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楼主: 郭国汀

人类历史上最恐怖最荒诞的大饥荒真相

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 楼主| 发表于 11/9/2014 23:11:42 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 02:22 编辑

Felix Wemheuer (2010). Dealing with Responsibility for the Great Leap Famine in the People's Republic of China. The China Quarterly, 201, pp 176-194.


in 1962, Mao Zedong took formal responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward in the name of the central government. Thousands of local cadres were made scapegoats and were legally punished.


Your dogs and swine eat the food of men, and you do not make any restrictive arrangements. There are people dying from famine and you do not issue the stores of your granaries for them. When people die, you say “It is not owing to me, it is owing to the year.” In which way does this differ from stabbing a man and killing him and saying – “It was not I; it was the weapon?” Let your Majesty cease to lay the blame on the year, and instantly from all the nation the people will come to you.

Mencius1


In the world view of imperial China, natural disaster and famine have been seen as indicators of the fate of a dynasty. According to traditional Confucian values, the ruler should not ignore his responsibility for nourishing the peopleand organizing famine aid in a case of a natural disaster.2


between 15 and 40 million people starved to death in the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward in the years between 1959 and 1961. despite of the famine, the Communist Party of China (CCP) and its leader Mao Zedong managed to stay in power.

Between late 1960 and 1961, the Party made great efforts to fight the famine. The Chinese government imported grain to feed starving peasants, public dining halls were abolished and private plots reintroduced(179).


the two 1993 volumes Reflections on Certain Major Decisions and Events by the retired central leader Bo Yibo.Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu (Reflections on Certain Major Decisions and Events) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1993).



the failure of the Great Leap Forward: leftist mistakes, the lack of experience with socialist construction and the weather as an external force(179).a leftist mistake which the central government committed,the history of leftist mistakes was written as a tragedy of good intentions.Crimes which caused millions of deaths could be de-emphasized as mistakes.


Deng Xiaoping said that Mao Zedong, along with other leading comrades from the central leadership such as Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and himself had became a “hot head” during the high tide of the Great Leap.Deng Xiaoping: “Dui qi cao ‘guanyu jianguo yilai de ruogan lizhi wenti de jueyi’ de yijian” (“Draft the suggestions for ‘Resolution on some questions concerning the history of the Party since the founding of the PRC’”), in Deng Xiaoping wenxian, Vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 296. the resolution explained that facing victory the comrades from the central government and the lower ranks became arrogant and self-satisfied.alomst the same word of translation of local cadres during the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union in 1929.


in 1962, Liu Shaoqi quoted a peasant from Hunan who said that the catastrophe was 70 per cent man-made and 30 per cent caused by nature. in his speech Liu did not even mention the retreat of the Soviet experts as a reason for the failure of the Great Leap but he mention the “study fee” . the resolution mention that the leftism first, then the weather and the retreat of the Soviet experts. in 1962 7000 conference, Mao Zedong acknowledged formal responsibility for the leftist mistakes in the name of the Central Committee.he cited the steel campaign, the “backyard furnace,”high planning targets and grain procurement quotas.direct responsibility was heaped on local cadres for violation of Party rules and crimes against the masses.Bo Yibo, Reflections on Certain Major Decisions and Events, Vol. 2, p. 27.using the local cadres as scapegoats was a long practised tradition in both the Soviet and Chinese tradition.Thousands of local cadres were sent to prison.villagers were criticized for their ideology of “peasant egalitarianism”.this theory was used by Stalin in the early 1930s when he blamed the rural workers for bringing ideas of peasant egalitarianism into factry.



the central government assumed responsibility for the famine only indirectly and formally. The Party historiography excluded the suffering and starvation of the peasants from their discourses(180)



Lui Shaoqi, “Zai kuoda de zhongyang gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech on the expanded working conference of the Central Committee”), in Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi: Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenjian xuanbian (A Collection of Important Documents after the Foundation of the State) (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1997), Vol. 15, p. 88.



Peng Xizhe calculated 23 million deaths in 14 provinces (Peng Xizhe, “Demographic consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China’s provinces,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1987), p. 649). Ansley Coale came to the conclusion that 16.5 million people died, and Basil Ashton counted 30 million deaths and 30 missing births (Basil Ashton and Kenneth Hill, “Famine in China, 1958–1961,” Population and Development Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1984), p. 614).


deep plough , the three waterwheels were destroyed, the necessary figure was reached.other intellectuals saw themselves as naïve children who blindly trusted Chairman Mao and the Communist Party.Wei Junyi desprise herself as a naïve child who is beaten by his mother again and again, but still loves her. many intellectuals about the Great Leap, the famine and suffering of the peasants is not an important topic(182).not the famine but the Cultural Revolution.

after the false report of a bumper harvest, the cadres started a campaign to collect the “hidden grain” from the peasants,a famine broke out in the spring of 1959 in huangjiang Guangxi;new Party secretary ordered the execution of every person who tried to steal grain from the full grain stores(183)to prevent a mass exodus to Guizhou province, peasants were tortured and beaten to death.who was willing to climb over mountains of corpses to build up socialism. In 1961, Zeng Yang was expelled from the CCP and sentenced to five years in prison.3  Wang Ding, “Yige da weiqing’ de muhou” (“The background of a great Sputnik”), in Zhang, Liu and Zhang, The “Great Leap Forward” and China in the Period of Three Years of Difficulties, p. 58.


the famine in Bo county, Anhui, was caused by false reports and unfeasibly high planning targets and grain procurement quotas;Liang zhiyuan remembers how the cadres used hunger as a weapon to control the peasants.Party committee established check points with armed militia at every bus station and crossroads to prevent peasants escape.He found that over 25 per cent of the members of the investigated brigade had starved to death.
Liang Zhiyuan, “‘Dayuejin’ zai Anhui Bo xian” (“The ‘Great Leap Forward’ in Bo county in Anhui”), Zhonggong dangshi ziliao, No. 75 (2000), pp. 5–31.



