楼主: 郭国汀


 楼主| 发表于 8/27/2013 23:19:27 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 8/27/2013 23:26 编辑

Beijing answer Red Cross’s offer help with “thecountry had witnessed and unprecedentedly rich harvest in 1960, there wasabsolutely no famine and rumours to the country were slanderous.” [1]Japaneseforeign minister had a quiet word with Chenyi, about a discreet gift of 100000tons of wheat, was rebutted. [2]Foreignvisitors were all too willing to jump to the defence of Maoism: Mitterrand, a left-wingpolitician who later became the President of France, felt privileged to report theMao’s words of wisdom to the West. In a villa in Hangzhou, Mao, ‘ a great scholarknown in the entire world for the diversity of his genius’, told him in 1961, thatthere was no famine, but only ‘a period of scarcity’. [3]

[1] Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The Historyof China most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p.115

[2] Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The Historyof China most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p.115。见BeijingForeign Affair Minister 1959, 127,109. P.13.

[3] Frank Dikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The Historyof China most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p.214

 楼主| 发表于 8/28/2013 02:53:56 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 8/28/2013 03:14 编辑

Family members could be punished for trying to burya relative who had fallen foul of local justice. DengDaming, beaten to deathfor his child stolen a few beans, party secretary DanNiming ordered his body tobe shimmed down into fertiliser. In Hunan, a reported to Zhou Enlai, peoplewere beaten to death in 82 out of 86 counties and cities. In Daoxian countymany thousands perished in 1960, but only 90% of deaths could be attributed todiseases and starvation. Having reviewed all the evidence, the team concludedthat 10 % had been buried alive, clubbed to death or otherwise killed by partymembers and militia. [1]In HunanShimen county, some 13500 people died in 1960, of whom 12% were ‘beaten or drivento their death’. In Xinyang regime, Li Xiannian, later become the president of China,led a team to investigated the famine, confirmed a million people died in 1960;estinated 6-7% were beaten to death; 297 in Sichuan, the death by beaten were muchhigher. In Kaixian, exam team concluded that in Fengle commune, where 17% of populationhad perished in less than a year, up to 65% of the victims had died because theywere beaten, punished with food deprivation or forced into committing suicide.[2]

[1] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p.297

[2]FrankDikotter, Mao’sGreat Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker& Co. NY 2010.p.298

 楼主| 发表于 8/28/2013 12:17:59 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 8/28/2013 14:19 编辑

仅四川一个省在中共人为制造的古今中外绝无仅有的大饥荒期间至少1000万人被饿死打死逼死或以其它各种方式杀害。王伟志先生依据北京公安局统计资料,确认全国至少有56个县死亡率超过10% 被列为“恐怖地区”:四川18个县名列榜首(Shizhu, Fuling,Rongzian, Dazu, Ziyang,Xiushan, Yayang, Nanxi, Dianjiang, Leshan,Jianwei,Muchuan, Pingshan, Bixian, Yaan, Lushan, Seda等县);安徽11个县次之(Chaoxian,Taihe, Dingyuan,Wuwei, Xuancheng, Haoxian, Suxian, Fengyang,Fuyang, Feichong, Wuhe);河南10个县(Guangshan, Shangcheng,Xincai, Runan,Tanghe, Xixian, Gushi, Zhengyang, Shangcai, Suiping);贵州(Meitan, Chishui, Jinsha,Tongzi)、青海(Huangzhang, Zaduo, Zhenghe)、山东(Juye, Jining, Qihe, Pingyuan)各四个县;甘肃三个县(Tongwei,Longxi, Wuwei);湖南(Guzhang)和广西(Huanjiang)各一个县。与之相应的是:所有这些省份的党委书记全部是毛泽东最铁杆的支持者。四川与大多数其他省份不一样,大饥荒持续到1962年底。直至1962年底四川全省各县无数报告继续报告饥荒。该年1.5%的人口因饥饿而死,意味着另外30万人死于饥荒;根据四川省公安局统计资料确认四川820万人死于饥荒。即使该数字无疑少报至少10-20%因为李井泉始终牢控四川省,尽管他应对上千万人饿死负责。即使1962年,也很少干部敢于准备如实报告饥荒真相。[1]共产风,瞎指挥,胡命令,剥夺全体农民的私有财产实质使之变成共产党的奴隶。四川省委书记李井泉下令“让荒山变良田”,令农民放弃现有的良田开荒造田;大建公共食堂,巨型养猪场,大市场。在FULING宝兹公社,1959年公社书记虚报产量由3500吨变成11100吨,结果国家征走3000吨;民兵挨家挨户搜查藏粮,按人的体重划分右派,胖者即成右派,许多人被没完没了的迫害致死。最后农民只能吃树叶,观音土。该公社有些村超过三分之一的村民饿死。1961年农产品87%被强制征收,结果全社15000人有一半饿死。[2]FULING县,有些村在1960年一个月内饿死9%,整个地区大队平均死亡率40-50%相当普遍。重庆其他县1960年死亡率超过10%。在SHIZHU县,民兵抢走全部锅碗,禁止公共食堂之外煮食物。专设打人队依赖暴力维持秩序。公社副书记陈志林殴打了数百人,打死八人;有些人被活埋。据县公安局报告称,全县1959年至60年饿死64000人占人口20%;在水田公社四十人被集体掩埋,在县政府路旁另外六十人被集体掩埋。

