楼主: 郭国汀


 楼主| 发表于 11/7/2014 00:29:24 | 显示全部楼层
well-known third explanation, offered by Mao himself, was that
the escalating Sino-Soviet conflict distracted the leadership from
domestic issues. Table 2 gives a count of entries in Mao wengao
devoted to foreign and domestic affairs. In 1959, the vast majority of
entries concerned domestic matters. In 1960, in contrast, the sharp
drop in domestic entries from April to June and especially from July
to September clearly suggests that while the Leap festered on, Mao's
attention was indeed focused on other matters. Only in October did he
once more turn to domestic issues.102
A fourth explanation lies in Mao's fanatical commitment to
achieving socio-economic breakthroughs by means of all-out mobi
lizational campaigns. He knew that these were destabilizing and could
easily get out of hand. But he also believed that defects could be
corrected once the campaign had achieved its core objective. If
corrective intervention came too early, attainment of the project itself
might be jeopardized. This may explain the Chairman's disinterest in
information that contradicted his image of a countryside storming
towards communism. As MacFarquhar observes, Mao's "demonic
desire for earthshaking progress ... demanded exaggerated claims
of success," overriding his pragmatic side of paying attention to

 楼主| 发表于 11/7/2014 00:32:26 | 显示全部楼层
fifth explanation, related to the fourth, is that Mao was fully
prepared to accept mass death as the price of progress. This would
suggest that the concerns that Mao voiced from November 1958 to
July 1959 and again from October 1960 on were an aberration and did
not reflect his real attitude. The case for this is made in a recently
published book by Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown
Story.104 In their brief chapter on the GLF, entitled "The Great Leap:
'half of China may well have to die'," the authors claim that "Mao
knowingly starved and worked these tens of millions of people to
death."105 In support of this thesis, they cite numerous primary and
secondary sources. Some of these, however, are used in misleading
ways. Compare, for example, Mao's response to the Yunnan report
on deaths from illnesses due to overwork and neglect of livelihood
cited above with their dismissive appraisal: ".... Mao's response was to
pass the buck: 'This mistake is mainly the fault of county-level
cadres'." Similarly, they claim that Mao's response to the reports he
received about the spring 1959 famine cited above "... was to ask the
provinces to 'deal with it,' but he did not say how."106
A striking instance of the use of misleading quotations is from a
speech given on 21 November 1958, around the time when Mao
expressed strong concern about deaths in Yunnan:
"Working like this, with all these projects, half of China may well have to die. If
not half, one-third, or one-tenth - 50 million - die." Aware that these remarks
might sound too shocking, he tried to shirk his own responsibility. "50 million
deaths," he went on, "I could be fired and I might even lose my head ... but if you
insist, I'll just have to let you do it, and you can't blame me when people die."107
The Chinese original, however, is not quite as shocking. In the speech,
Mao talks about massive earthmoving irrigation projects and
numerous big industrial ones, all requiring huge numbers of people.
If the projects, he said, are all undertaken simultaneously "half of
China's population unquestionably will die; and if it's not half, it'll be
a third or 10 per cent, a death toll of 50 million people." Mao then
pointed to the example of Guangxi provincial Party secretary, Chen
Manyuan (f?fc?f|?2?) who had been dismissed in 1957 for failing to
prevent famine in the previous year, adding: "If with a death toll of 50
million you didn't lose your jobs, I at least should lose mine; whether I
should lose my head would also be in question. Anhui wants to do so
much, which is quite all right, but make it a principle to have no
Chang and Halliday take literally Mao's penchant for talking about
mass death in highly irresponsible, provocative, callous and reckless
ways, exemplified by his famous remark that in a nuclear war, half of
China's population would perish but the rest would survive and
rebuild. In 1958, when ruminating about the dialectics of life and
death, he thought that deaths were beneficial, for without them, there
could be no renewal. Imagine, he asked, what a disaster it would be if
Confucius were still alive. "When people die there ought to be
celebrations."109 In December 1958 he remarked that "destruction
(miewang ]Kt29 also to dying out) [of people] has advantages. One can
make fertilizer. You say you can't, but actually you can, but you must
be spiritually prepared."110 As the authors rightly note, these kinds of
remarks could well have justified the indifference of lower-level cadres
to peasant deaths.111