According to official figures the famine caused two million deaths in Henan.Cao Shuji mentions 2,939,000 “irregular deaths” based on the statistics of the county gazettes of Henan.Zhang Linnan, “Guanyu fan Pan, Yang, Wang shijian” (“On the Anti-Pan, Yang, Wang incident”), in Zhonggong Henan shengwei dangshi gongzuo weiyuanhui (ed.), Fengyu chunqiu – Pan Fusheng shiwen jinian ji (Wind and Rain, Spring and Autumn – Poetry and Articles in the Memory of Pan Fusheng) (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 323. Cao Shuji, Dajihuang – 1959–1961 nian de Zhongguo renkou (The Great Famine – The Population of China from 1959 to 1961) (Hong Kong: Dangdai guoji chubanshe gongsi, 2005), p. 264.



the death rates given in the county gazettes are much lower than the internal statistics published by the provincial
government(186)Wu Zhipu implemented the Great Leap Forward very radically.Pan Fusheng was rehabilitated, but Wu Zhipu was not officially criticized.48 Pan and Wu were transferred out of Henan and a new leadership was put in place(186).
in provincial Party historiography, both leaders were portrayed as good Marxist-Leninists and revolutionaries.
Xinyang accident a historian who had access to the provincial archive said that over two million peasants starved and were beaten to death in this area.the district had only ten million inhabitants before the outbreak of the famine. After false reports of a record harvest, the state even purchased the peasants’ grain rations and seed
grain. local government blockaded the region in an attempt to prevent anyone from leaving. After the dismissal of
Lu Xianwen as the leader of the Xinyang region in late 1960, thousands of local cadres were arrested and punished for the Xinyang Incident.  accuse them of leftist tendencies, but attacked them for the restoration of landlord rule.    Zhonghua renmin gongheguo guojia nongye weiyuanhui bangongting (ed.), “Zhonggong zhongyang dui Xinyang diwei guanyu zhengfeng zhengshe yundong he shengchang jiuzai gongzuo qingkuang de baogao de pizhi,” Nongye jitihua zhongyao wenjian huibian (A Collection of Important Documents Regarding the Collectivization of Agriculture) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1981), Vol. 2, p. 423.

Both the theoretical explanation and the language had been borrowed from the Soviet tradition. the official interpretation, official historiography.in most of the Chinese books on the Great Leap Forward the Xinyang event is not even mentioned.cadres from Xinyang are questioning the official evaluation of the famine rather than blaming individual cadres for misguided implementation(188), according to Zhang Shufan, Lu Xianwen is an ignorant and heartless leader who tried to hide the fact that hundreds of thousand peasants were starving in Xinyang, but he was shielded by Wu Zhipu. Zhang demanded the opening of the grain stores Lu Xianwen suspended him from work until early 1960.all the secretaries working for the Party committees of the cities and countries were expelled from the Party and 200,000 local cadres were educated by "special treament". according to the memories of the villagers in Runan county, half the population starved to death(190).


official claims that communism three years natural disaster, left-wing radicalism or utopian socialism.a former
cadre Chen Chuwu remembered the Great Leap Forward as nothing but working in the fields and on the construction sites day and night(191). Stealing unripened grain (chi qing 吃青) and eating things like grass were the survival strategies of the peasants."everybody was a thief, even the children” or “everybody just took care of himself.  most of the children and the elderly starved to death.

In Judong, the villagers talked openly about cannibalism. Even the peasants who fled to Qinghai province heard rumours about cannibalism in Guangshan county in the Xinyang region.people ate the corpses of people who had been starved before. Is that correct?” Wu answered: “Yes, corpses. At that time the people had no choice". cadres managed the food in the public mess halls, the financial budget and the work point system.they could use hunger as a weapon.beatings and torture were aspects of daily life at the struggle meeting during the great leap forward.

many intellectuals are not interested in the problems of the peasants.no other event in post-1949 history that challenges the legitimacy of the CCP at such a high degree.If intellectuals are looking for
an ally to overcome Party rule, they could start to transmit the memories of the peasants into the public space and use the famine as an argument against the rule of the CCP(194).


Kang Jian, Huihuan de huanmie –Renmingongshe de jingshilu (The Glorious Disillusion – Warning about the People’s Commune) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui chubanshe, 1998), p. 558.


She Dehong, a retired cadre from the municipality of Xinyang, on a trip back his home village in December 1959, he saw a mountain of over 100 corpses. After he arrived, he realized that half his family had starved to death(189)in nearly every village in Huaibin county, cannibalism took place.it was very dangerous to speak about the starvation during the famine. in the spring 1960, The corpses began to smell horribly, but people recovered enough strength to
bury them.   the local government decided to dig mass graves with over 100 corpses in them. He eastamates that the grain in the grain stores of Xinyang was enough to feed 8 million peasants with a ration of 400 grams per day,  If the government had opened the grain stores, nobody would have starved.     She Dehong, “Guanyu ‘Xinyang shijian’ de yishu” (“Memories of the ‘Xinyang Incident’”), in Zhongguo nongcunyanjiu bianji weiyuanhui (ed.), Zhongguo nongcun yanjiu 2002 quan (Bejing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2003), p. 325.329.330.

As Ruby Watson has pointed out in her studies about Eastern Europe, the socialist states failed to convince society of their interpretations of the past. An alternative “underground memory” always existed.( Rubie S. Watson (ed.), Memory, History and Opposition under State Socialism (Houston: School of American Research Press, 1994), p. 4.)










 楼主| 发表于 11/10/2014 03:08:04 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 15:03 编辑

YANG JISHENG, The Fatal Politics of the PRC’s Great Leap Famine: the preface to Tombstone , Journal of Contemporary China (2010), 19(66), September, 755–776.
Yang Jisheng, an economist, journalist and Xinhua editor, has devoted more than two decades of his life to collecting data from official archives and interviewing survivors, witnesses and officials. diverse localities and the power center in Beijing to explain the dynamics of the catastrophe caused by CCP policies and practices under the leadership of Mao Zedong. Chief among these policies were the state monopoly of purchasing and marketing grain, the power of officials to seize grain from people’s homes, compulsory collective mess halls that ‘imposed the dictatorship of the proletariat on every individual stomach’, and a full-scale collectivization that left villagers no means of saving themselves.



Despite receiving reports of widespread famine and cannibalism, Mao touted alleged successes and attacked those who spoke the truth as counter-revolutionaries, thereby prolonging and intensifying the famine for another two years. Yang places the ultimate responsibility for 36 million deaths on China’s political system. how a political system presented to the Chinese people as a ‘Road to Paradise’ instead turned into a ‘Road to Perdition’.



Tombstone. Four intentions inform this title: the first is to erect a tombstone for my father, who died of starvation in 1959; the second is to erect a tombstone for the 36 million Chinese who died of starvation; the third is to erect a
tombstone for the system that brought about the Great Famine; the fourth came to me while I was halfway through writing this book, when Beijing’s Xuanwu Hospital found a positive AFP reading in my blood work, at which point I accelerated my efforts, determined to complete the book and thereby erect a tombstone for myself.