Sichuan province public security bureau’s record ofthe province was rather full: by far the most devastated province in all China.the boss ordered to investigate the date of whole province from 1954 to 1961.The results undermined many of the reported totals, which underestimated thedeath toll by several percent in 1960 alone. The death rate for 1954 to 1957was an average of 1%; 2.5% in 1958; 4.7% in 1959; 5.4% in 1960; 2.9% in 1961.It added up to 10.6 million deaths from 1958 to 1961 of which 7.9 million wereabove 1%, and can thus be considered ‘excess deaths’. but Sichuan unlike therest of country, famine did not vanish in 1962, countless reports about continuingstarvation from counties until the end of 1962. 1.5% died in 1962, meansanother 300000 perished prematurely, that is at least 8.2 million died ofstarvation. Even this figures must be lower than 10 to 20% of actually figuresof deaths, for Lijingquan firmly controlled everything from beginning to theend, despite he must be reasonability for over 10 million people died ofhunger. Even in 1962,few county leaders in Sichuan would have been prepared toreport the full extent of the disaster. [3]

[1] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p328

[2] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p311

[3] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p328

 楼主| 发表于 8/28/2013 13:55:18 | 显示全部楼层
CaoShuji, used published party gazetteers toesterase death rates on a county basis, is in agreement with other populationspecialists who proposed 32 million people died of hunger. But common senseshows that local party committee try their best to cover the true death number.[1]

[1] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p329

 楼主| 发表于 9/7/2013 00:48:02 | 显示全部楼层

There is enough archive evidence, from asufficiently large diversity of party units, to confirm the figure of 43 to 46million premature deaths by Chen Yizi, is reliable estimate, the death tollstands at a minimum of 45 million excess deaths. It could be even worse thanthat. Some historians speculate that true figure stand high 5 to 6 million.YuXiguang, an independent research with a great deal of experience part thefigure of 55 million excess death. [1]

[1] FrankDikotter, Mao’s Great Famine The History of China most Devastating Catastrophe,1958-1962 Walker & Co. NY 2010.p334

 楼主| 发表于 7/31/2014 00:16:26 | 显示全部楼层
 楼主| 发表于 11/6/2014 13:23:50 | 显示全部楼层
However, recently a number of the CCP's so-called scholars are trying to deny the greatest man-made famine and allaged that Mr. Yang Jisheng's work are liber! a professor whose last name is Sun even allaged that all peasents die of starvation only about 2.5 million! Rogue state born great deal hooligan "scholar"!
 楼主| 发表于 11/6/2014 13:31:07 | 显示全部楼层
Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960: A Study in Wilfulness*
Thomas P. Bernstein