The accusation that Mao deliberately exposed China's peasants to
mass death during the GLF is not, however, plausible. It is true that,
in his zeal to advance, he was willing to inflict severe, sometimes
extraordinary hardships on peasants. But large-scale famine threa
tened a core claim to legitimacy of the regime. Implicit in the
communist "liberation" was the promise that China's history of
famines was a thing of the past. Thus, when Mao finally began to
grasp the scope of the 1960 famine, he strongly supported corrective
measures. On a more practical level, Mao was acutely sensitive to the
absolute necessity of preserving the peasants' "enthusiasm for
production," meaning that at a minimum their subsistence needs

had to be met.
In sum, understanding Mao's complex and contradictory motiva
tions is a daunting undertaking. What matters for the purposes of this
report is that after Lushan, Mao Zedong dismissed from his mind the
lessons that he had learned and acted on a year earlier when he sought
to rectify unrestrained leftism, albeit in a limited way. This act of
wilful abdication of his duty as the country's undisputed leader makes

him directly responsible for the immense catastrophe that ensued.
Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960: A Study in Wilfulness
Author(s): Thomas P. Bernstein
Source: The China Quarterly, No. 186 (Jun., 2006), pp. 421-445

 楼主| 发表于 11/7/2014 00:48:02 | 显示全部楼层
The hottest search term on Weibo on September 6, 2013 was “nutritional death” (营养性死亡). The term appears in a forum post written by Sun Jingxian, a professor from Jiangsu Normal University, claiming that the 30 million estimated deaths during the Great Chinese Famine (1958-1961) is a rumor. Instead, the professor estimated that about 2.5 million “nutritional deaths” had taken place during the “three year difficult period”.

This damn so-called professor Sun Jingxian, will be punished by the new China after the CCP regime collapes! for his shameless lie and deceit.

 楼主| 发表于 11/7/2014 13:27:08 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/11/2014 00:16 编辑

Dealing with responsibility for the great leap famine in the PR.China. Fexlix Wemneuer,  The China Quartely Nol 201, march 2010. pp.176-174.

The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's leap famine. By James Kai-Sing Kung, Shuo Chen, HK university Science and Technology American Political Science Review. Vol. 105. No.1. Feb 2011. pp 27-45

 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 15:29:15 | 显示全部楼层
Kenneth Walker,an agricultural economist, argued "a bumper harvest in 1958, and large stocks put down in 1958 'help to explain why China has not suffered from wide spread hunger' despite three subsequent years of poor harvests".  See Kenneth Walker comments " On China's descenting spiral", The China Quaterly, no. 12. 1962:46-47.

Anthony Garnaut (U of Oxford), " Hard facts and half-truth: the New archival history of China's Great Famine". China Information 2003: 27 (2) 223-246.

G.William Skinner saw a breakdown of the rural trading network but not famine.

demographers, economists, and political scientists. provincial crude mortality rates and grain production figures, high level policy document; official biographies, memoirs of leading personalities, Bo Yibo

plausible cause of the famine including rdicalism of local party-leades, dinning halls, poor whether, local party archives, internal party reports.

Both Yang and Dikotter present plausible accounts of how Mao and his collecgues established the policies and institutional strutrues that gave rise to the famine(226)

deserving title by several pundits of China's Gulag Archipelago. three red flag are general line, great leap forward, and people's commune.

investigatory reports commissioned by central and provincial party committee 1960-1962, Yang argued that fundamental cause of the famine was the top-down radicalization of Chinese party-state.