The authorities in a totalitarian system strive to conceal their faults and extol their merits, gloss over their errors and forcibly eradicate all memory of man-made calamity, darkness and evil. In 1950 Yang attened a struggle meeting against landlord, when people had finished venting their grievances against each one, others would rush up and beat them. They beat each of these people until they were lifeless, then took them to the hillside and executed them. At this session 14 people were executed. After the Chinese Communist Party gained power, it sealed China off from information beyond its borders, and also imposed a wholesale negation of China’s traditional moral standards. The government’s monopoly on information gave it a monopoly on truth. As the center of power, the Party central was also the heart of truth and information. All of the social science research organs wholeheartedly endorsed the validity of the Communist regime; all cultural and arts groups poured full effort into extolling the Chinese Communist Party; all news organs published news verifying the wisdom and might of the Chinese Communist Party. From nursery school to university, the chief mission was to implant a Communist worldview in theminds of all students. The social science research institutes, cultural groups, news organs and schools all became tools for the Party’s monopoly over thought, spirit and opinion, and all were continuously engaged in molding the souls of China’s youth. People employed in this work were proud to be considered ‘engineers of the human soul’.

the Cultural Revolution that the governor of Hubei Province, Zhang Tixue, said something that shocked me: during the three years of hardship in Hubei Province, some 300,000 people had starved to death!My personal experience of the turmoil in Beijing in 1989 led me to a profound awakening; the blood of those young students cleansed my brain of all the lies it had accepted over the previous decades. As a journalist, I strove for truthful reporting and discussion. As a scholar, I felt a responsibility to restore history to its true colors, and tell the truth of history to others who had been deceived.

I consulted many types of material, from both China and abroad, to confirm that some 36 million people died of
starvation in China from 1958 to 1962. Because starvation also caused a drop in the birth rate, there were also an estimated 40 million fewer births in China during those years than would ordinarily have been the case. Together, that is a total of 76 million lives lost to famine in those four years.



In the regions of Xinyang, Tongwei, Fengyang, Haozhou, Luoding, Wuwei, Guantao and Jining and in many parts of Sichuan Province, nearly every family experienced at least one death from starvation, and some families were completely wiped out. In some cases, entire villages were left without a single living inhabitant.



Setting aside the 40 million who were never born, how can we conceptualize the 36 million among the living who starved to death? This number is equivalent to 450 times the number of people killed by the atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki on 9 August 1945.10 It is as if someone had dropped 450 atomic bombs on the villages of China. This number is 150 times the number of people killed in the Tangshan earthquake on 28 July 1976.11 It is greater than the number of people killed in World War I. About 10 million people died in World War I, or an average of 2 million
people during each year from 1914 to 1918. In 1960 alone, 15 million people starved to death in China. The severity of the Great Famine even outstripped the ravages of World War II, during which 40–50 million people died.



The most severe famine previously recorded in Chinese history occurred in the years 1928–1930, during which a natural calamity affected 22 provinces. That famine broke all previous records, but still totaled only 10 million
people. In the 17 years from 1920 to 1936, famine due to crop failures took the lives of 18.36 million people.AN: Deng Yunte, Zhongguo jiuhuang shi [History of Famine Relief in China ] (Beijing: Commercial Press, 1993), pp. 142–143.In fact, the number of people who died during the most severe famine in 1928–1930 did not exceed 6 million, while 140,000 died as a result of the Yangtze floods in 1931.


The starvation that preceded death was worse than death itself. The grain was gone, the wild herbs had all been eaten, even the bark had been stripped from the trees, and bird droppings, rats and cotton batting were used to fill stomachs. In the kaolin clay fields,15 starving people chewed on the clay as they dug it. The corpses of the dead, famine victims seeking refuge from other villages, and even one’s own family members became food for the desperate.



Cannibalism was no longer exceptional. The ancient annals reported cases of families exchanging their children to consume during severe famines, but during the Great Famine, some families resorted to eating their own children. In some counties in Xinyang, in Tongwei, Gansu Province, and in Sichuan Province, survivors related shocking tales of cannibalism. I personally met people who had eaten human flesh, and heard them describe its taste. An analysis of reliable evidence I collected indicates that there were thousands of cases of cannibalism throughout China at that
time.


16 In the first seven editions of the Chinese edition of this book, I used Li Rui’s estimate, which put the number of cannibalism cases throughout China in excess of 1,000. In July 2009, the former deputy commissioner of the Anhui provincial Public Security Bureau, Yin Shusheng, provided me with the following information: in 1961, the Anhui provincial Public Security Bureau reported to the provincial Party committee that there had been 1,289 cases of cannibalism in the province. There were more than 300 cases of cannibalism reported in Xining City and Huangzhong County in Qinghai Province. Added to the figures reported for Sichuan, Shandong, Henan and other places in China, an estimated total of several thousand is no exaggeration.



This was a tragedy unprecedented in human history. For tens of millions of people to starve to death and resort to cannibalism during a period of normal climate patterns with no wars or epidemics is utterly unique in the history of the world.



Officials at all levels falsified statistics relating to the number of deaths and shrank the figures by every means at their disposal. In order to conceal this matter forever, the authorities ordered the destruction of all data in every province reporting the depletion of China’s population by tens of millions.Chinese government categorically labeled them ‘vicious attacks’ and ‘slanderous rumors’.



In order to reverse international public opinion, the Chinese government invited some ‘friends of China’ to visit and see for themselves, in hopes that they would write reports that ‘clarified the facts and truth’. The Chinese government carried out extremely thorough preparation for each of these visits, meticulously arranging every step of a visitor’s itinerary, including which places they would visit, the people with whom they could come into contact, and the lines people should recite when receiving the guests. During these visits, foreign guests were kept completely segregated from ordinary people, and well-fed and well-clothed individuals were even put on display in some places.



Fang Shi, at that time deputy director of Xinhua’s domestic news service, was at one point tasked with accompanying foreign guests on inspection tours of Anhui Province. Later, at the age of 85, he told me how the Anhui provincial Party committee deceived foreign visitors (described later in this book). The duped visitors, upon their return would publish articles based on their ‘personal experience’ in praise of China’s ‘great accomplishments’, saying that China was not experiencing a famine and that its people were well fed and well clothed.



The British journalist Felix Greene wrote in his famous 1965 work on China, A Curtain of Ignorance, that in 1960 he had traveled throughout China at a time when grain was being severely rationed, and never saw any signs of mass starvation. The American journalist Edgar Snow, who became a household word in China, was one of those deceived by China who passed that deception on to others.  