Abstract: In late autumn 1958, Mao Zedong strongly condemned widespread  practices of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) such as subjecting peasants to exhausting labour without adequate food and rest, which had resulted in epidemics, starvation and deaths. At that time Mao explicitly recognized that anti-rightist pressures on officialdom were a major cause of "production at the expense of livelihood." While he was not willing to acknowledge that only
abandonment of the GLF could solve these problems, he did strongly demand that they be addressed. After the July 1959 clash at Lushan with Peng Dehuai, Mao revived the GLF in the context of a new, extremely harsh anti rightist campaign, which he relentlessly promoted into the spring of 1960 together with the radical policies that he previously condemned. Not until spring 1960 did Mao again express concern about abnormal deaths and other abuses, but he failed to apply the pressure needed to stop them. Given what he had already learned about the costs to the peasants of GLF extremism, the Chairman should have known that the revival of GLF radicalism would exact a similar or even bigger price. Instead, he wilfully ignored the lessons of the first radical phase for the sake of achieving extreme ideological and developmental goals.

 楼主| 发表于 11/6/2014 13:35:51 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/22/2014 18:09 编辑

Five Explanations
Why was Mao so reluctant to give up the GLF? One reason is that  he desperately wanted to prove Peng Dehuai and other Party critics  wrong, thereby restoring the loss of prestige that he evidently felt he  had suffered during the first phase of the Leap.96 A second is offered  by Mao zhuan, whose authors criticize the Chairman for failing to
practise what he had preached since the early 1930s, namely "no investigation, no right to speak."
The sources from which he derived his understanding of the situation narrowed more and more and it became very difficult to discover the true situation at the grassroots. Failure to investigate what was actually going on in the villages was a result of his age and various objective circumstances. He relied on reading reports from below, which not only were sloppy (cuzhi daye flfe^C^) but contained many false reports.97 But even if had he insisted on talking to grassroots cadres and ordinary peasants, it is inconceivable that anyone would have dared tell him the truth. Mao was caught in a web of deception of his own

91. Mao zhuan, pp. 1073 and 1081.
92. Mao zhuan, p. 1087.
93. Mao Zedong wenji, Vol. 8, p. 274.
94. Mao zhuan, pp. 1097-98.
95. See Macfarquhar, Origins, Vol. 3, Parts 1 and 2.
96. MacFarquhar, Origins, Vol. 2, pp. 293 and 335.
97. Mao zhuan, p. 1073.

This content downloaded from on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 22:18:48 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions442 The China Quarterly making. His credulousness was itself a major obstacle. When travelling to cities, he talked to provincial, prefectural and county leaders: "Everyone reported news that made Mao very happy." On 22 September 1959, en route to Zhengzhou, he was shown an unrepresentative field that promised to yield a bumper crop. "Such goods news formed an important basis for his decisions and had a big impact on him."98 On tour in the latter part of October, "Mao Zedong very much believed that the domestic economic situation had
seen a marked turn for the better .... The stories were good and the materials [he was given] were good. These kinds of news were constantly transmitted to Mao Zedong and he happily received them."99 In this same vein, in mid-March 1960 he ordered dissemination of a report from Hunan that claimed that "mass welfare and health were generally quite good."100 In April 1960, Liao Luyan (0#W), the minister of agriculture, told Mao that the 1960 harvest would be about 300 MMT (the actual total was less than half, 143.5 MMT). When Mao asked whether it could be more, Tan Zhenlin responded in the affirmative. Mao zhuan claims that this was based on the exaggerated reports received from below and not on self serving lies.101
A well-known third explanation, offered by Mao himself, was that the escalating Sino-Soviet conflict distracted the leadership from domestic issues. Table 2 gives a count of entries in Mao wengao devoted to foreign and domestic affairs. In 1959, the vast majority of entries concerned domestic matters. In 1960, in contrast, the sharp drop in domestic entries from April to June and especially from July to September clearly suggests that while the Leap festered on, Mao's attention was indeed focused on other matters. Only in October did he once more turn to domestic issues.102 A fourth explanation lies in Mao's fanatical commitment to achieving socio-economic breakthroughs by means of all-out mobi lizational campaigns. He knew that these were destabilizing and could
easily get out of hand. But he also believed that defects could be corrected once the campaign had achieved its core objective. If corrective intervention came too early, attainment of the project itself might be jeopardized. This may explain the Chairman's disinterest in information that contradicted his image of a countryside storming towards communism. As MacFarquhar observes, Mao's "demonic desire for earthshaking progress ... demanded exaggerated claims of success," overriding his pragmatic side of paying attention to costs.103