Xinyang incident 549,171 or 6.5% death. Mao personally characterized as a counterevolutionary restoration. Purged formal party leaders and undesireble elements were beaten, many killed.  at least 10000 be executed, 800 to larger, 4000 to small. Comment: "I have not yet killed a county party secretary, give them commuted death sentences".

Cao Shuji's population date in prefectureal and county gazettea, Yang systematically presents the contral party leadership has a high degree of responsibility for the famine.

three years of hardship; not bad weather(rainfall and temperature levels during the Great Leap Forward were unexceptional) nor was soviet union ( abandoned their )

Deng encouraged Li Jingquan to his regard popular welfare in ursuit of central government grain quotas, and shielded Li from criticism during 7000 cadre confrence.

Dikotter: how he draws generalizations from fragmentary evidence. Dikotter never acknowledge a substantial scholarly debt.

the established scholarship on PRC elite politics contends that there was a distinct ' coolingdown ' phase of the Great Leap Forward between nov 1958 and July 1959, Mao championed a series of moderate measures that supported the welfare of the rural population (235).

1958 harvest figure was first reported as 100% above the of 1957, then revised down in early 1959 to a 50% increase, then remised further to 6% increase (237)

" if all are unable to eat their fill, then all will die. it is better for half to die, so that half of the people can eat their fill" Mao said on the conference in Shanghai in March 1958.

the 'people' whom Mao was willing to let die of starvation turn out to be not people at all, but large-scale industrial projects" the author argued (238)
 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 16:10:53 | 显示全部楼层
Yen Lin Chung, The CEO of the Utopian Project: Deng Xiaoping's Roles and Activities in the Great Leap Forward, The China Journal No.69 (2013) pp.154-173

great leap forward, resulted in tens millions of Chinese people starvating to death (154)  Chung argued that Deng was rarely pragmatic during the camaigne, and sometimes got more carried away than Mao himself (154). in March 1958 Chengdu conference, for promoting the GLF, enlarged politiburo conference at Deidaihe, 17-30 August 1958, the first tide of the GLF began. to raise 1958 steel target to 10.7 millions, double 1957, develop commune throught the countries (158).

Deng's efforts, passed a resolution required that production of grain reach 400-500 million tons in 1959; 65 million tons in 1960; 750 million tons or more in 1962. steel must reach at least 27million tons and 30 million tons in 1959, 50 million tons in 1960 and 80 to 100 million tons in 1962!(159)

in Nov 1958, Mao begin to doubt that it could be reached 27-30 million tons of steel, adjusted the 1959 steel down to 18-20 million tons in Dec 1958 at Wuhan; In March 1959 Shanghai conference, reduced once more to 16.5million ton, in mid May further reduced to 13 million tons, finally to 12 million at Lushan conference.

In April 1959, Deng was well aware that famine had begun to occur in some provinces, having handle a case in which it had claimed the dies of half the people and live stock in a village in Qinghai. Deng took no action to mitigate or avert the unfolding calamity. Qinghai party boss did not changed his work style and exaggerated, cause farmers continued to starve to death (154)

a national water conservancy campaign was launched in 1960. promoted by Deng after promoting Guangdong. In early 1961, Deng told foreign delegations that the reason China successfully overcome 1956-1960 natural disasters, was a result of newly built water conservancy projects and commune(167)!

Henan Wu Zhipu, passed a party resolution to carry out 1960 production plan at any price, 1960 steel target was 5.9 times larger than actural than 1959 (168)!

Deng and Li Fuchun make plan steel target at least 31-33 million tons as much 36-38 million ton in 1962;  grain 330 to 350 million tons.  Deng maintaing the campaign to save teh party's face.