I took advantage of my reporting trips to consult relevant materials throughout the land and interview people who had survived the famine. I traveled from the northwest to the southwest, from North China to East China, from Northeast China to South China, consulting archives in more than a dozen provinces and interviewing more than 100 eye-witnesses. After 10 years of effort, I accumulated documents totaling millions of words and 10 notebooks full of
notes from interviews. In this way I obtained a relatively comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the true circumstances of the Great Famine.



Liu Shaoqi once said to Mao Zedong, ‘History will record the role you and I played in the starvation of so many people, and the cannibalism will also be memorialized!’ In the spring of 1962, in a conversation with Deng Liqun, Liu once again noted that ‘Deaths by starvation will be recorded in the history books’.Liu Shaoqi also once said that this disaster should be engraved on a memorial tablet as a record ‘to be passed down to our children and grandchildren so that such an error will never be committed again’.Wang Guangmei, Liu Yuan et al., Ni suo buzhidao de Liu Shaoqi [The Unknown Liu Shaoqi] (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 2000), p. 90.

the basic reason why tens of millions of people in China starved to death was totalitarianism. in this kind of system, the government monopolizes all production and life-sustaining resources, so that once a calamity occurs, ordinary people have no means of saving themselves and can only sit back and wait for death.

the CCP regime even tighter and more detailed, extensive and penetrating control over society, officialdom and the people than the former imperial autocracy had ever accomplished. This stranglehold encompassed all of society’s political, economic, cultural and ideological workings and all aspects of daily life. The dictatorship’s coercive power penetrated every corner of even the most remote village, to every member of every family, into the minds and entrails of every individual. From top to bottom, there is no independence of character or thought; all must obediently submit themselves to those in power in every aspect of life.In 1950, on the first International Labor Day (1 May) celebration under the New China, when Mao was provided with a list of slogans for his approval, he personally added one: ‘Long live Chairman Mao!’ High procurement levels for grain had already caused many rural inhabitants to starve to death in 1956. When Mao became fanatical in 1958, other officials followed him in his fanaticism, and only after the grave consequences became clear did they adopt some corrective measures at the end of 1958 and in early 1959.he not only abandoned the original corrective measures but intensified the erroneous policies of 1958. As a result, policies that had already caused starvation among the peasants were continued for three years.


The more a person possessed, the greater his fear, because punishment would cause his fall to be that much greater. Officials and intellectuals possessed more than the average person, and as a result they lived in even greater fear and demonstrated even more ‘loyalty’ to the system.


In this pyramid of power, officials at each level were the slaves of those above them and would curry favor by any means available, while acting the part of the tyrannical master toward those below them. For all their desire to advance to the next level, even stronger was their fear of losing their current positions as slaves.They had blind faith in their leader, worshiped power, conformed to the prevailing trends and resigned themselves to whatever came. The more concentrated the power, the stronger the infighting within those circles of power.The stronger the infighting, the more threatened Mao Zedong felt by those around him, and the more vicious his purges.In the midst of these ruthless and intense power struggles, people would not hesitate to lie and sell out their friends for the sake of self presevation and promotion.

  The totalitarian system deprived the people of silent right. In one political movement after another, in meetings and conferences of every size and at every level, each person was forced to ‘declare his stand’, ‘expose his thoughts’ and ‘bare his heart to the Party’. A person had to open the most hidden places in his heart to the Party for examination. ‘Declaring one’s stand’ under a high-pressure political situation effectively forced a person to betray his own conscience and lose jurisdiction over the last morsel of his soul.This totalitarian system repeated self-abasement led people to continuously trample upon the things they had most cherished, and to flatter those things they had always most despised. In this way the totalitarian system caused the degeneration of the national character of the Chinese people.

The peasants bore the chief burden of realizing these ideals: they shouldered the cost of industrialization, of
collectivization, of subsidizing the cities, and of the extravagant habits of officials at every level. Most of this cost was imposed through the state monopoly for purchasing and marketing. The peasants were obliged to sell their produce to the government at prices that did not cover their costs.The inadequacy of the grain left after the peasants sold their ‘surplus’ to the government was one of the reasons so many peasants starved to death.

The communal kitchens were a major reason why so many people starved to death.Some communes consumed their full supply of grain by the end of 1958 and were left to wait for government replenishment that never arrived (774) . The communal kitchens remained bastions of privilege for cadres, however; cadres always managed to eat their fill, and corruption was rife, with illicit appropriation of already scarce food supplies aggravating the hunger of commune members.The most effective function of the communal kitchens was to impose the‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ on every individual stomach. anyone who proved disobedient could be deprived of a meal.


Thousands of wrongful deaths resulted from beatings or persecution by grass-roots level officials(774).Yang Weiping, a member of the Henan Provincial Party Committee secretariat, provided some concrete figures on 15 October 1960 in his ‘Report on the Xinyang Incident’: 2,104 people were beaten to death in Jinguangshan and Huangchuan counties, with another 254 people in Huangchuan County disabled by beatings. Those killed or injured included not only villagers but also some uncooperative local cadres.villagers had no power to seek aid or escape elsewhere. Officials at all levels used all means at their disposal to prevent news of the famine from leaking to the outside world.Regardless of what kind of person went into the totalitarian system, all came out as conjoined twins facing in opposite directions: either despot or slave, depending on their position in respect of those above or below them.




The economic foundation for implementing totalitarianism was the negation of private ownership and individual interests. Without the agricultural collective movement, the totalitarian system could not have existed in China(772).


The People’s Communes were developed from the agricultural collective system, and were a further development of totalitarianism. The integration of governmental administration and commune management under the People’s Communes formed the basic level of state administrative power and social authority on the foundation of social integration. This process not only integrated government administration with enterprise management, but also made all economic activity subservient to political goals, brought all wealth under the control of government officials, and used the  government’s organizational structure to replace the family, religion and all other forms of social organization(773).


