the history of the world. And this is why I choose this topic, after extensive researching, My conclusion is that the great leap forward direct caused the great leap famine, and Mao and the CCP had committed the crimes of murder to kill tens million people, without take any responsibility to date. Its is not so called natural disaster at all but political disaster, more exact should be defined as murderlized greatest faime in the world. I sincerely welcomed any Chinese Communist party's scholars to critize my thesis here, I am waiting for all of you. Following is the records what Sun has said and he must be take responsibility for those tens million dead souls!


On August 23, 2013, China Social Science Newspaper publishedan article title of “Starvation of 3million is not true” by Sun Jingxian, a professor of Jiangsu NormalUniversity, who claimed that “ the Great leap Famine (1958-1961) is a rumor”.Instead, Sun alleged that about 2.5 million “nutritional deaths” had takenplace during the “three year difficult period”.[1] Its said that a number of professorshared Sun’s opinion, for instance: Liang Zhangdong, Professor at Shanxi University,Wang Shaoguang, visiting professor at Qinghua university, and Li Shengming, formalvice dean of China Social Science etc.


[1]2013年8月23日,《中国社会科学报》“评论”版刊发了江苏师范大学孙经先教授《“饿死三千万”不是事实》。作者thought三年困难时期“营养性死亡”250万。2013年9月9日,《中国社会科学报》再刊孙经先《“中国饿死三千万”的谣言是怎样形成的?》《墓碑》绝大多数关键性的“饿死人数”数据是虚假的。



 楼主| 发表于 11/28/2014 04:14:54 | 显示全部楼层
The Great Leap Famine: Natural disaster or Murderlized crime ?

Guoting Guo

Why heaven send down the drought, flood, and famine endlessly? We must be fear and take upon responsibility, as if facing the thunder and roll, Fed all people without left a single one. Then the heaven will not abandon us.                                                                    
                                                                                                 –The Shi Jing  in 1200 BC-


Introduction

Chairman Mao triggered The Great Leap Forward, which caused the Great Leap Famine(GLF). The GLF destroyed 43 to 46 million souls during 1958 and 1962. It is the greatest disaster in human history; however, the CCP regime not only hides all evidences, but alleged it is “three years natural disaster” to date. Some scholar deny the GLF or did not mention the death of starvation at all (Edmund Clubb 1964; Alexander Eckstein1966; Jack Chen1975; Immanuel C.Y. Hsu) others thought it is combine many elements, including bad weather, but with the “good intention” (Li, Zhisui 1994; James Kung 2003: Thomas Bernstein 2006; Felix Wemheuer 2010; Yixin Chen 2010; Chris Bramall 2011; Yen Lin Chung 2013; Anthony Garnaut 2014) , only few point out its crime nature (Jasper Becker1996; Jung Chang 2005; Yang Jisheng 2008;Frank Dikotter 2010). My argument is that it is political disaster rather than natural disaster; exactly describe it should be a murderlized crime that ruined tens million people life. My contribution to  the literature are that reveal the reason that why Chen Yizi’s claim is reliable, because Zhao Zhiyang played a bad role in the GLF while he was the Guangdong party secretary, the guilty made him to instruct an investigation to reveal the horrible tragedy after he become the boss of the CCP. Although until his death, Zhao never revealed the report, which I presumption that you must keep some secret place and he must have a will which might reveal sometimes later. For protecting his family`s interest, he keep the top secret to his tomb. First I will analysis why the heinous crime is doubtless truth; then I would like to discuss the fundamental cause of the GLF, finally I will show that at some key point, Mao and the regime`s action turn from good intention, if they really had, into murder. The forced agricultural collectivization policy is the root of the   shocking tragedy which was inevitable.  Totalitarian regime marry with a wise cunning dictator, who with cold blood and strong will, while extremely ignorance of natural science knowledge, but full of dilution in his mind, born the greatest political disaster in the human history.
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