Mao furious societ withdrow experts, lanched another mass steel making campaign to produce more steel than 1960 steel target. Deng defended the GLF and the mass steel making campaign to foreign visitors in late June 1960(170)

in the summer 1960, Mao made decision to export massive amounts of grain and non-staples foods to the Soviet,  so China could pay back its debt ahead of schedule (171)!

in April -May 1960, Deng became alert to the increasingly dire demostic grain situation, it was clear to him that state of affairs was very serious(172).
 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 17:56:09 | 显示全部楼层
Thomas P. Bernstein, Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959-1960: A Study in Willfulness, The China Quarterly no 186(2006) pp 421-445.

how relentlessly Mao promoted the anti-right campaign and lefist policies after Lushan in the autumn of 1959 and well into 1960

Rural death rate per 1000 people:
year                          death rate per 1000
1957                         11.07
1958                         12.50
1959                         14.61
1960                         28.58
1961                         14.58
1962                         10.32
source: China tongji nian jian 1984 ( Beijing China tongji press 1984 p.83; widely cited estimates put the number of excess deaths at 30 million even more; such as 43 to 46 million and 50 to 60 million.

In 1960, death rate in the most severely afflicted provinces were 68.6%0 in Anhui, 54%0 in Sichuan; 52.3%0 in Quizhou; 41.3%0 in Gansu; 39.6%0 in Henan.  in 1957, 147.041 people die in Gansu; in 1960, 538,479 die; In Henan, 572000 people died in 1957, in 1960, 1.98 million died.  see Dali Yang, Calamity and Reform in China ( Stanford: U of California Press 1996 p.38)

unusually severe natural disasters affacted large parts of country in 1959 and 1960 , such as Henan.

Man-made causes, however, far outweighted the imput of natral disaters, the area sown to grain in 1959 was cut. others fall under the rubie of the 'five wind' blew during the GLF. wind of communism, destroyed peasent incentives; "free supply" eating in mass halls, closing free markets confiscating private plots. ( 422)

secend wind was of " blind directives" set of wholly unnealistic production targets. the thired was a " wind of commardism" , compelled peasants to do exhausting labour. fourth was a wind of " cadre special prinvileges", cadre appropriated food whensevere shortage arose. finally the " wind of exaggeration of output", led to devastating increases in state grain procurements based on false date, played a major caused zole in the famine. (423)

local official did not dare to report the truth. but a great deal of information did reach Mao during the autumn of 1958 and first half of 1959. in contrast, Aug 1959 and the last weeks of Feb 1960, the available records indicate Mao did not reveive advases information. partly becasue of the extraordinary harshness of anti-rightist campaign, some courageous individuals may have submitted truthful reports, Mao choose not to cut on them, sincere he was fanatically determined to push the leap to further heights(423)

the trouble information did reach him beginning in late Feb 1960. On 5 Sept 1958, an anonymous letter reported that in three township in Lingbi conuty, Anhui, 500 people has starved to death and many to sick to get out of bed. in a comment date on 2 Oct 1958, Mao asked Zeng Xisheng to investigate(424).

in mid nov 1958, Mao learned about an epidemic, had spread to 21 county 71 viliage in Handan Hebei.  Mao orderd the report at the Wuchang conference; " noglect of livelihood is a nationwides problems, which must immidiatedly be brought to the atention of responsible combrades all levels of entire party, equal weight must be given to work and to livelihood( 426).

on nov 1958, Yunnan provincial party committee sent Mao an investigation report on outbreaks of edema, serious deaths had results. the main reason was tense and bitter labour battles, cadre relies on force and violenced laws and discipline.

on 2 Feb 1959, Mao spoke of five million cases of edema resulting from neglect of livelihoold.

in early April 1959, Mao received a report from Zhou Enlai on Spring famine in Shangdong, Jian Su, Henan, Hebei, and Anhui. the central Disaster Relief Committee also provided statistics on spring famine in 15 provinces.

on 17 April, Mao asked Zhou immidiately to sent reports to the first party secretries, so as to " save 25.2 million people from two months of urgent daner."

in the spring of 1959, Mao not only justifyed peasant rebistance but told basic level cadres to " pay no attention to the directives from a higher level".