China political system remains unchanged, the great changes in the economic and social sphere have only aggravated the contradictions between the superstructure and the economic base. The main manifestation of this contradiction is in the unequal allocation of the fruits and costs of economic reform. Those who have borne the greatest cost of the reforms have enjoyed the smallest benefit, and in some cases have become members of a disadvantaged class. Those who have borne the least cost of the reforms have enjoyed the greatest profits and become members of a privileged class(776)


 楼主| 发表于 11/10/2014 05:29:00 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 18:14 编辑

Amartya Sen, who won the 1998 Nobel Prize for his research on famine, wrote:


In the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. We cannot find exceptions to this rule, no matter where we look: the recent famines of Ethiopia, Somalia, or other dictatorial regimes; famines in the Soviet Union in the 1930s; China’s 1958–61 famine with the failure of the Great Leap Forward; or earlier still, the famines in Ireland or India under alien rule. China, although it was in many ways doing much better economically than India, still managed (unlike India) to have a famine, indeed the largest recorded famine in world history: nearly 30 million people died in the famine of 1958–61, while faulty governmental policies remained uncorrected for three full years. The policies went uncriticized because there were no opposition parties in parliament, no free press, and no multiparty elections. Indeed, it is precisely this lack of challenge that allowed the deeply defective policies to continue even though they were killing millions each year.


Amartya Sen, ‘Democracy as a universal value’, Journal of Democracy 10(3), (1999), pp. 3–17,

The first major article introducing the existence and  full severity of the Chinese famine to a broader public was by Amartya Sen in the New York  Review of Books in 1982.    "How is India Doing?", New YorkReview of Books, Vol. 29, Christmas number, 1982.


 楼主| 发表于 11/10/2014 15:48:44 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 16:58 编辑


The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China’s Great Leap Famine
JAMES KAI-SING KUNG. SHUO CHEN (Hong Kong University of Science and Technology)American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 1 February 2011pp.27-45


Using excessive grain procurement as a pertinent measure, we find that such variations were patterned systematically on the political career incentives of Communist Party officials rather than the conventionally assumed ideology or personal idiosyncrasies.

author argues that the variations in political radicalism were related to officials’ career incentives.  campaign with a aim to speed up the process of industrialization by “squeezing”the agricultural sectors( 27). severity followed closely the rate of state-procured grain intended to fuel industrialization.the excess procurement ratio of provinces governed by alternate members of CCP CP are 3% highier than those governed by full members.this translater into 17.62 kilograms of grain procured per person;or an approximate 1.11‰ increase in the excess death rate.Given the mean excess death rate of 6.59‰ during the Great Leappolitical rank alone can explain up to 16.83% of the excess death rate(28).radicalism declined once bureaucrats reached the highest levels of their career ladders.

the excessive grain procurement was likely the major culprit of excess deaths.alternate members of the CC-CCPhad stronger incentives than both full members and nonmembers to climb the career(43)Great Leap provided these party officials with a rare, extraordinary opportunityto respond to Mao’s unambiguous signal that radical behavior would be duly rewarded. author chanlenge the assumption that ideology is the main source of bureaucratic radicalism in totalitarian regime.in the absence of political checks and balances on the dictator,he can easily misuse the samecareer incentives that have been employed to promote(43)

 楼主| 发表于 11/10/2014 17:10:58 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/10/2014 17:51 编辑

The number of excess deaths was enormous, 20 million to 30 million ;The exaggeration of the 1958 grain output estimates clearly affected the course of  the famine by misleading high officials, local officials; continued exportation of grain and the institution of the free supply  system for grain, as well as enhancing beliefs in the glorious achievements of the commune system;A remarkable and distinguishing characteristic of the famine is that it began following the largest grain crop on record and prior to the spring harvest of the subsequent  year. the large increase in mortality in 1958 over 1957 in  Sichuan, Yunan and Gansu--the increases in death rates ranged from 37 percent to 120 percent.large export and labor intensive projects; famine started in 1958--following a record  grain crop.

excessive procurement, the protection of urban consumers from the worst effects of the food shortages, the continued export of grain while people starved, the output declines.The famine was primarily induced by policies adopted during the Great Leap Period;Mao argued that the area devoted to grain should be reduced in 10% then 1958; radical policies adopted  that reduced production incentives;


  excessive consumption and waste of food engendered by the communal  dining system due to excessive exports to the rest of China, engendered by enthusiastic provincial party officials seeking favor from Beijing; output decline  favoritism of urban residents over rural residents and the continued export of grain were the primary causes of the severity of the famine; political  factors associated with the spread of the communal kitchens;why China continued to export grain while officials knew that  some of its people were starving.


why did the famine end in 1962? 1 The overall supply of food, at least based on  the official data, was clearly less than in 1959 and very nearly the same as in 1960, abolition  of the community kitchens, the institution of private plots, the allocation of land to house; in 1960, when net exports  were 2.7 million tons, and in 1962, when net cereal imports were 4 million tons.national availability of grain would have provided 120 million people with an average of 500 calories per day for the year. intake of 2,300 per capita did not provide enough for adult workers to engage in strenuous physical activity throughout the year.Great Leap Famine nearly all market activity  was restricted .now grain only 7 percent of consumption expenditures for urban residents, and 15 percent for rural residents.



 楼主| 发表于 11/10/2014 17:54:57 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/11/2014 00:09 编辑

SEVEN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CHINESE  FAMINE OF 1959-61 by Carl Riskin, CHINA ECONOMIC REVIEW VOLUME 9(2) 1998 PP.112-124

basis of ethical evaluation of China's leaders: what did they know and when did they know it?

government  policies, exports and imports of food, social and administrative disarray due to the Great  Leap Forward, per capita food availability over the period, and mortality statistics(113).China did not published any date, until a couple of articles published in China in 1980-81 presented a few isolated  statistics on mortality and fertility rates for those years.      
Zhu Hengzhi, "Dangnian woguo renkou wenti ji fazhan qushi" (China's current population  problem and the direction in which it is developing), Jingji Kexue (Economic Science), no.  3, 1980; and Sun Yefang, "Jiaqiang tongji gongzuo; gaige tongji tizhi" (Strengthen statistical work; reform the statistical system), Jingji Guanli(Economic Management), No. 2, February  15, 1981.  A.J. Coale,"opulation trends, population policy and opulation studies in China," Population and Development Review, Vol. 7, 1981; and J. Aird, "opulation studies and population policy in China," Population and Development Review, Vo. 8, 1982.

crude mortality rates appeared only in 1983, in the Statistical Yearbook of Chinaenny Kane, in her monograph on the  Chinese famine (1988, pp. 3-4),cites the discussion of a later director of the State Statistical Bureau Li Chengrui, as to how the Bureau compiled statistics for the tumultuous Cultural revolution decade," 1966-76. Li mentions the existence of locally collected statistics that had never been aggregated and the implementation of retrospective surveys asking for; Kane wrote: "it seems reasonable to assume that, where necessary, similar procedures were used to compile figures for  the Great Leap Forward. This may have presented greater problems, however, since the statistics for that  period were not so much missing as distorted to an incredible degree".