98. Ibid p. 1014.
99. Ibid. p. 1019.
100. Mao wengao, Vol. 9, pp. 64-65.
101. Mao zhuan, p. 1070.
102. Ibid. p. 1097.
103. MacFarquhar, Origins, Vol. 2, p. 333.
This content downloaded from on Thu, 2 Oct 2014 22:18:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsMao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960
Table 2: Entries in Mao Wengao Devoted to Foreign and Domestic
Period Domestic (%) Foreign (%) Total
1959 January-June 123(78) 35(22) 159
1959 July-December 137 (82.5) 29 (17.5) 166
1960 January-March 40(80) 10(20) 50
1960 April-June 19(41.3) 27(58.7) 46
1960 July-September 9(23) 30(77) 39
1960 October-December 37 (75.5) 12 (24.5) 49
Routine greetings are omitted, but relevant greetings, e.g. in times of conflict, as
with SU, are included. I thank Ashley Esarey for assisting in the count.
Mao Zedong wengao, Vols. 8 and 9.

A fifth explanation, related to the fourth, is that Mao was fully prepared to accept mass death as the price of progress. This would suggest that the concerns that Mao voiced from November 1958 to July 1959 and again from October 1960 on were an aberration and did not reflect his real attitude. The case for this is made in a recently
published book by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story.104 In their brief chapter on the GLF, entitled "The Great Leap: 'half of China may well have to die'," the authors claim that "Mao knowingly starved and worked these tens of millions of people to death."105 In support of this thesis, they cite numerous primary and
secondary sources. Some of these, however, are used in misleading ways. Compare, for example, Mao's response to the Yunnan report on deaths from illnesses due to overwork and neglect of livelihood cited above with their dismissive appraisal: ".... Mao's response was to pass the buck: 'This mistake is mainly the fault of county-level
cadres'." Similarly, they claim that Mao's response to the reports he received about the spring 1959 famine cited above "... was to ask the provinces to 'deal with it,' but he did not say how."106
A striking instance of the use of misleading quotations is from a speech given on 21 November 1958, around the time when Mao expressed strong concern about deaths in Yunnan: "Working like this, with all these projects, half of China may well have to die. If not half, one-third, or one-tenth - 50 million - die." Aware that these remarks  might sound too shocking, he tried to shirk his own responsibility. "50 million

104. Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan
Cape, 2005).
105. Ibid. p. 457.
106. Ibid. p. 446.