In a letter on April 29, 1959, Mao sent via an internal publication to officials from the contre down to the brigates, " donot pay attention to those kinds of higher level cadres. only pay attention to reality. speak the truth and report how much output you can acturally guarantee, donot lie".

Mao failed to address the underlying, system problem, which was the GLF itself.

" petty-bourgeois fanaticism" one person make all decision, many people were afraid to speak out. lefism was provailing over everywhere.

the impact of the 1959 campaign was far larger than the anti-rightist campaign of 1957, investigations revealed that in 1959-1960 some 3.65 million cadres and party members had been labelled or purged as " rights oppportunists". of whom 70% were adjudged to have been wronged. in addition, 3.7 millons ordinary citizens has been wrongly labelled.

MacFarquhair, Origins. Vol 3. pp.61, 179 and 206-207.  the Origins of the Cultural Revolution, Vol. 3. coming of the cataclysim; 1961-1966 ( new york: Columbia University Press, 1997) p. 179, 206-207.

it was Mao who personally and relentlessly stoked the anti-rightist fires, promoting class struggle from Aug 1959 to the spring 1960. Mao supported repid grain procurements, large investments in construction projects, commune, mess halls.

in the late autumn of 1959, the regime assumed that 270 millon tons of grain had been harvested when the corrected figure was only 170 millon tons. in 1960, the actural harvest of 143.5 MMT, the net amount procured was 21.5% caused by teh "wind of exaggeration".

in 1959 autumn, Mao seized on the idea of investing in large scale collective pig-raising, in volving establishing farms for 10000 hogs. He asked report publicized, to encourage the whole country to do the same, and the whole country embarked on a large scale hog-raising movement.

Mao strongly supported the revived campaign to achieve an early transition to commune ownership. (436) Mao zealously promoted the spread and universalization of mess halls. Mao warmly praised as " scientific" a Guizhou report from which he concluded that the transtion form socialism to communism could be achieved in five to ten years. the whole country should follow without excepton(437).

in early March 1960, Mao ordered distribution of a set of instructions issued by Guangdong's party committee on solving five problems in the communes: the communist wind, false report, use of force, corruption and waste. when Mao learned that the winds of communism continued to blow he reacted with " great anger". he emphasizing that " the national situation was very good, the vast majority cadres were good doing good and praiseworthy work."

on 29 March 1960, Zhou Enlai reveived an anonymous letter from Anhui, on serious grain shortages in counties. deaths from starvation had occurred; Zhou forward the letter to Zeng Xisheng, with a request to investigagte, clearly, neither Zhou nor Mao felt a sense of of urgency about those deaths.

30 April 1960 in Tianjin, Tan Zhelin, told Mao that inspective terms had been sent to Fuyang, Anhui, found that only individual deaths, most sick people had been cured.

a large number of deaths occured in Henan, especially in Xinyang. but Mao didnot know this neither did Tan Zhelin(440)

on 6 May 1960, in Henan Wu Zhip, informed Mao of a severe drought but insisted that the wheat crop was dong pretty well. He reported many cases of edema, around 100000, mainly in Xinyang, several tens of thousand died ( autumn 1960 investigation reveals a death toll of 1.36 millon, 14 % population). while Mao begun to doubt the reliabilitity of reports from below, calling for investigations, little was done at this times. He was unwilling to jettison the GLF.

in 1960 Beidaihe Central work conference, from 5 July to 10 Aug, spent 70-80 % times on international matters and only at the end was the grain problem disasters, only on October 1960 did Mao begin to grasp the dimensions of he rural caastrophe, " he stopped eating meat from Oct". (441)

Mao want to prove Peng's wrong, restoring the loss of face, none dare to tell Mao truth. Mao was caught in a web of deception of his own making. everyone reported news that made Mao very happy.

in April 1960, Liao Luyan, the minister of agriculture, told Mao that 1960 harvest would be about 300 MMT ( actural only 143.5 MMT) when Mao asked whether it could be more, Tan Zhenlin, responded in the affirmative.