Officially published mortality rates imply about 15 million  excess deaths during the famine period;Ansley J. Coale (1981) estimated the number at  16.5 million, John Aird (1982) and Peng Xizhe (1987) at 23 million, Ashton et al. at 29.5 million,(1984) Judith Banister (1987) at 30 million, and Chen Yizi at 43 million 5 (South erland, 1994).
Chen Yizi's methods of estimation are unknown. The Washington Post of July  17, 1994 reported that "National Defense University professor Cong Jin estimated that 40  million died between 1959 and 1961."

cause of famina: The initial pronouncements of the Chinese government laid most blame for what was then  called the "three hard years" on natural disasters, which were said to be unusually widspread and devastating during the relevant period. Since then this claim has been widely  rejected. even Liu Shaoqi, was reputed to have said that the
famine was 70% man-made and only 30% the result of natural disasters. Prolonged drought, heavy flooding, and other natural calamities severely damaged agricultural production" (peng 651).Public dining halls replaced family meals in much of the countryside, and food was  treated as a free good. Farming methods ("deep plowing, close planting") increasing amounts of foodgrain for export in a rush to pay off China's debt to the  Soviet Union.the causes lists : output collapse, irrational methods  of cultivation, destruction of work incentives, wasteful consumption of available  foodgrain, ignorance of the planning authorities, over-procurement of grain by the government, increased exports in the midst of the crisis, failure to initiate imports in time, bad  weather, etc. if the government had acted swiftly  to relax procurement, stop exports, begin large-scale imports and move grain to the most seriously affected regions, massive excess deaths  could have been avoided. In some areas,  members' kitchens were destroyed and their grain and cooking implements confiscated. Xue Muqiao, the  former commissioner of state statistics and a prominent economist, estimated that Chinese  farmers over-consumed by about 11% of the rural grain supply in 1958

Dali Yang (1996) such as a ban on private plots, greater egalitarianism, a larger collective accounting unit, larger and more militarized work teams, more emphasis on ideological rather than technical criteria for production decisions (close planting, deep plowing)

dating of famine: the 1958 harvest was a very good one, the largest in history. The bulk of the annual crop is harvested in the autumn months.Sichuan (73 million) in 1958 experienced a sharp increase with its crude death rate doubling the 1957 level. Sichuan,Gansu (13 million), Anhui (34 million), Yunnan (19 million) and Ningxia (2 million) also had sharply increasing mortality in 1958.(Peng, X. (1987). Demograpic consequences of the great leap forward in china's provinces. Populaption and Development Review, 13. p.646)Anhui's crude death rate rose to 12.4 per thousand in 1958, 36% above the very low rate that had been achieved in 1957 (9.1 per thousand)with the death rate reaching 68.6 per thousand in 1960.


government reduced procurement of grain from the countryside to 16-17% of output, compared to 28% in 1959 and 22% in 1960


by mid-1959 the center was aware of very tense conditions in much of the Chinese countryside,It was thisknowledge that led Mao and  other leaders to begin tempering the more extreme Great Leap policies in the spring of 1959.

Mao is quoted as saying during a visit to Hunan, "I would be happy if peasants really have hidden grain. I am afraid they have nothing to hide". Yang, D.L (1996). Calamity and reform in China: State, rural society, and institutional change since the great leap famine. Stanford: Stanford University Press. adoption of household contracting.

the people who most need to understand the great leap famine event and its surrounding history are the Chinese people, themselves.


Wehrli (1991)examines records of weather events for various years for the country as a whole and for two provinces most heavily impacted by the famine, and finds no relationship between incidence of natural disasters and famine mortality.





 楼主| 发表于 11/11/2014 00:21:04 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/11/2014 02:35 编辑

James Kai‐sing Kung and Justin Yifu Lin,The Causes of China’s Great Leap Famine, 1959–1961, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 52, No. 1 (2003), pp. 51-73

Ashton et al., p. 620. Before then the Chinese famine of 1876–79, with an estimated casualty of between 9.5 to 20 million, was considered the worst famine ever.

Ashton et al.; Judith Banister, “An Analysis of Recent Data on the Population of China,” Population and Development
Review 10 (June 1984): 241–71;

current studies have focused on only one single factor as explanation, such as excessive grain procurement, wasteful communal dining, and politics, or at the most two—food availability decline (FAD) and urban bias.FAD was arguably a possible culprit.death rates were much higher in rural areas similarly suggests the possibility of an urban bias.While the rural casualties were in excess of 28 per thousand in 1960, the urban mortality rate was only 13.7 per thousand.
the compulsory procurement system;the communal dining system;the higher mortality of the Leap may also be attributable to politics.many provincial officials allegedly mobilized rural laborers to engage excessively in a variety of energy-consuming activities, thereby raising the level of caloric intake at a time when food supply became less available.Ashton argued that the famine’s catastrophe was not evenly distributed across China but heavily concentrated in a number of provinces of diverse geographical variation. find that the decline in food availability, excessive grain procurement caused by an urban-biased policy, and politics and its consequences, respectively, were important factors in the death rate.

the Leap was an unorthodox development strategy conceived to hasten the pace of transforming the Chinese
economy from its predominantly agrarian nature into a powerful industrial state. large-scale irrigation projects, water conservancy works;tens of millions, or 30%–50% of the rural labor force, were involvedbackyard furnaces;the economic costs of this diversion were colossal. First, the 3 million tons of steel produced in these backyard furnaces was of such poor quality that at least half of it was considered wasted.many commune authorities were so preoccupied with iron and steel manufacturing in the autumn of 1958 that they neglected to harvest the crops, which
were simply left to rot in the fields. This diversion of resources is estimated to account for 28.6% of the overall grain output collapse(54). the Leap had created an incentive structure of encouraging cadres to overreport grain output, which led to the illusion that China had already produced a huge grain surplus.Mao’s decision to reduce the acreage sown to grain by a substantial 9.6% in 1959.the work-point system; food distribution and consumption.Mao encouraged the communes to set up communal dining facilities and centralized food preparation and consumption.