deaths," he went on, "I could be fired and I might even lose my head ... but if you insist, I'll just have to let you do it, and you can't blame me when people die."107 The Chinese original, however, is not quite as shocking. In the speech, Mao talks about massive earthmoving irrigation projects and numerous big industrial ones, all requiring huge numbers of people.
If the projects, he said, are all undertaken simultaneously "half of China's population unquestionably will die; and if it's not half, it'll be a third or 10 per cent, a death toll of 50 million people." Mao then pointed to the example of Guangxi provincial Party secretary, Chen Manyuan (f?fc?f|?2?) who had been dismissed in 1957 for failing to prevent famine in the previous year, adding: "If with a death toll of 50 million you didn't lose your jobs, I at least should lose mine; whether I should lose my head would also be in question. Anhui wants to do so much, which is quite all right, but make it a principle to have no deaths."108
Chang and Halliday take literally Mao's penchant for talking about mass death in highly irresponsible, provocative, callous and reckless ways, exemplified by his famous remark that in a nuclear war, half of China's population would perish but the rest would survive and rebuild. In 1958, when ruminating about the dialectics of life and death, he thought that deaths were beneficial, for without them, there could be no renewal. Imagine, he asked, what a disaster it would be if Confucius were still alive. "When people die there ought to be celebrations."109 In December 1958 he remarked that "destruction (miewang ]Kt29 also to dying out) [of people] has advantages. One can make fertilizer. You say you can't, but actually you can, but you must be spiritually prepared."110 As the authors rightly note, these kinds of remarks could well have justified the indifference of lower-level cadres to peasant deaths.111
The accusation that Mao deliberately exposed China's peasants to mass death during the GLF is not, however, plausible. It is true that, in his zeal to advance, he was willing to inflict severe, sometimes extraordinary hardships on peasants. But large-scale famine threa tened a core claim to legitimacy of the regime. Implicit in the
communist "liberation" was the promise that China's history of famines was a thing of the past. Thus, when Mao finally began to grasp the scope of the 1960 famine, he strongly supported corrective measures. On a more practical level, Mao was acutely sensitive to the absolute necessity of preserving the peasants' "enthusiasm for production," meaning that at a minimum their subsistence needs had to be met.

107. Ibid p. 458.
108. "Zai Wuchang huiyi shang de jianghua" (speech at Wuchang conference),
Center for Chinese Research Materials (Oakton, VA, nd.), Vol. 13, pp. 203-204.
109. Mao wengao, Vol. 7, p. 201.
110. "Liuzhong quanhui jianghua" (speech to the Sixth Plenum), 9 December 1958,
in Center for Chinese Research Materials, Vol. 11-B, p. 148.
111. Chang and Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story, p. 457.

In sum, understanding Mao's complex and contradictory motivations is a daunting undertaking. What matters for the purposes of this report is that after Lushan, Mao Zedong dismissed from his mind the lessons that he had learned and acted on a year earlier when he sought to rectify unrestrained leftism, albeit in a limited way. This act of wilful abdication of his duty as the country's undisputed leader makes him directly responsible for the immense catastrophe that ensued.

 楼主| 发表于 11/6/2014 13:37:16 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/6/2014 13:38 编辑

Is Xi Jinping the Reformist Leader China Needs?
ABSTRACT: In autumn 2012, following the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping is to succeed Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Party and also, in all probability, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, where he has been second-in-command since 2010. In March 2013, he is set to become President of the People’s Republic of China. Born into the political elite, he enjoys a great deal of support in the Nomenklatura. Having governed several coastal provinces, the current Vice-President is thoroughly acquainted with the workings of Party and state. He also has support within the Army, where he spent a short time at the beginning of his career. In addition, in recent years, he has acquired significant international experience. Urbane and affable, Xi is appreciated for his consensual approach. Nonetheless, Xi is taking charge of the country at a particularly delicate time. China is having to adopt an alternative growth model whilst the government is struggling with powerful economic and regional feudalities. The Bo Xilai affair has highlighted the weakening of the central government, the corruption of the elites, and deep-rooted ideological differences within the Party machine that are damaging the political
legitimacy of the regime and endangering its stability. As a result, Xi must not only reunify the Party leadership and machine but also establish his authority over all the country’s civil and military institutions. His style and charisma will help him. But his success will also and above all depend on his ability to form a united coalition set on reform and capable of dismantling the privileges acquired by the regime’s many bosses. The CCP needs a leader who is both strong and courageous. Is Xi such a man? Perhaps.

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