Mao's fanatical commitment to achieving socio-economic break throughs by means of all-out mobilizational campaigns. Mao was fully prepared to accept mass death as the price of progress.  " half of China may well have to die" Jung CHang claim that " Mao knowingly starved and worked these tens of millions of people to death. (443).
the accusation that Mao deliberately exposed China's peasants to mass death during the GLF is not plausible. (444)

when Mao finally began to grasp the scope of the 1960 famine, he strongly supported corrective measures. (444)

Chang cited unmerous primary and secondary sources, some of these are used in misleading ways(443). A striking instance of the use of misleading Quotation is from a speech given on 21 Nove 1958.

4. the Geography of the Great Leap Famine, by Anthony Garnaut, Modern China 2014 Vol. 40(3) 315-348. a social historyian, U of Oxford.

 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 19:12:09 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/9/2014 22:44 编辑

Revationalist scholars claim that that neither poor weather nor the excesses of local cadres can explain the extent of mortality; rather, responsibility lies squarely with Mao and the CCP leadership.that poor weather, withdrawn Soviet aid and local cadres caused famine – and argue instead that responsibility for the famine lies primarily with Mao Zedong himself.

traditional literature has been pre-occupied with what is best described as famine accounting: measuring the respective roles played by output decline, distributional failure and increased food demand.(991)

First, the Great Leap Forward (1958–60) reduced grain production from its 1958 peak of 198 million tonnes to a trough of 137 million tonnes in 1961. The 1958 crisis was precipitated instead by an unequal distribution of food supplies.the population to work on irrigation expansion and steel,

8 Cao Shuji, Da jihuang (The Great Famine) (Hong Kong: Time International, 2005), p. 282; Yang Jisheng, Mubei (Tombstone) (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 2008), p. 904; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005); Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine (London: Bloomsbury, 2010).

According to Cao, the famine claimed 32.5 million lives; Yang put the total at 36 million;Chang and Halliday computed 38 million deaths, and Dikötter claims over 45 million.

it is simply a re-statement of the claim made by Chen Yizi and reported in Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts –
China’s Secret Famine (London: Murray 1996), pp. 271–72. Chen’s claim is suspect; he collected the data whilst a member of an investigative team appointed by Zhao Ziyang in the early 1980s which had the remit of discrediting the Maoist regime (and hence consolidating the political position of the reformers). And some of Dikötter’s “new” provincial estimates have been in the public domain for many years: for Sichuan, for example, see Bramall, In Praise of Maoist Economic Planning, pp. 296– 97. More generally, Dikötter’s claim that the Chinese archives provide more reliable data on mortality than published data is problematic. He asserts that archival reports can be trusted because “There was no political advantage to be had from declaring extra deaths” (Dikötter, Great Famine, p. 332) but this
ignores how officials exaggerated deaths to evade or diminish state-imposed grain procurements.

was no “tragedy of good intentions.”malevolent party-state and in particular by “China’s ultra-leftist
emperor, Mao Zedong, Mao was the major causal agent of the Great Leap calamity – not the local party cadres who were blamedand scapegoated by Mao and allies at the center of the party.”16 Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China, p. 325.

For the Henan famine, see Felix Wemheuer, “Dealing with responsibility for the Great Leap famine in the People’s Republic of China,” The China Quarterly, No. 201 (2010), pp. 176–94, and Becker, Hungry Ghosts.William A. Joseph, “A tragedy of good intentions: post-Mao views of the Great Leap Forward,” Modern China, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1986), pp. 419–58; Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China, p. 325.