A system of “unified purchase and sale” (Tonggou tongxiao) of grain and other major farm products was set up in late 1953 to facilitate the transfer of agricultural surplus between the agricultural and industrial sectors.gross procurement in 1959 increased by more than 30% over the previous year and reached a record level of 64 million tons, or 38% of total output, against an average procurement rate of 25% in the pre-Leap years(55).a widely held view attributes this excessiveness to Mao’s erroneous belief that China had produced a grain output that was twice the size of the previous year, a belief fueled by the exaggerations and falsification of grain output.But procurement ratio remained high, at 32.4%, in 1960, after Mao became aware of the multitude of problems associated with the commune in general and the public dining institution in particular.

After peaking at 200 million tons in 1958, grain output fell precipitously in1959 by a magnitude of 15%, to be followed by a further reduction of 16%in 1960. Cumulatively, output fell by a substantial 28% against the level of
1958, to 143.5 million tons. It was only in 1966 that for the first time grain output surpassed the level reached in 1958(56). municipalities Beijing, Tianjian, and Shanghai collectively took in close to half, or 45.4%, of the provincial grain imports. With Liaoning, a highly industrialized province, importing another 21.6%.the three municipalities had imported during this period (1958–62) had soared further to 60% of total provincial grain imports. And with Liaoning
taking in another 26.7%, these four major urban centers accounted for close to 90% of the provincial exports during this crisis period.

Hypothesis: the food availability decline (FAD) hypothesis postulates that death rates would be higher;second hypothesis concerns the effect of urban bias on death rate.The third hypothesis relates to whether communal dining and its attendantincentive structure of wasteful food preparations and consumption had negatively affected the death rate;we hypothesize that provinces with igher participation rates in communal dining were likely to suffer from higher death rates(57).final hypothesis concerns the differential impact of the Leap’s policies caused by variations in their implementation by government officials across provinces.In times of food shortages, the excessive mobilization of labor would likely lead to caloric deficiencies and malnutrition and induce such diseases as edema, which, if left untreated, would eventually lead to death.


production of inferior, useless steel in primitive backyard furnaces

conclude that a decline in food availability, the deepening of an existing systemic bias that discriminated against the rural population in the form of excessive grain procurement, and, finally, the relationships between policy discretions, excessive labor mobilization, and death rates. Conversely, we fail to support the idea that communal dining was the main cause of the Leap’s famine(67).

For excessive grain procurement, see Thomas Bernstein, “Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants,” Theory and Society 13 (May 1984): 339–77. For wasteful communal dining, see Chang and Wen. For politics, see Dali Yang. For food availability decline and urban bias, see Lin and Yang.

Death Rate of the Chinese Provinces, 1954–64 (.1%)
Province 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Anhui 11.8 14.25 9.1 12.36 16.72 68.58 8.11 8.51 7.92 8.59
Fujian 8.26 8.43 9.02 7.5 7.95 15.61 12.18 8.28 7.51 8.68
Gansu 11.98 10.78 11.33 21.11 17.38 41.32 11.48 8.25 10.38 15.55
Guangdong 10.7 11.19 8.42 9.15 11.76 15.09 10.67 9.32 11.78 8.32
Guangxi 14.8 12.48 12.42 11.98 17.33 29.2 20.37 10.15 10.34 10.55
Guizhou 16.24 13.01 12.35 15.26 20.28 52.33 23.27 11.64 17.14 20.66
Hebei 11.86 11.26 11.59 10.92 12.31 12.19 13.34 8.97 10.66 10.48
Heilongjiang 11.33 10.08 10.45 9.17 12.76 10.52 11.12 8.62 8.56 11.47
Henan 11.75 14 11.8 12.69 14.1 39.65 10.2 8.04 9.39 10.65
Hubei 11.6 10.81 9.61 9.6 14.49 21.22 9.08 8.77 9.83 10.94
Province 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Hunan 16.41 11.5 10.35 11.58 12.92 29.26 17.48 10.23 10.26 12.88
Inner Mongolia 11.40 7.90 10.50 7.90 11.00 9.40 8.80 9.00 8.50 11.80
Jiangsu 11.65 12.81 10.04 9.33 14.55 18.41 13.35 10.36 9.04 10.13
Jiangxi 16.23 12.49 11.47 11.33 13.01 16.06 11.54 11.00 9.76 10.87
Jilin 9.91 7.53 9.05 9.12 13.43 10.13 11.12 9.96 9.44 12.62
Liaoning 9.40 6.60 9.40 8.80 11.80 11.50 17.50 8.50 7.90 9.30
Ningxia N.A. N.A. N.A. 14.1 15.81 13.88 10.71 8.49 10.22 13.44
Qinghai 13.76 9.34 10.4 12.64 16.29 40.73 11.68 5.35 8.37 15.53
Shaanxi 10.55 9.85 10.31 11.04 12.76 12.27 8.76 9.35 10.55 15.60
Shandong 13.73 12.16 12.05 12.77 18.14 23.51 18.49 12.35 11.78 12.06
Shanxi 12.93 11.6 12.68 11.73 12.84 14.21 12.2 11.34 11.44 13.98
Sichuan 13.26 11.79 11.82 17.37 19.22 47.78 28.01 14.61 12.82 13.87
Yunnan 13.76 15.21 16.29 21.62 17.96 26.26 11.84 10.86 14.14 15.23
Zhejiang 12.58 9.46 9.32 9.15 10.81 11.88 9.84 8.61 7.89 9.21
Source.—State Statistical Bureau, A Compendium of Materials on Population and Census
Statistics, 1949–1985 (Renkou Tongji Ziliao Huibian, 1949–1985) (Beijing: Zhongguo Caizheng
Jingji Chubanshe [China’s Economic and Financial Press], 1988).


Frederick Teiwes and Warren Sun in their 1999 study, China's Road to Disaster: Mao, Central Politicians, and Provincial  Leaders in the Unfolding of the Great Leap Forward
 楼主| 发表于 11/11/2014 02:38:52 | 显示全部楼层
Elizabeth J. Perry,Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution? The China Journal, No. 57 (Jan., 2007), pp. 1-22


Nearly three decades after Mao's death and more than fifteen years after the Tiananmen uprising, China is still a Leninist Party-state(1).