Sichuan it rose from 12 to 25 per thousand. The Sichuan famine was also more severe than almost anywhere else in China.2For the literature on Sichuan, see Cao Shuji, The Great Famine, pp. 193–215 and Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, pp. 161–228; rural availability fell from around 197 kgs per head in 1957 to a low of 133 kgs in 1959. The death rate actually exceeded 100 in six of the eleven  counties in one year or other in Fuling. exceeded 100 per thousand in 23 counties;surpassed 150 per thousand in five.36 In the counties of Pixian (175 per 1,000 in 1960), Shizhu (168 in 1960), Rongxian (165 in 1960), Fengdu (163 in 1960) and Yingjing (151 in 1959); see Yang Jisheng, Tombstone, p. 533 in Pi 郫 county soared from 12 per thousand in 1956 to 175 per thousand in 1960.

30,000 of the farmers resident in Renshou 仁寿 county had been sent to Hongya,the residual farm labour force was not large enough to collect the harvest.5 Sichuan as a whole, 10 per cent of the (notional) 1958 harvest allegedly
rotted in the fields. local cadre responses, not differential economic treatment by the Party centre, best explain mortality variations around Chengdu.

Sichuan exported more grain than any other province in every year between 1957 and 1961,and was a net exporter even at the height of famine in 1959–60.1959 output down by about 50 per cent because of labour shortages, this meant that the (gross) procurement burden rose from 14 to a colossal 80 per cent.

the extent of the output decline,the famine was primarily man-made.shift the blame for the Great Famine from local leaders to the Party centreand to Mao, do not square with the evidence.(1007)

Chris Bramall (2011). Agency and Famine in China's Sichuan Province, 1958–1962. The China Quarterly, 208, pp 990-1008 doi:10.1017/S030574101100110X

 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 19:18:17 | 显示全部楼层
Ralph Thaxton, Catastrophe and Contention in Rural China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008),
Thomas P. Bernstein, “Mao Zedong and the famine of 1959–1960,” The China Quarterly, No. 186 (2006) pp. 421–45,  Kimberly Ems Manning and Felix Wemheuer (eds.), Eating Bitterness: New Perspectives on China’s Great Leap Forward and Famine (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2011).

 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 22:58:37 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 15:46 编辑

Anthony Garnaut, The Geography of the  Great Leap Famine,Modern China 2014, Vol. 40(3) 315–348.

It is suggested that the radicalization of local party leaders, often considered to be a key cause of spatial variation in famine severity, was strongly conditioned by factors of economic geography.

the Great Leap Forward famine have  explained the origins of Maoist radicalism in the interaction between Mao Zedong, his colleagues in central party organizations, and certain radical local party officials.grain over-procurement, the introduction of  communal dining halls, and the deprivation of the right to withdraw from  rural collectives.

new perspectives on the Great Leap Forward have  been presented by several authors who have drawn heavily on the memoirs of  local party leaders, local archives, and interviews in the field (Yang Jisheng,  2008; Gao, 2006, 2011; Yang Xianhui, 2002; Thaxton, 2008; Dikötter, 2010). Leaders of prefectures, counties, communes, and villages each made distinct  contributions to the Leap effort.the grain procurement,  internal security, and military agencies that had local structures outside of the  control of local party leaders (Yang Jisheng, 2008: chap. 22).

the causes of famine,the origins of the famineThe official grain production  data show that the worst harvest occurred in 1960, which would normally  lead to the food crisis reaching its most acute phase in the spring of 1961; yet,  the official crude death rates show that in 1961 the country was well on its  way to recovery from famine(318). The official  grain yield increased by almost 10 percent per annum between 1949 and  1958.

in late 1953 introduced a national compulsory grain procurement system.compulsory grain procurement;severe
famine in the near periphery; moderate to  mild famine in the remote periphery;Southwest: almost all counties in the densely populated areas of eastern  Sichuan and northern Guizhou experienced severe or extreme famine.

author conclded that local party leaders encouraged to implement radical policies,radicals were the root cause of  the famine, party leadership of Xinyang prefecture, Henan,  who were punished for transgressing party norms in the wake of the famine,were merely fulfilling the role allocated to them within the plan(341). In 1953 Chen yun pointed out "If we adopt compulsory procurement methods, the peasants may oppose us".

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