 楼主| 发表于 11/11/2014 03:07:29 | 显示全部楼层
本帖最后由 郭国汀 于 11/11/2014 04:00 编辑

William A. Joseph, A Tragedy of Good Intentions: Post-Mao Views of the Great Leap Forward, Modern China, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Oct., 1986), pp. 419-457

great leap famine and cultural revolution are  identified as times when extreme Leftism dominant Chinese Communist Party and brought the country to  the brink of political and economic ruin. These episodes, often eferred to in such terms as the "two comprehensive Leftist mistakes," the "two grave setbacks," and the "two declines," ' are viewed as sharing many characteristics as expressions of ultrLeftist ideology (Deng Liqun, 1982: 123; Laio Gailong, 1982:211;  Du Wenzhen and Zhang Yongtao, 1979: 1) although highly critical of the mistakes of the Great Leap, is restrained in its description of the movement and speaks only in passing of the "serious losses" incurred between 1959 and 1961 (Resolution, 1981: 29, 32)grain consumption decreased by 22% between 1957 and 1961, pork by 72%, and cotton cloth by 57% (Statistical Yearbook of China, 1985: 477)

The official reckoning of the number of people "persecuted to death" during the CR is put at approximately
35,000 (Joseph 1986.420)while other credible projections of the numbers who perished due to the disorder of 1966-1976 reach as high as one million; in contrast, estimates of the "excess mortality" caused by the Great Leap famine of 1959-1961 range between 15 and 30 million! (A Great Trial in Chinese History, 1981: 21; Goldman, 1983: 116; Shalom, 1984: 46-63, 81-88; Bernstein, 1984: 343; Ashton et al., 1984: 613-45.)

The CCP is the shameless greatest liar in the world.For example, before 1986, China government alleged that during the "great proletarians cultural revolution", persecuted to death 35000 people. However, in fact, millions and 20 millions people lost their life during 1966 and 1967.  The official reckoning of the number of people "persecuted to death" during the CR is put at approximately 35,000 (Joseph 1986.420)
Party historian Liao Gailong has labelled it as the "decade of tortuous advance" .Party History concluded its summary commentary on the GLF by noting that, "We must strictly distinguish mistakes in work guidelines from the valuable revolutionary spirit of the Party and the people and the accomplishments" of the Leap years (Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, 1985: 323).

Deng Xiaoping commented that the CCP's work in the 10 years prior to the Cultural Revolution "should be assessed as generally good; in the main, it proceeded along the right road." "We suffered setbacks and made mistakes during
that period," he admitted, "but the achievements were the main thing. " Deng lauded the prestige of the Party at the time as well as the fine atmosphere and high spirits that pervaded society. In a reference that obviously included the GLF, he observed that "when we met with difficulties, we were able to get through them quite smoothly," thus amplifying the current view that the negative experiences of the Leap do not detract from the overall upbeat assessment of the decade before the CR (Deng Xiaoping, 1984: 288)DENG XIAOPING (1984) "Remarks on successive drafts of the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China."' March 1980-June 1981, in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.

Cultural Revolution decade of 1966- 1976, which is dubbed the "ten years of internal chaos" and has been subjected to a campaign of "thorough negation" (chedi fouding) that denies even the smallest virtue to that era.The GLF and the CR are both regarded as examples of "comprehensive mistakes(423).the "rash advance" during collectivization and the anti-Rightist campaign of 1957 that had much more limited impacts (Tao Kai, 1982: 141; Deng Liqun, 1982: 143)TAO KAI (1982) "Kaishi quanmian jianshe shehui zhuyi de shinian" (The 10 years of  starting to build socialism in all spheres). In Xuexi lishi jueyi zhuanji (Special  Compilation for the Study of the Resolution on [Party] History). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.DENG LIQUN (1982) "Xuexi 'guanyujianguo yilai dangde ruogan lishi wenti dejueyi'de wenti he huida" (Study the questions and answers on the 'Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China'). July 30, 1981, in Dangshi huiyi baogaoji (Compilation of Reports from Meetings on Party History). Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe.

official post-Mao views of the CrLF make a great deal of the various installments of rectification of Leap policies and
especially of Mao's role in leading the adjustments of late 1958- mid 1959 and the early 1960s when he is said to have put forth many important ideas on the objective laws of socialist economic development (Hongqi, 1981: 25; ) Thus the GLF is viewed as a period in which the Party made drastic mistakes but ultimately was able to redeem itself through the established mechanisms of rectification and self-criticis(Joseph,1986:423).

The most common theme in post-Mao analyses of the origins  of the GLF concerns the combination of inexperience and arroganc. rise to the Leftist errors of excessive targets, commandism, and boastfulness during the Leap, the Resolution on Party History explains that This was due to our lack of experience in socialist construction ad
inadequate understanding of the laws of economic development and the basic economic conditions in China.... More important, it was due to the fact that Comrade Mao Zedong and many leading comrades, both at the Center and in the localities, had become smug about their successes, were impatient for quick results, and overestimated the role of man's subjective will and efforts [Resolution, 1981: 28]. Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China (1981), in Resolution on CPC History. Beijing: Foreign  Languages Press.

the errors of the GLF should be regarded as "setbacks occurring in the process of our Party's probing socialism" (Shi Zhongqiang, 1981: 54).SHI ZHONGQIANG(1981) "An example of summing up historical experience." Hongqi 14, in Joint Publications Research Service 78929: 49-62.

Post-Mao analyses are clear and consistent in asserting that those who made mistakes in the Leap were motivated by ideological optimism and patriotic aspirations. Their errors are seen as a product of overexuberance, not malice. At the conclusion of a self-criticism for his part in the GLF, Bo Yibo reflected in 1981 that "the masses excused us for doing wrong things because our intentions were good" (Bo Yibo, 1981: K34)BO YIBO (1981) "Respect and remembrance-marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the CCP." Hongqi 13, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, July 29, 1981: K26-36.

praises the "noble and heroic spirit of daring," as well as the "enthusiasm and creativeness" of the masses during the Leap. Although acknowledging that during the GLF many people in the area "indulged in the wildest fantasies, thus causing incalculable losses and waste," the report also comments that those were times when "people dared to think and dared to act and achieved a lot of marvelous results" (Mu Qing et al., 1982: 41). MU QING et al. (1982) "A corner of the Chinese countryside." Hongqi 4, in Joint Publications Research Service 80713: 39-50.


This distinction is what sets Mao's ultra-Leftist errors apart from the criminal acts of Lin and the Gang; but it is also part of what distinguishes the more forgiving attitude toward the GLF from the total denunciation of the CR.




 楼主| 发表于 11/11/2014 14:31:19 | 显示全部楼层
Stanley Karnow, Mao and China: Inside China's Cultural Revolution, Penguin Books 1972.pp.92-109


The great leap famine during 1958-1961, widespread famine, which had so oftern afflicted Chian in the past, when the death toll during lean years ran into the millions, did not occur(104).However, 70000 people were reported to have died of starvation in Kansu province.
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